Opinion
D081646
05-06-2024
CAREY SMITH et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. CITY OF ENCINITAS, Defendant and Respondent; CARDIFF TOWNE CENTER, LLC, Real Party in Interest and Respondent.
Law Offices of Darren J. Quinn and Darren J. Quinn for Plaintiffs and Appellants. Jones Mayer and Krista M. Jee for Defendant and Respondent City of Encinitas. Gordon &Rees, Charles V. Berwanger and Andrew Harris for Real Party in Interest and Respondent Cardiff Towne Center, LLC.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County No. 37-2021-00017488-CU-WM-NC, Robert P. Dahlquist, Judge. Affirmed.
Law Offices of Darren J. Quinn and Darren J. Quinn for Plaintiffs and Appellants.
Jones Mayer and Krista M. Jee for Defendant and Respondent City of Encinitas.
Gordon &Rees, Charles V. Berwanger and Andrew Harris for Real Party in Interest and Respondent Cardiff Towne Center, LLC.
IRION, J.
Carey Smith, Carol Ray-Malone, and Darren Quinn appeal the judgment against them in their action to stop a development project proposed by Cardiff Towne Center, LLC (CTC) and approved by the City of Encinitas (the City). Appellants contend the trial court erroneously ruled their challenge to the City's approval of the tentative map and the design review permit for the project was untimely and their count against CTC for unfair competition failed to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. We affirm.
I.
BACKGROUND
In the fall of 2020, CTC applied to the City for a tentative map, a design review permit, a coastal development permit, and a sign program for the construction of two new two-story retail/office buildings in Cardiff-by-the-Sea. The City's planning commission conducted two noticed public hearings on the application and approved it with conditions on November 5, 2020.
Quinn, who owns or resides at property adjacent to the proposed project site, appealed the commission's decision to the city council. The council conducted a noticed public hearing on the appeal on January 20, 2021, at which it determined the proposed project was consistent with the City's general plan for land use and development, the specific plan for Cardiff-by-the-Sea, and other local land use and development requirements. The city council upheld the planning commission's decision by adoption of a written resolution the same day. At the end, the resolution stated, "NOTE: This action is subject to Chapter 1.04 of the Municipal Code, which specifies time limits for legal challenges."
On April 20, 2021, appellants filed a verified petition/complaint against the City and CTC seeking a writ commanding the City to set aside its resolution approving the tentative map and design review permit and an injunction prohibiting the City from issuing any permits or approvals for the proposed project and prohibiting CTC from proceeding with it. No summons was issued until August 25, 2021. The City was served with the verified petition/complaint on August 31, 2021. Appellants later filed an amended verified petition/complaint. After the trial court sustained in part demurrers with leave to amend, appellants filed the operative pleading, the verified second amended petition/complaint, on April 19, 2022.
In their operative pleading, appellants alleged three irregularities in the January 20, 2021 hearing at which the city council denied Quinn's appeal and adopted the resolution approving CTC's proposed project: (1) no councilmember for the district in which the proposed project is located participated, because the seat for that district was vacant and the city council refused to continue the matter until the seat was filled; (2) the mayor discussed the proposed project with a principal of CTC outside the hearing; and (3) the city council refused to address residents' objections that the proposed project was inconsistent with the specific plan for Cardiff-by-the-Sea. Appellants alleged the proposed project was inconsistent with the specific plan because: (1) the new buildings would be higher than the buildings to be torn down and adjacent buildings; (2) the tentative map would consolidate 12 existing lots into four new ones and thereby artificially lower the project lot coverage and floor area ratios; and (3) additional parking spaces in an alley behind the new buildings and construction of a wall would dangerously narrow the alley.
