Opinion
C. A. 0:21-2031-DCN-PJG
03-13-2023
Nicole R. Smith, individually and as Personal Representative of the Estate of Dominique Antonio Smith, Estate of Dominique Antonio Smith, Plaintiff, v. Stacy Carter; Eric Flavor; Audra Wright; Bernadette Richardson; Marquette Lunn; Izell Simon, Jr.; Deleon McElveen, Jr.; Willie Mae Young; Shairy Largent, Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
PAIGE J. GOSSETT, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Plaintiff Nicole R. Smith brings this civil rights action individually and as a personal representative of the estate of Dominique Antonio Smith. This case arises out of the death of Dominique while he was in the custody of the South Carolina Department of Corrections (“SCDC”). Plaintiff brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 raising claims of constitutional violations against the defendants, who are all SCDC officers. This matter is before the court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2) (D.S.C.) for a Report and Recommendation on the defendants' motion for summary judgment. (ECF No. 25.) Plaintiff filed a response in opposition to the motion (ECF No. 38), and the defendants filed a reply (ECF No. 42). Having reviewed the record presented and the applicable law, the court concludes that the defendants' motion should be granted.
BACKGROUND
The following facts are either undisputed or are taken in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, to the extent they find support in the record. Dominique Antonio Smith (“Smith”) was an inmate in SCDC's Palmer Pre-Release Center in Florence, South Carolina. The facility houses inmates transitioning to release and allows the inmates to work outside of the facility during the day. Thus, the facility does not provide on-site medical care and inmates with significant medical conditions are not eligible for assignment to the facility. When needed, inmate medical care is provided through SCDC's Turbeville Correctional Institution (“Turbeville”), which is approximately thirty-six miles from the Palmer Pre-Release Center.
Smith, a twenty-six-year-old man, was transferred to the Palmer Pre-Release Center on July 5, 2018. Smith had no known medical conditions that precluded his assignment to the facility. But on July 28, 2018, Smith complained to staff that he was experiencing chest pain. Control room officer Shairy Largent radioed to Sergeant Bernadette Richardson to meet Smith in front of the control room. Richardson found Smith holding his chest and complaining of chest pain. Richardson contacted medical staff at Turbeville and was instructed by a nurse to have Smith transported to the hospital for treatment. Corporal Willie Mae Young transported Smith to McLeod Hospital.
Largent also notified Lieutenant Eric Flavor, a supersivor, about Smith's condition.
Smith was examined by Dr. Mary Smyrnioudis, who ordered various medical tests. Dr. Smyrnioudis diagnosed Smith with chest pain and costochondritis, a condition in which tissue or cartilage in the chest becomes irritated, causing pain that usually goes away on its own time. Dr. Smyrnioudis prescribed Smith ibuprofen to take every six hours for pain. Smith was discharged from the hospital that evening and provided with discharge instructions, which directed Smith to “seek immediate medical care if,” among other things, Smith experienced “increased chest pain or pain that spreads” to other areas of the body, “shortness of breath,” or “increasing cough” or coughing up blood. (Pl.'s Resp., ECF No. 38-6 at 6.) The instructions noted that these worsening conditions signaled an emergency requiring immediate medical care. (Id. at 7.)
Young transported Smith back to the Palmer Pre-Release Center that evening. Upon arrival, Smith told Young that his chest was hurting worse than before. (Young Dep. at 24-25, 3031, ECF No. 38-1 at 7-9.) Young informed Richardson that Smith's chest was hurting worse. However, the record is unclear what happened to Smith's discharge instructions. Young testified that the information in the papers “would have been relayed” to the shift supervisor, which that night would have been either Richardson or Flavor. (Id. at 14-17, ECF No. 38-1 at 5-6.) Young also testified that the supervisor would have looked over the paperwork and passed along any needed information to the officers on shift. (Id. at 18-19, ECF No. 38-1 at 6.) However, the record does not show whether Smith's discharge instructions were provided to a supervisor or whether any officers were made aware of the information in the discharge instructions.
Around 3:22 a.m. the next morning, July 27, correctional staff provided Smith ibuprofen for pain, though it is not clear what prompted staff to provide the medicine. A logbook of the control room shows only that the medicine was distributed. (Pl.'s Resp. Ex. G., ECF No. 38-7 at 2.) Around 3:55 p.m. that same day, Sergeant Deleon McElveen, Jr., received a report from an officer that Smith was complaining of chest pain and sweating very heavily. McElveen was apparently aware that Smith had visited the hospital the day before for “chest pains and shortness of breath” and “had a condition similar to a pulled muscle.” (Incident Report, Ex. C., ECF No. 38-3 at 3.) McElveen contacted a nurse at Turbeville and shared Smith's symptoms and diagnosis from McLeod hospital. The nurse “agreed” that Smith would be experiencing those issues based on the diagnosis and told McElveen that Smith should be transported to Turbeville if his symptoms worsened. (Id.)
