Opinion
Civil Action No. 00-2496-GTV
September 24, 2002
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Plaintiff Michelle Smith brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1383(c)(3) and D. Kan. Rule 83.7, seeking judicial review of the decision of the Commissioner of Social Security ("Commissioner") to terminate her Supplemental Security Income benefits under Title XVI of the Social Security Act. The Commissioner terminated her benefits pursuant to Public Law 104-121, which amended 42 U.S.C. § 1382c to provide that "an individual shall not be considered to be disabled . . . if alcoholism or drug addiction would . . . be a contributing factor material to the Commissioner's determination that the individual is disabled." Contract with America Advancement Act of 1996, Pub.L. No. 104-121, 110 Stat. 847. For the reasons set forth below, the court affirms the Commissioner's decision.
I. Procedural Background
On May 4, 1992, Plaintiff originally filed her application for disability benefits. The Commissioner found her disabled based on Plaintiff's "atopic dermatitis due to drug and alcohol" [sic], and Plaintiff began receiving disability benefits. On March 29, 1996, Public Law No. 104-121 went into effect. The law provided that substance abuse could no longer be a factor in findings of disability. Id. It also provided that those who were receiving benefits on the basis of substance abuse could reapply for benefits under the Social Security Act. Id. Individuals who could not prove disability on the basis of other impairments would have their benefits terminated effective January 1, 1997. Id.
Plaintiff reapplied for disability benefits pursuant to Public Law No. 104-121 on April 25, 1996. On October 17, 1996, Plaintiff was notified that her benefits would be terminated effective January 1, 1997. At Plaintiff's request, an administrative law judge ("ALJ") held a hearing on September 4, 1997, at which Plaintiff and her counsel were present. On December 18, 1998, the ALJ rendered a decision in which he determined that Plaintiff was not entitled to a continuation of Supplemental Security Income benefits. The ALJ made this determination by evaluating Plaintiff's impairments of atopic dermatitis and depression, without considering any alcohol dependence issues. After the ALJ's unfavorable decision, Plaintiff requested review by the Appeals Council. The Appeals Council denied Plaintiff's request for review on September 1, 2000, rendering the ALJ's decision the final decision of the Commissioner.
II. Standard of Review
The Commissioner's findings are binding on this court if supported by substantial evidence. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Dixon v. Heckler, 811 F.2d 506, 508 (10th Cir. 1987). The court's review is limited to determining whether the Commissioner's decision is supported by substantial evidence in the record and whether the Commissioner properly applied relevant legal standards. Marshall v. Chater, 75 F.3d 1421, 1425 (10th Cir. 1996) (citing Castellano v. Sec'y of Health Human Servs., 26 F.3d 1027, 1028 (10th Cir. 1994)). "Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Castellano, 26 F.3d at 1028 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). The court may not reweigh the evidence or substitute its judgment for that of the Commissioner. Hamilton v. Sec'y of Health Human Servs., 961 F.2d 1495, 1500 (10th Cir. 1992).
III. ALJ's Findings
In his December 18, 1998 decision, the ALJ made the following findings:
• Claimant was previously found to be disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act and has not engaged in substantial gainful activity since that time.
• The medical evidence establishes that claimant has atopic dermatitis and depression.
• The medical evidence establishes that claimant has not had an impairment or combination of impairments which meets or equals the severity of an impairment listed in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1, Listing of Impairments, at any time relevant to this proceeding.
• For reasons explained in the body of this decision, testimony of claimant is found not credible.
• Claimant retains the residual functional capacity to lift and carry a maximum of ten pounds; she requires the option to sit or stand while working; must avoid repetitive use of hand controls, needs to avoid water/wet work and chemicals, and she must be able to wear white cotton gloves.
• Claimant does not have any past relevant work.
• At all times relevant to this proceeding, claimant was a "younger individual" and has a high school education.
• Considering claimant's above-described residual functional capacity and vocational profile, there are a significant number of sedentary, unskilled jobs in the national economy which she can perform. Examples of such occupations are cashier; surveillance system monitor; information clerk; and telephone solicitor. This finding is based on the testimony of the vocational expert.
• Claimant is not disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act, as amended, and her entitlement to supplemental security income benefits was appropriately ceased January 1, 1997.
IV. Discussion
Plaintiff alleges that the ALJ made three mistakes in evaluating her case. First, Plaintiff alleges that the ALJ improperly determined that her atopic dermatitis did not meet or equal Listing 8.05. Second, she alleges that the ALJ failed to make proper credibility findings. Third, she alleges that the ALJ failed to analyze how the combined effect of her atopic dermatitis and depression limited her ability to work. The court rejects all of Plaintiff's arguments and finds substantial evidence in the record to support the Commissioner's decision.A. Failure to Meet or Equal Listing 8.05
Plaintiff first claims that her condition meets Listing 8.05 in the Commissioner's Listing of Impairments. If a claimant has an impairment which meets or equals one of the impairments the Commissioner has "listed," then the claimant is conclusively presumed disabled. Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 141 (1987). Listing 8.05 states, " Psoriasis, atopic dermatitis, dyshidrosis. With extensive lesions, including involvement of the hands and feet which impose a marked limitation of function and which are not responding to prescribed treatment." 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1, Listing of Impairments. The ALJ concluded that Plaintiff's atopic dermatitis did not meet the Listing "because the record does not show that claimant was resistent [sic] to treatment for her dermatitis. Additionally, at the hearing, claimant held her hands and palms up claiming pain but there were no visible lesions; and she wore sandals and walked without a limp."