Appellants asserted three separately labeled causes of action. In the first cause of action, asserted against only the City, appellants sought a writ of administrative mandate to set aside as invalid the city council's adoption of the resolution approving issuance of the tentative map and design review permit, on the grounds that the council exceeded its jurisdiction, did not conduct a fair trial, and abused its discretion by refusing to consider the inconsistencies between CTC's proposed project and the City's specific plan for Cardiff-by-the-Sea that were identified by residents at the hearing. In the second cause of action, asserted against both the City and CTC, appellants sought a declaratory judgment on the propriety of various aspects of the city council's approval of the tentative map and design review permit for the proposed project. In the third cause of action, asserted against only CTC, appellants sought an injunction prohibiting CTC from proceeding with the proposed project, on the ground that it would violate the City's specific plan for Cardiff-by-the-Sea and thus would constitute an unlawful business act or practice under the unfair competition law (UCL; Bus. &Prof. Code, § 17200 et seq.).
CTC demurred to the verified second amended petition/complaint. The trial court overruled the demurrer to the first and second causes of action, and sustained it without leave to amend as to the third. As to the third cause of action, the court ruled: "Where, as here, the City has approved the subject project, and that approval has not been found to be unlawful, the Court is not persuaded that [appellants] have stated a cognizable claim for an unlawful business practice against the developer for purs[u]ing the approved project." The City moved for summary judgment on the ground the two causes of action asserted against it were time-barred. Specifically, the City contended appellants' claims for a writ of administrative mandate and a declaratory judgment were untimely because the claims challenged the City's approval of the tentative map and design review permit for CTC's proposed project, such challenges must be commenced and served within 90 days of the approval (Gov. Code, §§ 65009, subd. (c)(1), 66499.37), and appellants did not serve the City until after the 90-day period had expired. CTC joined in the City's motion.
Government Code section 65009, subdivision (c)(1) provides that "no action or proceeding shall be maintained in any of the following cases by any person unless the action or proceeding is commenced and service is made on the legislative body within 90 days after the legislative body's decision." The "following cases" include those "[t]o attack, review, set aside, void, or annul any decision on the matters listed in Sections 65901 and 65903 ...." (Id., § 65009, subd. (c)(1)(E).) The "matters listed" in those sections include decisions by the board of zoning adjustment, zoning administrator, or board of appeals on "applications for conditional uses or other permits" and on matters requiring the "exercise [of] any other powers granted by local ordinance." (Id., §§ 65901, subd. (a), 65903.) In a city that has no board of zoning adjustment or zoning administrator, "the planning commission shall exercise all of the functions and duties of said board or said administrator." (Id., § 65902.) In a city that has no board of appeals, "the local legislative body shall exercise all of the functions and duties of the board of appeals." (Id., § 65904.) The City charged its planning commission with deciding applications for tentative maps and design review permits. (Encinitas Mun. Code, §§ 2.34.010, 2.34.040, subd. B.3, 23.08.040, subd. B.) The commission's decisions may be appealed to the city council, whose decision is the final action of the City. (Id., §§ 2.34.060, 1.12.010-1.12.040.) We grant the City's unopposed request to take judicial notice of Chapter 2.34 of its Municipal Code, which concerns the Planning Commission's duties. (Evid. Code, §§ 452, subds. (b), (c), 459, subd. (a); The Kennedy Com. v. City of Huntington Beach (2017) 16 Cal.App.5th 841, 852.) Government Code section 66499.37 provides that "[a]ny action or proceeding to attack, review, set aside, void, or annul . . . the approval of a tentative map or final map[ ] shall not be maintained by any person unless the action or proceeding is commenced and service of summons effected within 90 days after the date of the decision."
Appellants opposed the motion. They argued the applicable limitations period was 90 days after the City's decision became final, and the period had not commenced because the City never mailed them the notice of decision that was required for finality. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 1094.6, subd. (b).)
Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.6 applies to a petition for writ of mandate seeking "[j]udicial review of any decision of a local agency, other than school district." (Id., subd. (a).) "Any such petition shall be filed not later than the 90th day following the date on which the decision becomes final." (Id., subd. (b).) "If there is a provision for a written decision or written findings, the decision is final for purposes of this section upon the date it is mailed by first-class mail, postage prepaid, including a copy of the affidavit or certificate of mailing, to the party seeking the writ." (Ibid.) "As used in this section, decision means a decision subject to review pursuant to Section 1094.5, suspending, demoting, or dismissing an officer or employee, revoking [or] denying an application for a permit, license, or other entitlement, imposing a civil or administrative penalty, fine, charge, or cost, or denying an application for any retirement benefit or allowance." (Id., § 1094.6, subd. (e).)
