Opinion
2:21-cv-01062-JAD-EJY
07-12-2022
Jonathan Lee Smith, Plaintiff v. Clark County District Attorney Family Division; Inskeep, Defendants
ORDER ADOPTING REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION AND DISMISSING CASE
[ECF NO. 7]
Jennifer A. Dorsey, U.S. District Judge
Pro se plaintiff Jonathan Lee Smith brings this civil-rights lawsuit against the Clark County District Attorney and one of its Child Support Enforcement employees, alleging that they violated his due-process rights by extracting past-due child-support obligations from his prison account. Because Smith applies to proceed in forma pauperis, the magistrate judge screened his complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). And because the targets of this complaint are immune from this suit under the law, the magistrate judge recommends that I dismiss this action and close this case. Smith objects to that recommendation.
ECF No. 1-1.
ECF No. 7 (report and recommendation).
ECF No. 8 (objections to report and recommendation).
Unfortunately, Smith's objections do not overcome the reason that this case must be dismissed. As the Nevada Supreme Court recognized in County of Washoe, on relation of its Office of the District Attorney, Nonsupport Division v. Second Judicial District Court, a district attorney is immune from damages for actions related to the performance of civil obligations related to child-support enforcement. And the Ninth Circuit has recognized that enforcement of child-support orders by a district attorney is an integral part of the judicial process that warrants prosecutorial immunity. That immunity “is essential if prosecutors are to be able independently to perform their public duties free from fear that their actions might give rise to civil liability.”And “a prosecutor's post-adjudication activities also enjoy absolute immunity.” So the law immunizes the defendants here from Smith's suit.
County of Washoe v. Second Jud. Dist. Ct., 652 P.2d 1175, 1176 (Nev. 1982).
See, e.g., Meyers v. Contra Costa County Dept. of Soc. Servs., 812 F.2d 1154, 1156-59 (9th Cir. 1987).
Coverdell v. Dept. of Soc. & Health Svcs., 834 F.2d 758, 762 (9th Cir. 1987).
Cash v. Los Angeles County Dist. Atty., 50 F.3d 13, *1 (9th Cir. 1995) (unpublished); see also Demery v. Kupperman, 735 F.2d 1139, 1144 (9th Cir. 1984).
Smith argues that he isn't suing for monetary damages-he's couched his claim as one “for a reparitive [sic] injunction”-so that immunity does not apply. But characterizing his claim this way doesn't make it a true equitable-relief claim. Smith's complaint makes it clear that he is seeking “the return of . . . funds” collected from his account, “with interest.” That's money damages, not equitable relief. Plus, the request for relief in his complaint does not mention an injunction or any other type of equitable relief. So the true nature of Smith's suit is monetary damages, and the defendants are immune from it.
ECF No. 8 at 2.
ECF No. 1-1 at 6.
Id. at 15.
Smith cites to the Fifth Circuit's decision in LeClerk v. Webb, 419 F.3d 405 (2005), for the proposition that a judge, acting in an enforcement role, is not immune from suit. But the LeClerk court held that this was true only for equitable-relief clams, not monetary-damages suits, so LeClerk does not support Smith's objection here. See LeClerk, 419 F.3d at 414 (“When acting in its enforcement capacity, the Louisiana Supreme Court, and its members, are not immune from suits for declaratory or injunctive relief.”) (emphasis added).
Smith also “finds it strange that the magistrate did not elaborate on the issue of due[-] process violations or the fact the D.A.'s office intentionally violated federal regulations that resulted in the violation of [his] due process” so “this is not a suit solely based on a D.A. enforcing a child[-]support order.” And he objects that, here, the district attorney “was not carrying out a state order”-the order wasn't even in his name. But these are distinctions without a difference for immunity purposes. As the Ninth Circuit has held, prosecutors are absolutely immune from all theories of claims based on quasi-judicial activities taken within the scope of their authority, even when “grave procedural errors” are made.
ECF No. 8 at 1.
Ashelman v. Pope, 793 F.2d 1072, 1077-78 (9th Cir. 1986).
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Smith's objections [ECF No. 8] are OVERRULED and the Report and Recommendation [ECF No. 7] is ADOPTED. This action is DISMISSED with prejudice. The Clerk of Court is directed to ENTER JUDGMENT accordingly and CLOSE THIS CASE. In forma pauperis status should not continue on appeal.