Plaintiff claims that the ALJ erred because the fact that she has grappled with her atopic dermatitis for years shows that it is unresponsive to treatment. The court disagrees. At least eight times in the record, medical treatment notes indicate that Plaintiff's skin condition was improving. The record as a whole supports a finding that Plaintiff's atopic dermatitis was episodic in nature, worsening at times and then responding to treatment. The ALJ also properly observed at the hearing that Plaintiff had no visible lesions on her hands and that her ability to function was not markedly impaired. The court concludes that substantial evidence supports the ALJ's finding that Plaintiff did not meet Listing 8.05.
B. Credibility Determination
Plaintiff next claims that the ALJ improperly assessed her credibility. Because the ALJ is "`optimally positioned to observe and assess witness credibility,'" Adams v. Chater, 93 F.3d 712, 715 (10th Cir. 1996) (quoting Casias v. Sec'y of Health Human Servs., 933 F.2d 799, 801 (10th Cir. 1991)), the court "may overturn such a credibility determination only when there is a conspicuous absence of credible evidence to support it," Patterson v. Apfel, 62 F. Supp.2d 1212, 1217 (D.Kan. 1999) (citing Trimiar v. Sullivan, 966 F.2d 1326, 1329 (10th Cir. 1992)). Credibility determinations made by the ALJ are generally treated as binding upon review. Talley v. Sullivan, 908 F.2d 585, 587 (10th Cir. 1990).
In assessing credibility, the ALJ must consider both objective and subjective evidence. Hamilton v. Sec'y of Health Human Servs., 961 F.2d 1495, 1498 (10th Cir. 1992). Plaintiff asserts that the ALJ only considered objective medical evidence, and not Plaintiff's subjective complaints of pain. The court disagrees. The ALJ discussed both objective and subjective evidence in his decision.
The ALJ noted that the objective medical evidence did not support Plaintiff's complaints of disabling pain. Indeed, Dr. Kestenbaum, Plaintiff's long-time treating physician, opined, "[Plaintiff] has had a severe problem at times as I said, that required hospitalization, but this is a small percentage of the time. She would probably be off work one to two weeks per year because of skin disease, would be my guess." Dr. Kestenbaum also did not think Plaintiff's condition would preclude her from lifting, carrying, standing, sitting, pulling, or pushing most of the time. With regard to Plaintiff's depression, Dr. Stern, who saw Plaintiff in 1996 for a consultative psychological examination, noted that, "other than that her mood changes," Plaintiff did not appear emotionally incapacitated.
Subjectively, the ALJ observed that Plaintiff continued to engage in social activities and activities of daily living. The ALJ also mentioned that Plaintiff did not have any ongoing therapy for depression and did not continue taking psychiatric medication prescribed for her in 1994. And, as mentioned earlier, the ALJ noticed during the hearing that Plaintiff had no visible lesions on her hands and that she did not walk with a limp. All of this evidence supports the ALJ's finding that Plaintiff's complaints of disabling pain were not credible.
Plaintiff summarily makes four other arguments. First, Plaintiff claims that the ALJ misstated the law, but the court concludes that he did not. Second, Plaintiff claims that the ALJ was required to mention all of the factors enumerated in Huston v. Bowen, 838 F.2d 1125, 1132 (10th Cir. 1988), when assessing her credibility. The court disagrees. It is not necessary for the ALJ to cite every credibility factor in his analysis. Koenig v. Chater, 936 F. Supp. 776, 784 (D.Kan. 1996) (citing Porter v. Chater, 895 F. Supp. 1427, 1436 (D.Kan. 1995)). Third, Plaintiff states that the ALJ improperly evaluated some of the medical evidence, but does not explain in what manner. The court finds that the ALJ's discussion of the medical evidence is supported by the record. Finally, Plaintiff alleges that the ALJ improperly found that Plaintiff's daily activities and social activities were inconsistent with claims of disabling pain. Again, the court disagrees. Plaintiff completed a form entitled, "Activities of Daily Living," where she indicated that she engaged in a wide range of household activities and a few social activities. At the hearing, Plaintiff testified that her range of activities was much more limited, but the court still concludes that the ALJ's finding is supported by substantial evidence. The court will not overturn the ALJ's credibility determination.
C. Combined Effect of Plaintiff's Impairments
Plaintiff's last argument is that the ALJ failed to analyze the combined effect of Plaintiff's atopic dermatitis and depression. The ALJ "must consider the combined effects of impairments that may not be severe individually, but which in combination may constitute a severe medical disability." Hargis v. Sullivan, 945 F.2d 1482, 1491 (10th Cir. 1991); see also 20 C.F.R. § 404.1523. While the ALJ addressed Plaintiff's impairments individually, he discussed both of the impairments in his opinion and in his hypothetical to the vocational expert. After reviewing the record as a whole, the court is convinced that the ALJ properly considered the cumulative effect of Plaintiff's impairments.
IT IS, THEREFORE, BY THE COURT ORDERED that the decision of the Commissioner is affirmed.
The case is closed.
Copies of this order shall be transmitted to counsel of record.