The trial court held a hearing and granted the summary judgment motion on the ground appellants' action was untimely under Government Code section 65009, subdivision (c)(1). Based on that ruling and its earlier ruling on CTC's demurrer, the court entered judgment against appellants and in favor of the City and CTC.
II.
DISCUSSION
Appellants contend the trial court erred by granting the City's motion for summary judgment. They argue the City in its Municipal Code adopted Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.6, subdivision (b) as the statute of limitations for actions like theirs, and the limitations period has not started to run because the City's failure to mail them the decision they are challenging has prevented it from achieving the finality required to trigger the statute. Appellants alternatively argue that even if the limitations period commenced when the City adopted the resolution approving CTC's proposed project, their action is timely because they filed it within 90 days of adoption of the resolution and did not also have to serve the City within that period. Appellants also contend the trial court erred by sustaining without leave to amend CTC's demurrer to their UCL count. They argue they sufficiently stated a cause of action because their allegations that CTC's proposed project violates the specific plan for Cardiff-by-the-Sea show that proceeding with the project would constitute an unlawful business act or practice within the meaning of the UCL that a court may enjoin. Appellants ask us to reverse the judgment. For reasons set forth below, we reject appellants' claims of error and affirm the judgment.
A. Summary Judgment Ruling
We start with appellants' challenge to the trial court's order granting the City's motion for summary judgment. A defendant is entitled to summary judgment on the basis of the statute of limitations if undisputed facts show the action was not commenced within the statutorily prescribed period. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subds. (c), (o)(2); City of San Diego v. U.S. Gypsum Co. (1994) 30 Cal.App.4th 575, 582.) The pertinent dates are not in dispute: the City adopted the resolution approving the tentative map and design review permit for CTC's proposed project on January 20, 2021; appellants filed the action challenging that approval on April 20, 2021; and they served the summons and initial pleading on the City on August 31, 2021. What is in dispute is which statute prescribes the applicable limitations period. Which statute applies and whether on the undisputed facts the applicable statute bars appellants' claims are questions of law we decide de novo. (Robin v. Crowell (2020) 55 Cal.App.5th 727, 739; Citizens for Beach Rights v. City of San Diego (2017) 17 Cal.App.5th 230, 237-238 (Citizens for Beach Rights).)
Government Code section 65009, subdivision (c)(1) applies to appellants' causes of action seeking a writ of administrative mandate and a declaratory judgment. That statute applies to an action or proceeding "[t]o attack, review, set aside, void or annul any decision on the matters listed in Sections 65901 and 65903." (Id., § 65009, subd. (c)(1)(E).) As we noted earlier, such matters include decisions by the City's planning commission on applications for permits or tentative maps and decisions by the city council on appeals of commission decisions. (See fn. 1, ante; Travis v. County of Santa Cruz (2004) 33 Cal.4th 757, 766, fn. 2 (Travis) [Gov. Code, §§ 65901 &65903 "provide for hearing and decision on, and administrative appeals concerning, applications for variances, conditional use permits, and other permits"].) In their causes of action against the City, appellants alleged the City's approval of the tentative map and design review permit for CTC's proposed project was "invalid," and they sought a judgment declaring the tentative map and design review permit inconsistent with the specific plan for Cardiff-by-the-Sea and a writ commanding the City to "set aside its resolution approving the [t]entative [m]ap and the [d]esign [r]eview [p]ermit." Appellants' claims against the City thus seek "[t]o attack, review, set aside, void or annul any decision" within the meaning of Government Code section 65009, subdivision (c)(1)(E).
