We have repeatedly held that in such cases a finding by the trial court has the force and effect of a jury verdict as to facts. See Deming Investment Co. v. Love, 31 Okla. 146, 120 P. 635; In re Byrd, 31 Okla. 549, 122 P. 516; Gates Oil Co. v. Prairie Oil Gas Co., 159 Okla. 288, 15 P.2d 56; Smart v. Billings, 169 Okla. 26, 35 P.2d 923. And that finding of fact by the trial court is conclusive on appeal.
5A C.J.S. p. 476, § 1656(5), note 10; Platt v. Woodland, 121 Kan. 291, 246 P. 1017. Rain v. Balph, Okl., 293 P.2d 359, 360-361; Smart v. Billings, 169 Okl. 26, 35 P.2d 923. On April 28, 1964, Mr. Brickman wrote a letter to Mr. Warner confirming that Cass-Warner had agreed to perform work on the harbor and that the "cost of such work would be in accordance with the conversation had between Ben Warner and Blair Muller, R.A."
"1. This case was tried to the court, and if there was a conflict in the evidence, it was for the trial court to determine the questions of fact therein, and this court will not weigh the evidence or determine as to the credibility of witnesses." Smart v. Billings, 169 Okla. 26, 35 P.2d 923, holds: "2. Where a jury is waived and the cause is tried to the court and the finding of the court is general, such finding is a finding of every special thing necessary to be found sustaining the general judgment, and such finding, when reasonably supported by the evidence in the case, is conclusive on the Supreme Court upon all doubtful and uncertain questions of fact so found."
The proceedings on a motion to amerce are in the nature of a civil action (Fenton v. White [1896] 4 Okla. 472, 47 P. 472), and since they are based on no equitable grounds (Stein v. Scanlan, supra), the rule applicable in a case tried to the court, where a jury has been waived, is the one applicable here. In such cases, where there is any competent evidence reasonably tending to support the judgment of the trial court, the same will not be disturbed on appeal. Smart v. Billings (1934) 169 Okla. 26, 35 P.2d 923. Indeed, plaintiff asserts this to be the rule, but argues that there is an entire lack of evidence. In this she is in error.
While these oral observations of the court at the conclusion of the case appear in the case-made, they form no part of the record proper, since neither party requested findings of fact, and cannot be considered by this court for the purpose of impeaching the finding and judgment of the trial court as shown by the journal entry of judgment wherein the court found that defendant was not entitled to recover from plaintiff on his cross-petition. Ruby v. Warrior (1918) 71 Okla. 82, 175 P. 355; Smart v. Billings (1934) 169 Okla. 26, 35 P.2d 923; Berry Dry Goods Co. v. Jones (1936) 177 Okla. 278, 58 P.2d 529. Plaintiff's cause of action being in equity, defendant's cross-petition, although in law, does not change the nature of the action.
As no requests for any special findings or conclusions by the court were made by either side and the findings and judgment of the court are embodied in the journal entry containing general findings, the said "statement of his findings" not being embodied in the journal entry can be considered only as the oral opinions expressed by the court upon the law and the facts and performs no office in the case-made. Dixon v. Stoetzel, 136 Okla. 302, 276 P. 730; Smart v. Billings, 169 Okla. 26, 35 P.2d 923. Plaintiff contends in her bill of particulars filed on October 7, 1932, that the heavy rains resulting in her damages occurred "on or about the 15th day of June and for several days thereafter," and, although no year is designated after the word "June' we assume from further statements and recitals in the record that it was the year "1932.