" 'Temporary total disability' means the healing time, or that period of time that claimant, or the employee, by reason of the injury, is unable to perform any kind of labor and is totally disabled — that class of disability from which you could reasonably expect a recovery." And in Smith McDannald et al. v. State Industrial Commission et al., 133 Okla. 77. 271 P. 142, that: "The period of temporary total disability is that temporary period immediately after the accident during which the injured employee is totally incapacitated for work by reason of illness attended by the injury."

The intended results of our workers' compensation laws are to provide a "workable means of securing compensation to injured employees and to have industry bear its burden of the wear and tear on the human machine or man power." Smith McDannald v. State Industrial Commission, 133 Okla. 77, 271 P. 142, 143 (1928). [Emphasis added.]

Petitioners cite Vol. 41, Words and Phrases, page 281 which states that "temporary total disability" means the healing time, or that period of time that the employee, by reason of injury, is unable to perform any kind of labor and is totally disabled, when recovery is reasonably expected. Petitioners argue that claimant is temporarily totally disabled as that term is defined in Western Steel Erecting Co. v. Lukenbill, 143 Okla. 92, 287 P. 724; Mead Phillips Drilling Co. v. Rush, 158 Okla. 265, 13 P.2d 78; Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Allred, 160 Okla. 126, 16 P.2d 78; Oklahoma Natural Gas Co. v. Davis, 181 Okla. 530, 75 P.2d 435; Peabody Coal Co. v. Industrial Commission, 308 Ill. 133, 139 N.E. 7; and Smith McDonnald v. State Industrial Commission, 133 Okla. 77, 271 P. 142. In Mead Phillips Drilling Co. v. Rush, supra [ 158 Okla. 265, 13 P.2d 78], it is stated:

" And in addition thereto ". . . the amount of compensation . . . provided by the Workmen's Compensation Law for temporary disability, . . . which amount as theretofore provided was not limited by the 1943 Act. The Workmen's Compensation Law in existence prior to the 1943 Act provided for an award for temporary disability as a specific injury. Smith McDonnald et al. v. State Industrial Comm. et al., 133 Okla. 77, 271 P. 142; Thompson v. State Industrial Comm. et al., 138 Okla. 166, 280 P. 597; H. E. Turner Drilling Co. et al. v. Pendley et al., 142 Okla. 290, 286 P. 886; Barnsdall Refining Co. v. Ramsdall et al., 149 Okla. 99, 299 P. 499; Dailey Crawford Pevetoe et al. v. Rand et al., 155 Okla. 229, 8 P.2d 738; Geis Price Grain Co. et al. v. Bailey et al., 155 Okla. 302, 9 P.2d 424; Loffland Bros. Drilling Co. et al. v. State Industrial Comm., 157 Okla. 78, 10 P.2d 1096. And we observe that the 1943 Act carefully preserved the existing law in that respect and carefully continued the employer's liability therefor, obviously upon the theory that such character of disability was the direct result of the new injury. The order of the commission required the employer to pay only $1,800, which is obviously for 100 weeks of the permanent disability.

The court is committed to the rule that the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act are remedial in nature and should be liberally construed in favor of the employee when injury arises out of and in the course of employment. McGeorge Corporation v. State Industrial Commission, 180 Okla. 346, 69 P.2d 320; Oklahoma Gas Electric Co. v. Hunsicker, 178 Okla. 565, 63 P.2d 21; Smith McDonald v. State Industrial Commission, 133 Okla. 77, 271 P. 142. From a careful consideration of the record, we conclude that the award of the commission should be sustained; to hold otherwise would effectively remove from the Workmen's Compensation Act those vital precepts and principles which are fundamentally and substantially a part of it.

