Smiley v. Chrysler

6 Citing cases

  1. Hofacker v. Wells Fargo Bank Nat'l Ass'n

    179 F. Supp. 3d 463 (E.D. Pa. 2016)   Cited 9 times

    We agree with Defendant that Smiley v. Daimler Chrysler is factually similar to the case before us. 589 F.Supp.2d 471 (D.Del.2008).

  2. Ray v. Elecnor Hawkeye, LLC

    Civil Action 22-346 (MAS) (RLS) (D.N.J. Dec. 6, 2023)

    ) “Where the major life activity at issue is working, the term ‘substantially limited' is defined as ‘significantly restricted in the ability to perform either a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs in various classes as compared to the average person having comparable training, skills[,] and abilities.'” Smiley v. Daimler Chrysler, 589 F.Supp.2d 471, 483 (D. Del. 2008) (quoting Deane v. Pocono Med. Ctr., 142 F.3d 138 (3d Cir. 1998)). Here, Plaintiff was and is not substantially limited or significantly restricted from a class of jobs-Plaintiff testified that she is “somebody who is generally able to work .... [f]ull-time without restrictions” and is medically able to work up to 12 hours a day if she needs to.

  3. Montano v. Allen Harim Foods

    C.A. No. 15-392-LPS-CJB (D. Del. Sep. 20, 2017)   Cited 2 times

    Tillman v. Pepsi Bottling Grp., Inc., 2005 WL 2127820, at *7 (D. Del. Aug. 30, 2005) (quoting Wheller v. Graco Trucking Corp., 985 F.2d 108, 113 (3d. Cir. 1993)); accord Hughes v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 639 Fed. App'x 99, 103 (3d Cir. 2016). As Plaintiff's WPCA claim is "inextricably intertwined" with the terms of, or custom and practices under, the CBA with Defendant, it is preempted by the LMRA.Smiley v. Daimler Chrysler, 589 F. Supp. 2d 471, 489 (D. Del. Dec. 11, 2008); see In re Cargill, 632 F. Supp. 2d at 396 ("A determination of the state law claims for this period would be 'substantially dependent upon an analysis of the terms,' practices, and customs of the 2007 CBA and would be preempted by federal law." (quoting Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 220 (1985))); see also Tillman, 2005 WL 2127820, at *7 ("To determine whether the collective bargaining agreement was violated . . . and whether plaintiff is entitled to overtime, the court will have to interpret the [CBA].

  4. Hererra v. Perez

    Case No. CV 12-1101 CAS (AGRx) (C.D. Cal. Mar. 27, 2012)   Cited 1 times

    Plaintiff thus contends that whether her employment contract was breached can be resolved without reference to the CBA. Mot. at 14 (citing Smiley v. Daimler Chrysler, 589 F. Supp. 2d 471 (D. Del. 2008)). In opposition, Clougherty argues that the alleged independent employment contract can exist only as part of the collective bargaining agreement for it to have any effect.

  5. Daughtry v. Family Dollar Stores, Inc.

    634 F. Supp. 2d 475 (D. Del. 2009)   Cited 14 times
    Dismissing state law claims because plaintiffs were barred from simultaneously seeking remedies under Title VII and the DDEA

    This court has noted that the "ambit of a civil complaint, once a right-to-sue letter is issued by the EEOC, is `defined by the scope of the EEOC investigation which can reasonably be expected to grow out of a charge of discrimination,' regardless of the actual scope of the EEOC investigation." Smiley v. Daimler Chrysler, 589 F.Supp.2d 471, 486 (D.Del. 2008) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Hicks v. ABT Assocs., 572 F.2d 960, 966 (3d Cir. 1978)). Therefore, the "relevant test for determining whether plaintiff must exhaust his administrative remedies, . . . is `whether the acts alleged in the subsequent Title VII suit are fairly within the scope of the prior EEOC complaint, or the investigation arising therefrom.'"

  6. KNIGHT v. DRYE

    CIVIL ACTION NO. 07-3097 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 13, 2009)   Cited 4 times
    In Knight v. Drye, No. 07-3097, 2009 WL 704140, at *9 (E.D.Pa., Mar. 13, 2009), the district court held that a police officer's complaint to his superior regarding a fellow officer's alleged misconduct did not constitute "citizen speech" under Garcetti, and concluded that the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit decision in Reilly did not expand the protection of the First Amendment for police officers.

    Thus, to the extent that Knight's claim against the PBA is based on Mr. Welby's withdrawal as counsel during the arbitration proceedings, the PBA is entitled to summary judgment. See Smiley v. Daimler Chrysler and UAW Local 1183, 589 F. Supp. 2d 471, 488 (D. Del. 2008) (granting summary judgment for defendant on plaintiff's breach of the duty of fair representation claim where defendant union refused to submit plaintiff's grievance to arbitration because plaintiff rejected offer of reinstatement). Moreover, even after Mr. Welby withdrew as Knight's counsel, the PBA offered to provide Knight with a union representative during the merits portion of the arbitration, and paid the union's full share of the approximately $11,000 arbitration bill. (PBA's Mot. for Summ. J. at 18, doc. no. 51; 2/19/09 Hr'g Tr. 26:19-27:5.)