Opinion
DOCKET NO. A-2466-14T4
05-02-2016
CODY SMARGIASSI, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. JERSEY SHORE WILDCATS, Defendant-Appellant.
Kamensky, Cohen & Riechelson, attorneys for appellant (Philip Cohen, on the brief). Cody Smargiassi, respondent pro se.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION Before Judges Haas and Manahan. On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Monmouth County, Docket No. DC-9998-14. Kamensky, Cohen & Riechelson, attorneys for appellant (Philip Cohen, on the brief). Cody Smargiassi, respondent pro se. PER CURIAM
Defendant, Jersey Shore Wildcats, appeals from a decision after a bench trial holding that plaintiff, Cody Smargiassi, was entitled to a refund of monies paid pursuant to a contract. Defendant also appeals the dismissal of its counterclaim. After consideration of the record and our standard of review, we affirm.
This matter arose from a contract entered into between plaintiff and defendant. Plaintiff is a hockey player who sought to join defendant's junior hockey club. In furtherance thereof, the parties entered into a contract. The contract included a code of conduct that plaintiff was obliged to follow as a member of the hockey club. The agreement noted the required non-refundable payments by plaintiff to the club to cover certain related costs.
After joining the hockey club, defendant claimed that plaintiff breached provisions of the code of conduct including missing a bus to a showcase in Philadelphia. Plaintiff arrived on time at the Jersey Shore Ice Rink to take the bus but asked if he and a fellow teammate could walk to a nearby Wawa to buy food. When plaintiff and his teammate did not arrive back to the bus by the appointed time, the bus left without them. Plaintiff and his teammate then entered the Jersey Shore Ice Rink and decided to go on the ice without skates or helmets in violation of the rules of the rink. Plaintiff and his teammate were removed from the ice. An incident report was prepared by an employee of the rink memorializing the event. According to defendant, plaintiff also violated the rules of his billet house where he was residing. The alleged breach involved not respecting the house rules which was a condition of the contract.
A billet house provides lodging to players.
Based upon these incidents, defendant alleged that plaintiff was in material breach of the contract and he was removed from the club. Thereafter, plaintiff filed a lawsuit in the Law Division, Special Civil Part, seeking return of his payment to defendant. In response, defendant filed an answer and counterclaim. The counterclaim sought payment of the remaining monies owed by plaintiff in accord with the provisions of the contract.
A bench trial commenced on December 1, 2014, and was continued to completion on December 24, 2014. At the conclusion of the case, the trial judge issued an oral opinion from the bench which held that defendant used the incidents complained of as an excuse to terminate the contract. In essence, the judge held that the alleged violations of conduct were not so severe or material as to cause plaintiff's dismissal from the hockey club. The judge ordered defendant to refund the monies paid by plaintiff except for $500 which the court calculated as payment for plaintiff's stay at the billet home. The judge further held that defendant failed by a preponderance of the evidence to prove its counterclaim. This appeal followed.
Defendant raises the following arguments on appeal:
[POINT I]
THE COURT ERRED IN NOT ALLOWING [AN] INCIDENT REPORT UNDER THE BUSINESS RECORD EXCEPTION.
[POINT II]
THE COURT MADE A REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT AWARDED DAMAGES TO THE PLAINTIFF/RESPONDENT WITHOUT FINDING WHICH PARTY WAS IN MATERIAL BREACH OF THE CONTRACT.
[POINT III]
THE COURT ERRED IN AWARDING DAMAGES THAT WERE NOT CORRECT BASED ON THE FACTS PRESENTED.
[POINT IV]
THE COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE APPELLANT'S COUNTERCLAIMS WITHOUT FIRST DETERMINING WHICH PARTY WAS IN MATERIAL BREACH.
[POINT V]
THE TRIAL COURT INAPPROPRIATELY MADE JUDICIAL NOTICE DURING ORDER.