Such claims had to be "commenced and service . . . made on the legislative body within 90 days after the legislative body's decision." (Gov. Code, § 65009, subd. (c)(1), italics added.) The undisputed evidence shows service was untimely. The city council made its decision on January 20, 2021. Ninety days later was April 20, 2021. Although appellants filed their action on that date, they did not serve the City until August 31, 2021. "Upon the expiration of the time limits provided for in this section, all persons are barred from any further action or proceeding." (Id., subd. (e); see Royalty Carpet Mills, Inc. v. City of Irvine (2005) 125 Cal.App.4th 1110, 1125 [Gov. Code, § 65009 "requires dismissal of any proceeding that is not filed and served by an absolute time limit"].) The trial court therefore correctly granted the City's motion for summary judgment.
Appellants contend their claims against the City are not within the scope of Government Code section 65009, subdivision (c)(1)(E) for several reasons. As we explain below, none is persuasive.
Appellants argue only decisions by a "board of zoning adjustment," "zoning administrator," or "board of appeals" fall under Government Code section 65009, subdivision (c)(1)(E), and they are challenging the decision of the city council to approve CTC's proposed project. As we noted earlier, however, the City does not have a "board of zoning adjustment," "zoning administrator," or "board of appeals"; it instead tasks its planning commission with making initial decisions on tentative map and design review permit applications and its city council with deciding appeals of commission decisions. (See fn. 1, ante.) Such an assignment of tasks is permissible. (Gov. Code, §§ 65902, 65904.) In performing those tasks, the planning commission and the city council were "functionally acting" in the capacities of a board of zoning adjustment and a board of appeals, respectively. (Weiss v. City of Del Mar (2019) 39 Cal.App.5th 609, 621 (Weiss).) Appellants' attack on the city council's denial of the appeal of the planning commission's decision therefore falls within the scope of Government Code section 65009, subdivision (c)(1)(E).
Appellants contend that interpreting the statute as we have requires us to" 'indulge in a strained construction'" and frustrates the" 'strong public policy that litigation be disposed of on the merits wherever possible.' " (Steketee v. Lintz, Williams &Rothberg (1985) 38 Cal.3d 46, 56-57.) We disagree. The plain language of the pertinent provisions of the Government Code and the City's Municipal Code makes clear the 90-day filing and service requirements of Government Code section 65009, subdivision (c)(1)(E) apply to appellants' claims against the City. The short limitations period is intended "to provide certainty for property owners and local governments regarding decisions" on land use and development and to alleviate the "chilling effect" potential legal challenges to those decisions may have "on the confidence with which property owners and local governments can proceed with projects." (Id., subd. (a)(2), (3); see Travis, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 765.) We must give effect to that specific legislative intent, even if doing so prevents the decision of a case on its merits.
Appellants next contend the City's failure to notify them that Government Code section 65009, subdivision (c)(1)(E) applied to their claims made it "unreasonable and unconstitutionally vague to dismiss [their] action on statute of limitations grounds." They complain that without such notice, they would have had to "analyze[ ] tens of thousands of provisions contained in [the] Government Code" and "hundreds of Encinitas Municipal Code sections to anticipate the City's argument" that the statute applied. We reject this contention as unsupported by citation to authority imposing any such notice duty on the City. (See Honig v. San Francisco Planning Dept. (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 520, 531 (Honig) [rejecting appellant's claim "the board of appeals was required to notify her of the actual statutory provisions controlling the limitations period for her petition challenging its building permit decision" when she provided no authority for the claim].)
Moreover, a plaintiff ordinarily must timely assert her own rights and cannot reasonably rely on a defendant to help her to do so. The policy of statutes of limitations is "to require plaintiffs to diligently pursue their claims." (Jolly v. Eli Lilly &Co. (1988) 44 Cal.3d 1103, 1112; see Tanguilig v. Neiman Marcus Group, Inc. (2018) 22 Cal.App.5th 313, 322 [plaintiff has "affirmative obligation to do what is necessary to move the action forward to trial in timely fashion"].) The plaintiff has a "specific duty to keep track of the calendar and the pertinent dates which are crucial to maintenance of [the] lawsuit." (Minkin v. Levander (1986) 186 Cal.App.3d 64, 69.) The "defendant need make no move until the law requires him to do so 'in response to the movements of plaintiff at the various stages of the litigation.'" (Bonelli v. Chandler (1958) 165 Cal.App.2d 267, 275.) A need to consider several statutes of limitations to determine which one applies does not relieve the plaintiff of the obligation to do so or authorize her to shift that obligation to the defendant.