; Lahoma Oil Co. v. State Ind. Co., 175 P. 836 (Okla.); Consumers Gas and Fuel Co. v. Erwin, 243 S.W. 500 (Tex.); Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Ind. Co. 252 P. 567 (Utah); Smith McDonald v. State Ind. Co. 271 P. 142 (Okla.); Betz v. Columbia Tel. Co., 24 S.W. 2nd 224 (Mo.); Workmen's Comp. Exch. v. Chicago etc. R.R. Co., 45 F.2d 585 (Idaho); Lumberman's Recip. Ass'n. v. Day, 17 S.W. 2nd 1043 (Tex.); Petroleum Co. v. Beale, 13 S.W. 2nd 364 (Tex).

The rights and liabilities of the respective parties are purely statutory. Under subdivision 2, section 13356, O. S. 1931, the State Industrial Commission is authorized to award compensation for temporary total disability for a period not to exceed 300 weeks, and under subdivision 3 of said section is authorized to make an additional award as compensation for permanent partial disability. Smith McDannald v. State Industrial Commission, 133 Okla. 77,271 P. 142; Thompson v. State Industrial Commission, 138 Okla. 166, 280 P. 597; Magnolia Pet. Co. v. Allred, 160 Okla. 126, 16 P.2d 78. In the case now under consideration we find that, pursuant to the applicable provisions of the statute, payment of comensation for temporary total disability and permanent partial disability was authorized by the commission and was paid to the respondent.

There is ample evidence in the record of this case for the commission to base its award as to the reduced earning power of the claimant. It is apparent, however, that the testimony is conflicting but this court has said in numerous cases on appeal from the Industrial Commission that so long as there is any competent evidence to support the award of the commission, the same will not be disturbed, and this court has further held, as in the case of Smith et al. v. State Industrial Commission, 133 Okla. 77, 271 P. 142, that: "The Workmen's Compensation Act of this state * * * must be construed as a whole, and those laws enacted for the protection of labor should be liberally, rather than strictly, construed, both by the Industrial Commission and the Supreme Court, so as to give effect to the intention and purpose of the law."

The purposes of the act are to make industry bear the loss and burden of industrial accidents and compensate employees for loss of earning power, where the loss is within the provisions of the act. Fox v. Dunning, 124 Okla. 228, 255 P. 582; New Amsterdam Casualty Co. v. Rinehardt Donovan Co., 124 Okla. 227, 255 P. 587, and Smith McDonnald v. State Industrial Commission, 133 Okla. 77, 271 P. 142. While this court said in Winona Oil Co. et al. v. Smithson et al., 87 Okla. 226, 209 P. 398, and repeated the statement in Comeron Coal Co. et al. v. Dunn et al., 85 Okla. 219, 205 P. 503, that the test of the right to an award under the Workmen's Compensation Act is not limited to loss of earning power in the industrial world, it then had under consideration records showing injuries to specific members, and not injuries under the "other cases" provision of the statute.

Long prior to the passage of this act, this court has pursued the policy of treating the various classes of disability as specific injuries. Smith McDonnald Drilling Co. v. State Industrial Commission. 133 Okla. 77, 271 P. 142. It was held in numerous cases that, where an award had been made for temporary total disability, it is not necessary to prove a change in condition to sustain a subsequent award for permanent partial disability. Interstate Window Glass Co. v. Candler, 166 Okla. 59, 26 P.2d 198; Geis Price Grain Co. v. Bailey, 155 Okla. 302, 9 P.2d 424; Noble Drilling Co. v. Link, 161 Okla. 238, 17 P.2d 971; Dailey, Crawford Pevetoe v. Rand, 155 Okla. 229, 8 P.2d 738; Noel v. Kozak, 148 Okla. 210, 298 P. 298; Marland Production Co. v. Hogan, 146 Okla. 220, 294 P. 115; Williams Bros. v. Addison, 163 Okla. 264, 21 P.2d 1047; Continental Supply Co. v. Kirk, 163 Okla. 291, 22 P.2d 82; Boettcher v. Marland Refining Co., 163 Okla. 256, 21 P.2d 1070; Loftland Bros. Drilling Co. v. State Ind. Comm., 157 Okla. 78, 10 P.2d 1096.