Around 11:30 p.m. that night, Officer Izell Simon, Jr., observed Smith coughing up blood. Smith was transported to Turbeville to be evaluated by medical staff. Turbeville is approximately half an hour away from the Palmer Pre-Release Center, whereas McLeod Hospital is only ten minutes away. At Turbeville, Smith was first seen by a nurse who then called a physician. The physician ordered that Smith be transported to Tuomey Hospital, which was approximately twenty minutes away from Turbeville. Around 3:45 p.m. the next day, July 28, Smith died at the hospital of suspected respiratory failure, pneumonia, and sepsis. (Smith Med. Recs. at 7062, ECF No. 252 at 62.)
Plaintiff seeks to recover survival and wrongful death damages pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming that the defendants' actions violated the Fourth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments. Raising four causes of action, Plaintiff claims that the defendants' failure to provide Smith with medical care amounts to cruel and unusual punishment. Plaintiff also claims that the defendants violated Smith's right to due process.
DISCUSSION
A. Summary Judgment
Summary judgment is appropriate only if the moving party “shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the [moving party] is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). A party may support or refute that a material fact is not disputed by “citing to particular parts of materials in the record” or by “showing that the materials cited do not establish the absence or presence of a genuine dispute, or that an adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence to support the fact.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(1). Rule 56 mandates entry of summary judgment “against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986).
In deciding whether there is a genuine issue of material fact, the evidence of the nonmoving party is to be believed and all justifiable inferences must be drawn in favor of the nonmoving party. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). However, “[o]nly disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment. Factual disputes that are irrelevant or unnecessary will not be counted.” Id. at 248.
The moving party has the burden of proving that summary judgment is appropriate. Once the moving party makes this showing, however, the opposing party may not rest upon mere allegations or denials, but rather must, by affidavits or other means permitted by the Rule, set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c), (e); Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 322.
B. The Defendants' Motion
The defendants argue that Plaintiff fails to forecast any evidence to support her claim that the defendants were deliberately indifferent to Smith's medical needs. Specifically, the defendants argue that the record indisputably shows that rather than disregarding Smith's chest pains, they sought medical attention for him every step of the way. The court agrees.
A legal action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 allows “a party who has been deprived of a federal right under the color of state law to seek relief.” City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., 526 U.S. 687, 707 (1999). To establish a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must show: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).
The Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution expressly prohibits the infliction of “cruel and unusual punishments.” U.S. Const. amend. VIII. To proceed with his claim under the Eighth Amendment, Plaintiff must demonstrate: (1) objectively, the deprivation suffered or injury inflicted was “sufficiently serious,” and (2) subjectively, the prison officials acted with a “sufficiently culpable state of mind.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994); Williams v. Benjamin, 77 F.3d 756, 761 (4th Cir. 1996). “These requirements spring from the text of the amendment itself; absent intentionality, a condition imposed on an inmate cannot properly be called ‘punishment,' and absent severity, such punishment cannot be called ‘cruel and unusual.' ” Iko v. Shreve, 535 F.3d 225, 238 (4th Cir. 2008) (citing Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298-300 (1991)). “What must be established with regard to each component ‘varies according to the nature of the alleged constitutional violation.' ” Williams, 77 F.3d at 761 (quoting Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 5 (1992)).
Deliberate indifference by prison personnel to a prisoner's medical needs is actionable under the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104-05 (1976). To satisfy the subjective prong of an Eighth Amendment claim, an inmate must show that the prison official's state of mind was “deliberate indifference” to the inmate's health and safety. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834. A prison official is deliberately indifferent if he has actual knowledge of a substantial risk of harm to an inmate and disregards that substantial risk. Id. at 847; Parrish v. Cleveland, 372 F.3d 294, 302 (4th Cir. 2004). To be liable under this standard, the prison official “must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. However, because even a subjective standard may be proven through circumstantial evidence, “a prison official cannot hide behind an excuse that he was unaware of a risk, no matter how obvious.” Makdessi v. Fields, 789 F.3d 126, 133 (4th Cir. 2015) (quoting Brice v. Va. Beach Corr. Ctr., 58 F.3d 101, 105 (4th Cir. 1995)). Therefore, “a factfinder may conclude that a prison official knew of a substantial risk from the very fact that a risk was obvious.” Makdessi, 789 F.3d at 133 (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 842). On the other hand, courts have recognized that “lay people are not qualified to determine . . . medical fitness, whether physical or mental; that is what independent medical experts are for.” O'Connor v. Pierson, 426 F.3d 187, 202 (2d Cir. 2005).