Nor does the complexity of that task make the statute of limitations unconstitutionally vague. A statute is unconstitutional if it" 'forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that [people] of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application.'" (First Student Cases (2018) 5 Cal.5th 1026, 1034.) Stating that a party attacking a local legislative body's decision on a permit application or on a matter involving the exercise of a power granted by local ordinance must file its action and serve the legislative body within 90 days of its decision (Gov. Code, § 65009, subd. (c)(1)(E)) is "sufficiently clear to indicate" what is required that it is not void for vagueness (First Student Cases, at p. 1034).
Appellants assert their claim for declaratory relief is not subject to the limitations period of Government Code section 65009, subdivision (c)(1)(E) because the claim requires construction of provisions of the specific plan for Cardiff-by-the-Sea and the City's Municipal Code. They cite no authority supporting this assertion, and we reject it. In their declaratory relief count, appellants sought an order adjudicating that the tentative map and design review permit were inconsistent with certain provisions of the specific plan and its spirit and intent; the city council failed to consider those inconsistencies; and the council's hearing on the appeal was unfair because a council seat was vacant and the mayor had spoken to a principal of CTC about its proposed project outside the hearing. Since appellants' claim sought "[t]o attack, review, set aside, void, or annul" the city council's decision, it was subject to the 90-day period for filing and service. (Ibid.; see Citizens for Beach Rights, supra, 17 Cal.App.5th at pp. 235, 239 [holding Gov. Code, § 65009, subd. (c)(1)(E) applied to declaratory relief claim regarding city's decision to issue building permit].)
Appellants argue their UCL claim is subject to its own four-year limitations period (Bus. &Prof. Code, § 17208), not to the 90-day period of Government Code section 65009, subdivision (c)(1)(E). The UCL claim, however, was not at issue on the City's motion for summary judgment. That claim was asserted only against CTC and had been disposed of previously by demurrer. Whether the 90-day limitations period applied to the UCL claim was thus irrelevant to resolution of the summary judgment motion.
Appellants contend Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.6 sets forth the limitations period applicable to their claims against the City because it adopted that period in section 1.04.040 of its municipal code and referenced chapter 1.04 in its resolution approving the tentative map and design review permit for CTC's proposed project. Under Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.6, a petition for writ of mandate seeking judicial review of a local agency's decision "shall be filed not later than the 90th day following the date on which the decision becomes final.... If there is a provision for a written decision or written findings, the decision is final for purposes of this section upon the date it is mailed by first-class mail, postage prepaid, including a copy of the affidavit or certificate of mailing, to the party seeking the writ." (Id., subds. (a), (b).) Appellants argue that limitations period never started to run, because a written resolution by the city council was required on its decision to approve CTC's application for a design review permit (Encinitas Mun. Code, § 23.08.070, subd. A) and the City did not mail them a copy of the resolution. Appellants alternatively argue that even if the period commenced when the City adopted the resolution, their action against the City is not barred because they filed it within 90 days of the date of adoption of the resolution and did not also have to serve the City within that period. We are not persuaded.
Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.6 by its own terms does not apply to appellants' action. "As used in this section, decision means a decision subject to review pursuant to Section 1094.5, suspending, demoting, or dismissing an officer or employee, revoking [or] denying an application for a permit, license, or other entitlement, imposing a civil or administrative penalty, fine, charge, or cost, or denying an application for any retirement benefit or allowance." (Id., subd. (e), italics added.) "[T]he City's decision approving [CTC's] permit does not come within the definition of 'decision' in section 1094.6, subdivision (e), which, as to permits, applies to only the revocation or denial of a permit." (Simonelli v. City of Carmel-by-the-Sea (2015) 240 Cal.App.4th 480, 486, italics added.)
