Opinion
No. 8:00CV509
October 1, 2001
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
This matter is before the court on defendants' motions to dismiss, Filing No. 8, and for summary judgment, Filing No. 12.
I. BACKGROUND
This is an action for deprivation of civil rights under color of law under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Shannon Smith alleges he was arrested without probable cause and detained for four days by Omaha police. He further alleges that the arrest was made pursuant to information that officers knew, or should have known, was false and that he suffered humiliation and public ridicule as a result.
In its motion to dismiss, defendant City of Omaha ("City") asserts that Smith has failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted because he has not alleged that the officer's actions were pursuant to a custom or practice of the City. Defendant Police Department asserts that it is not a proper defendant in that it is not an entity that is subject to suit, but merely an arm of the City. Defendant Officer McCowen asserts that Smith has failed to state a claim and alternatively asserts that he is entitled to summary judgment by reason of qualified immunity. In support of his motion for summary judgment, Officer McCowen has submitted an affidavit that shows that Shannon Smith was identified by Mark E. Anderson as an accessory to a shooting that occurred on September 13, 1999, in Omaha, Nebraska. Officer McCowen believed the information to be correct and Anderson's statement corroborated facts not made to the public. The information was presented to a Douglas County Court judge and an arrest warrant was issued. Smith has not responded to the motions.
II. DISCUSSION
A. The City's Motion to Dismiss
In considering a motion to dismiss under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), this court accepts the factual allegations contained in the complaint as true and construes them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff Parnes v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 122 F.3d 539, 545-546 (8th Cir. 1997). A complaint should not be dismissed unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim that would demonstrate an entitlement to relief Id. Although, there is no heightened standard of specificity in cases alleging municipal liability under section 1983, a complaint must, at a minimum, contain facts sufficient to state a claim as a matter of law and must not be merely conclusory in its allegations. Springdale Educ. Ass'n v. Springdale Sch. Dist, 133 F.3d 649, 651 (8th Cir. 1998).
To state a claim under section 1983, a plaintiff must set forth facts that allege an action performed under color of state law that resulted in a constitutional injury. Id. A local government, however, cannot be held liable under section 1983 for an injury inflicted solely by its employees or agents on a theory of respondent superior. Id.; see Monell v. Department of Social Servs. of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978). Rather, a plaintiff seeking to impose such liability is required to identify either an official municipal policy or a widespread custom or practice that caused the plaintiffs injury. Springdale Educ. Ass'n., 133 F.3d at 651. The identification of an official policy as a basis upon which to impose liability ensures that a municipality is held liable only for constitutional deprivations that result from the decisions of its duly constituted legislative body or of those officials whose acts may fairly be said to be those of the municipality. Id. Similarly, actions performed pursuant to a municipal "custom," although not formally approved by an authorized decision-maker, may fairly subject a municipality to liability on the theory that the relevant practice is so widespread as to have the force of law. Id. Smith's complaint, read liberally, fails to allege that any constitutional injury was the result of an official policy or widespread custom of the City. Instead, every alleged action is attributed specifically to Officer McCowen. The City itself is mentioned only once in the complaint, by way of a summary accusation that it violated Smith's rights. The complaint is thus insufficient, on its face, to state a claim against the City. See id.
B. Officer McCowen's Motion for Summary Judgment
Qualified immunity shields governmental officials from personal liability if their actions, even if unlawful, were "nevertheless objectively reasonable in light of the clearly established law at the time of the events in question." Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 638-39 (1987). The inquiry in determining whether the officers are entitled to qualified immunity focuses on whether the appellants have asserted a violation of a clearly established constitutional right and, if so, whether there are genuine issues of material fact as to whether a reasonable official would have known that the alleged action indeed violated that right. Turpin v. the County of Rock, 2001 WL 940435, *2 (8th Cir. Aug. 21, 2001). A court required to rule upon the qualified immunity issue "must consider this threshold question: Taken in the light most favorable to the party asserting the injury, do the facts alleged show the officer's conduct violated a constitutional right? This must be the initial inquiry." Saucier v. Katz, 121 S.Ct. 2151, 2155 (2001). If no constitutional right would have been violated were the allegations established, there is no necessity for further inquiries concerning qualified immunity. Id. The second inquiry, whether the right was clearly established at the time, must be undertaken in light of the specific context of the case, not as a broad general proposition; and it too serves to advance understanding of the law and to allow officers to avoid the burden of trial if qualified immunity is applicable. Id. (noting "[t]he relevant, dispositive inquiry in determining whether a right is clearly established is whether it would be clear to a reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in the situation he confronted.").
The Fourth Amendment requires that an officer have probable cause for an arrest. U.S. Const. amend. IV. The arresting officer is entitled to qualified immunity, however, if the arrest was objectively reasonable — if a reasonable officer could have believed probable cause existed for the arrest. Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 228 (1991). Probable cause existed in the present case if, at the moment Officer McCowen arrested Smith, the facts and circumstances within McCowen's knowledge and of which he had reasonably trustworthy information, were sufficient to warrant a prudent person in believing Smith had been involved in the shooting. See id. Even assuming, arguendo, that Officer McCowen and the County Court judge erred in concluding that probable cause existed to arrest Smith, Officer McCowen nevertheless would be entitled to qualified immunity because his decision was reasonable, even if mistaken. Id. The qualified immunity standard gives ample room for mistaken judgments by protecting all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law. Id. Only where the warrant application is so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render official belief in its existence unreasonable will the shield of immunity be lost. Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 344 (1986).
In the present case, there are no allegations that the affidavit for the arrest warrant contained materially false statements or omissions knowingly or recklessly made in conscious disregard for the truth which would violate the Fourth Amendment. See Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 171-72 (1978). Officer McCowen's affidavit establishes that he believed the supposed witness's statement to be true and that the information was corroborated. In the absence of evidence to the contrary, the court finds the arrest was based on probable cause. Turpin, 2001 WL 940435 at *3 (partially corroborated facts sufficient for probable cause). Accordingly, plaintiff has not shown the violation of any clearly established constitutional right and Officer McCowen is entitled to qualified immunity.
If Smith's complaint against the City were not subject to dismissal for failure to state a claim, the court would alternatively find the City likewise entitled to summary judgment. See Abbott v. City of Crocker, 30 F.3d 994, 998 (8th Cir. 1994) (municipality cannot be liable unless officer is found liable on underlying substantive claim).
C. The Police Department's Motion to Dismiss
The court need not reach the issue of whether the Police Department is an entity subject to suit. Even if it were, Smith's allegations regarding the Police Department are subject to dismissal for the same reasons that his allegations against the City and the individual officer are subject to dismissal. See Abbott v. City of Crocker, 30 F.3d 994, 998 (8th Cir. 1994) (municipality cannot be liable unless officer is found liable on underlying substantive claim).
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated, the motion to dismiss of the defendants City of Omaha and the Omaha Police Department will be granted and Officer McCowen's motion for summary judgment will be granted. An order in conformity with this Memorandum will issue this date.
JUDGMENT
Pursuant to the Memorandum and Order entered this date, judgment is entered in favor of the defendants and against the plaintiff.
DATED this 1st day of October, 2001.