The parties do not address the fact that Plaintiff's Complaint also expressly raises claims of deliberate indifference to medical needs under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. Because the Eighth Amendment is the proper standard to evaluate a deliberate indifference claim for a state prisoner, the court does not construe the Complaint as asserting claims outside of the Eighth Amendment. See generally Cooleen v. Lamanna, 248 Fed.Appx. 357, 362 (3d Cir. 2007) (quoting Cnty. of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 843 (1998)).
Initially, the court notes that neither party analyzes the evidence in this case as to each defendant-that is, the parties do not discuss what actual knowledge each defendant possessed and whether he or she appreciated the risk of harm to Smith. Thus, it is unclear what Plaintiff's theory of liability is for each defendant. Instead, Plaintiff argues that Defendants Carter, Wright, Flavor, Richardson, Lunn, Simon, McElveen, Young, and Largent all had direct knowledge that Smith was experiencing chest pain and other severe symptoms, and that his condition deteriorated after he returned from his original visit to the hospital. Even assuming that Plaintiff's sweeping generalization of the evidence is true, mere knowledge of Smith's condition is insufficient to show that the defendants acted with a culpable state of mind-that is, that they deliberately or recklessly disregarded a substantial risk of harm. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837 (stating the prison official “must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference”). To show deliberate indifference, Plaintiff must show that not only did these defendants know that Smith's condition was worsening, but also that the defendants caused a substantial risk of harm to his health by not providing him immediate, emergency care. See, e.g., Iko, 535 F.3d at 242 (“[U]nder the high ‘deliberate indifference' standard, even subjective knowledge of Iko's medical needs is not enough; the officers must have actually known that their response was inadequate to address those needs[.]”).
Plaintiff argues that the defendants knew Smith needed to be taken back to the hospital if his condition worsened because that information was on the discharge instructions Smith received from the hospital. Initially, the court notes that the instructions stated only that Smith should seek “medical care” or “get help right away” if his conditions worsened, not that he specifically had to return to the hospital. (Pl.'s Resp., ECF No. 38-6 at 5-7.) Regardless, Plaintiff does not identify any evidence in the record that any of the defendants actually read the discharge instructions. As noted previously, the record is unclear what happened to the discharge instructions when Smith returned to the facility. While Young testified as to what hypothetically is supposed to be done with discharge instructions when an inmate returns from a hospital visit, Young had no direct knowledge of what happened to Smith's discharge instructions or who, if anyone, read them; and Young himself never possessed them. (Young Dep. at 14-19, ECF No. 38-1 at 5-6.) Otherwise, the record is devoid of any evidence that the defendants were made aware that a doctor instructed Smith to seek medical attention if his conditions worsened.
Even assuming the record could be construed as showing that some of the defendants either read the discharge instructions or were otherwise made aware that Smith was under doctor's orders to seek medical care if his condition worsened, the record plainly shows that the defendants provided Smith medical care every time Smith reported his symptoms to the defendants. When Smith first reported having chest pain, Richardson immediately contacted the medical staff at Turbeville and followed the nurse's instruction to send Smith to a hospital.
Plaintiff argues that because Young told Richardson that Smith's chest was hurting worse when they returned from the hospital, Richardson should have sent Smith directly back to the hospital based on the discharge instructions. But as explained earlier, there is no evidence in the record that Richardson received the discharge instructions. And more importantly, there is no evidence that Richardson was made aware that Smith's condition required further hospitalization. At that point, a doctor had diagnosed Smith with inflammation, a non-life-threatening condition. Richardson, as a non-medical employee, could not have reasonably understood that Smith needed emergency medical care at that time, even if Smith was reporting that he was in more pain than earlier that day. Smith's need for further medical care was not obvious at that point. See Depaola v. Clarke, 884 F.3d 481, 486 (4th Cir. 2018) (stating that a “serious medical need” is a condition “diagnosed by a physician as mandating treatment or one that is so obvious that even a lay person would easily recognize the necessity for a doctor's attention”). Young himself did not suggest to Richardson that Smith should return to the hospital. At that point, even Smith was not aware that he may have had a severe respiratory illness, and notably, there is no evidence in the record that Smith independently told Richardson about his worsening chest pain or suggested to anyone that he needed to return to the hospital. Considering that Smith-and not Young-had received the discharge instructions, a jury could not reasonably find that Richardson understood that Young's second-hand report about Smith's pain level required that he seek emergency care for a serious medical need. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837 (stating that to establish deliberate indifference, the prison official “must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference”).