The City's adoption of provisions of Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.6 does not make them applicable to appellants' action. Section 1.04.040 of the City's Municipal Code states: "Pursuant to Section 1094.5 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the provisions of Section 1094.6 of the Code of Civil Procedure are hereby made applicable to persons seeking judicial review of a decision of [the City]." Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.6 "addresses only a filing deadline, and is 'silent about the time within which . . . a filed petition must be served.'" (Weiss, supra, 39 Cal.App.5th at pp. 624-625.) "Moreover, local ordinances are preempted if they purport to provide greater limitations periods than a state statute. [Citation.] As other courts have held, Government Code section 65009 provides the applicable deadline for service, even when Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.6 also applies." (Weiss, at p. 625; see Okasaki v. City of Elk Grove (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 1043, 1049 [holding Gov. Code, § 65009 rather than Code Civ. Proc., § 1094.6 applied to challenge to city's variance decision on ground that "a specific statute controls over a more general statute"].)
Nor does the reference to chapter 1.04 of the City's Municipal Code in its resolution approving the tentative map and design review permit for CTC's proposed project make Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.6 applicable to appellants' action. The resolution "did not indicate that timely filing of [their] petition would be sufficient to obtain judicial review, did not purport to address the requirements for serving the petition, and did not state that failure to comply with any service requirements would be excused. Moreover, subdivision (g) of Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.6 (the limitations statute referenced in the [Municipal Code chapter cited in the resolution]) cautions that section 1094.6 'shall prevail over any conflicting provision in any otherwise applicable law relating to the subject matter, unless the conflicting provision is a state or federal law which provides a shorter statute of limitations, in which case the shorter statute of limitations shall apply.' This subdivision was sufficient to put appellant[s] on notice that a conflicting, shorter limitations provision relating to the subject matter might exist." (Honig, supra, 127 Cal.App.4th at pp. 530-531.) Government Code section 65009, subdivision (c)(1)(E), which requires an action challenging a city's decision on a permit application or on a matter on which the city exercised authority granted by a local ordinance be filed and served within 90 days of the date of the decision, prescribes a limitations period shorter than that of Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.6, subdivision (b), which requires the action be filed within 90 days of the date of finality of the decision but sets no service deadline. Therefore, even if the City's resolution constituted a "decision" within the meaning of Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.6, under subdivision (g) of that statute the shorter limitations period of Government Code section 65009, subdivision (c)(1)(E) would apply to appellants' claims challenging the resolution.
B. Demurrer Ruling
We next consider appellants' challenge to the trial court's order sustaining without leave to amend CTC's demurrer to the count for violation of the UCL. The court ruled appellants had not stated facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action, because CTC did nothing unlawful by pursuing a proposed project the City had approved when "that approval has not been found to be unlawful." We review that ruling de novo and may affirm on any ground supported by the record. (Allen v. San Diego Convention Center Corp., Inc. (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 589, 597; Doe v. Roman Catholic Archbishop of Los Angeles (2016) 247 Cal.App.4th 953, 960.)
The UCL authorizes a private party who has lost money or property as a result of an unlawful business act or practice to sue the person committing the act or practice for injunctive relief. (Bus. &Prof. Code, §§ 17200, 17203, 17204.) A business act or practice is" 'unlawful'" if it is "forbidden by law, be it civil or criminal, federal, state, or municipal, statutory, regulatory, or court-made." (Saunders v. Superior Court (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 832, 838839.) "To state a cause of action based on an unlawful business act or practice under the UCL, a plaintiff must allege facts sufficient to show a violation of some underlying law." (Prakashpalan v. Engstrom, Lipscomb &Lack (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 1105, 1133.) In their UCL count, appellants alleged CTC "propose[d] to engage in an unlawful business act or practice by initiating construction of the Project that violates Cardiff Specific Plan provisions," which they alleged would negatively impact the values of properties they owned or resided in, and they sought an injunction against construction.
Appellants are barred from pursuing that claim under principles of collateral estoppel. In the resolution denying Quinn's appeal of the decision of the City's planning commission to approve the tentative map and design review permit for CTC's proposed project, the city council determined "[t]he project is consistent with the . . . Cardiff-by-the-Sea Specific Plan." Because appellants did not file and serve their pleading challenging that determination within 90 days of the date of the resolution, it is final and not subject to collateral attack. (Gov. Code, § 65009, subds. (c)(1)(E), (e); see Johnson v. City of Loma Linda (2000) 24 Cal.4th 61, 69-70 ["unless a party to a quasi-judicial proceeding challenges the agency's adverse findings made in that proceeding, by means of a mandate action in superior court, those findings are binding in later civil actions"]; Briggs v. City of Rolling Hills Estates (1995) 40 Cal.App.4th 637, 648 [city council decision involving application of general standard in ordinance to specific property was "quasi-adjudicatory"].) The finality of the City's determination estops appellants from pursuing their UCL claim, because success on that claim would require a determination contrary to the final and binding determination of the city council. (See Briggs, at pp. 644-648 [property owners who did not timely seek writ of administrative mandate to set aside condition for final zone clearance imposed by city planning commission and affirmed on appeal to city council were precluded from challenging condition by action for damages and injunctive relief]; City of Santee v. Superior Court (1991) 228 Cal.App.3d 713, 719 [because validity of permit condition was at issue in prior administrative proceeding, builder's failure to contest validity via administrative mandate proceeding "estops it now from relitigating the same issue"]; see also Roberson v. City of Rialto (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 1499, 1511-1512 [final determination of issue against party who asserted interest in prior proceeding binds party and those with same interest in subsequent proceeding raising same issue].) Hence, the trial court properly sustained CTC's demurrer to appellants' UCL count without leave to amend. (See Miller v. City of Los Angeles (2008) 169 Cal.App.4th 1373, 1382-1383 [demurrer properly sustained without leave to amend when action precluded by finding in prior final administrative decision].)
We obtained supplemental briefs from the parties on the collateral estoppel issue. (See Gov. Code, § 68081.)
Neither of the two cases appellants cite for the proposition that violations of the Cardiff-by-the-Sea specific plan can form the basis of a UCL claim requires reversal of the trial court's demurrer ruling. In one case, the trial court found the defendant had violated several conditions of a county-issued use permit, and the Court of Appeal held the violation was "also a violation of the zoning law, and [was] therefore unlawful" under the UCL. (Hewlett v. Squaw Valley Ski Corp. (1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 499, 532.) No such violation was found in this case. To the contrary, the City found CTC's proposed project to be consistent with the Cardiff-by-the-Sea specific plan and other land use regulations. As we have explained, that finding is final and binding on appellants and defeats their UCL claim.
In the other case appellants cite, the defendants in a malicious prosecution action had sued the plaintiff in a prior action for violating the UCL by obtaining an allegedly illegal public subsidy and land use approvals that allegedly violated statutes and municipal ordinances. (Paulus v. Bob Lynch Ford, Inc. (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 659, 666-667, 681.) "Under these circumstances, [the Court of Appeal was] loath to conclude that [the defendants'] claim under the UCL's 'unlawful' prong was not objectively tenable." (Id. at pp. 681-682.) The Court of Appeal did not rule definitively on the merits of the UCL claim. (Id. at p. 684, fn. 22.) Nor did it consider the preclusive effect of a final determination that a proposed project was consistent with municipal ordinances on a subsequent UCL claim alleging the project was inconsistent-the issue in this case."' "It is axiomatic that cases are not authority for propositions not considered." '" (Foley Investments, L.P. v. Alisal Water Corp. (2021) 72 Cal.App.5th 535, 545.)
III. DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
WE CONCUR: O'ROURKE, Acting P. J. KELETY, J.