Nor did Young testify that Smith believed he needed to be returned to the hospital at that time. Young did testify that in his (Young's) personal opinion, Smith should have been taken back to the hospital immediately after they returned from the first visit. (Young Dep. at 30-31, ECF No. 38-1 at 9.) But Young did not testify that he shared this opinion with anyone; rather, he testified only that he reported to Richardson that Smith felt worse. Notably, Smith also testified that he could not have taken Smith back to the hospital himself because he went off duty right after arriving back from the hospital visit, but he believed that the night shift officers were providing medical attention to Smith as he clocked out. (Id. at 26, ECF No. 38-1 at 8.)
From there, the record shows that Smith did not report any further pain or symptoms to corrections officers until 4:00 p.m. the next day. McElveen, having received a report that Smith had worsening chest pain and was sweating heavily, immediately contacted a nurse at Turbeville. The nurse told McElveen that Smith's symptoms should be expected given his diagnosis from the hospital and instructed McElveen to seek medical care for Smith if his condition worsened. Plaintiff argues that McElveen should have transported Smith to the hospital at that time, but again, there is no evidence that McElveen was aware of Smith's discharge instructions. Regardless, McElveen was entitled to rely on the medical advice of the nurse. See Johnson v. Doughty, 433 F.3d 1001, 1010 (7th Cir. 2006) (collecting cases finding that lay prison personnel can reasonably defer to medical professionals' opinions); see also Iko, 535 F.3d at 242 (noting that, generally, a supervisory prison official can rely on medical staff's examinations and diagnoses). And again, when Smith reported later that day that he began coughing up blood, Smith was taken to Turbeville for treatment, as instructed by the nurse.
The record does not show whether McElveen or the nurse had, or had access to, Smith's hospital discharge instructions.
The record does not reveal exactly why Smith was taken to Turbeville instead of the hospital, as Plaintiff argues the officers should have done instead. Either way, the record shows that the correctional officers sought medical care for Smith, and even assuming that hindsight shows that taking Smith to a different medical provider would have been a better decision, no reasonable jury could conclude that the defendants disregarded Smith's medical needs. See generally Scinto v. Stansberry, 841 F.3d 219, 226 (4th Cir. 2016) (“[E]ven officials who acted with deliberate indifference may be ‘free from liability if they responded reasonably to the risk.' ”) (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 844).
Accordingly, Plaintiff fails to identify any evidence from which a reasonable jury could conclude that any of the defendants knowingly or recklessly disregarded Smith's medical needs. In every instance that Smith reported worsening pain or other conditions, the defendants either contacted Turbeville's medical staff for medical advice or transported Smith to Turbeville or the hospital for treatment. Therefore, the defendants are entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law with respect to Plaintiff's Eighth Amendment claims.
In response to the defendants' motion, Plaintiff argues that some of the defendants are also liable under a theory of supervisory liability. See generally Shaw v. Stroud, 13 F.3d 791, 799 (4th Cir. 1994). However, Plaintiff did not plead supervisory liability in the Complaint. Therefore, such a claim is not properly before the court. See generally Barclay White Skanska, Inc. v. Battelle Mem'l Inst., 262 Fed.Appx. 556, 563 (4th Cir. 2008) (“A plaintiff may not amend her complaint through argument in a brief opposing summary judgment.”) (citing Gilmour v. Gates, McDonald & Co., 382 F.3d 1312, 1315 (11th Cir. 2004)). In any event, because supervisory liability is derivative and the court concludes that no reasonable jury could find a constitutional violation here, such a claim would fail. See Evans v. Chalmers, 703 F.3d 636, 654 (4th Cir. 2012) (stating that a claim for damages under § 1983 based on supervisory liability may not succeed without a predicate constitutional violation).
RECOMMENDATION
Based on the foregoing, the court recommends that the defendants' motion for summary judgment be granted. (ECF No. 25.)
The parties' attention is directed to the important notice on the next page.
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. “[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must ‘only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.' ” Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); see Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk
United States District Court
901 Richland Street
Columbia, South Carolina 29201
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).