Our review of the factual findings made by the trial judge in a non-jury trial is limited. Estate of Ostlund v. Ostlund, 391 N.J. Super. 390, 400 (App. Div. 2007). "[W]e do not weigh the evidence, assess the credibility of witnesses, or make conclusions about the evidence." Mountain Hill, L.L.C. v. Twp. of Middletown, 399 N.J. Super. 486, 498 (App. Div. 2008) (quoting State v. Barone, 147 N.J. 599, 615 (1997)). In general, the judge's factual "findings . . . should not be disturbed unless . . . they are so wholly insupportable as to result in a denial of justice[.]" Rova Farms Resort, Inc., v. Inv'rs Ins. Co. of Am., 65 N.J. 474, 483-84 (1974) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). However, "[a] trial court's interpretation of the law and the legal consequences that flow from established facts are not entitled to any special deference." Manalapan Realty, L.P. v. Twp. Comm., 140 N.J. 366, 378 (1995).
At trial, the judge heard testimony from plaintiff, plaintiff's mother, a representative for defendant, and the hockey club's coach with respect to the bases for the claimed breach of contract and the counterclaim. The judge also made evidentiary rulings barring the admission of the incident report into evidence, and taking judicial notice of the location of the Wawa. Among defendant's arguments is that the judge erred in not making a finding as to which party was in material breach of the contract. We disagree.
A breach is material if it goes to the "essence" of the contract. Neptune Research & Dev., Inc., v. Teknics Indus. Sys., Inc., 235 N.J. Super. 522, 532 (App. Div. 1989); Ross Sys. v. Linden Dari-Delite, Inc., 35 N.J. 329, 341 (1961). Whether a breach is material is a question of fact. Murphy v. Implicito, 392 N.J. Super. 245, 265 (App. Div. 2007); Magnet Res., Inc. v. Summit MRI, Inc., 318 N.J. Super. 275, 286 (App. Div. 1998).
In reviewing a trial court's findings of fact, we will only determine "whether the findings made could reasonably have been reached on sufficient or substantial credible evidence present in the record, considering the proof as a whole." Quality Guaranteed Roofing, Inc., v. Hoffmann-La Roche, Inc., 302 N.J. Super. 163, 166 (App. Div. 1997); see also Brunson v. Affinity Fed. Credit Union, 199 N.J. 381, 397 (2009); Rova Farms, supra, 65 N.J. at 484. Here, the clear import of the judge's decision was that plaintiff, even by his admitted conduct, was not in material breach of the contract. The judge concluded that plaintiff's removal from the hockey club was predicated upon defendant's pre-textual claim of code of conduct violations, which the judge rejected as violations not supportive of removal. Similarly, the judge's dismissal of the counterclaim due to defendant's failure to meet its burden of persuasion was grounded in the finding that there was an insufficient basis for defendant to terminate the contract. As such, defendant materially breached the contract by removing plaintiff and was not entitled to the damages it sought. "[A] material breach by either party to a bilateral contract excuses the other party from rendering any further contractual performance." Magnet Res., supra, 318 N.J. Super. at 285 (citing Nolan v. Lee Ho, 120 N.J. 465, 472 (1990)). This would include the additional payment sought by defendant from plaintiff in its counterclaim.
The judge found that defendant's "motive" was to remove plaintiff due to his lack of hockey skills and poor leadership. Although there was no direct evidence of the "motive," the judge could have reasonably drawn this inference from the trial record in his role as factfinder. --------
In sum, based upon our assessment of the testimony and documentary evidence, we are satisfied the record supports the judge's factual findings and legal conclusions. There was sufficient, credible evidence for the judge to find that defendant's breach was material as it deprived plaintiff the benefit of playing for the hockey club — the "essence" of the contract. Moreover, we discern no basis to second-guess the judge's rulings with respect to the complaint and counterclaim nor as to the findings as to the appropriate measure of damages.
Finally, we review a trial judge's evidentiary rulings under an abuse of discretion standard. Estate of Hanges v. Metro. Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 202 N.J. 369, 383-84 (2010). We give substantial deference to the trial judge's discretion on evidentiary rulings. Benevenga v. Digregorio, 325 N.J. Super. 27, 32 (App. Div. 1999), certif. denied, 163 N.J. 79 (2000). We will not reverse unless the trial judge's ruling was "so wide off the mark that a manifest denial of justice resulted[.]" Brenman v. Demello, 191 N.J. 18, 31 (2007) (quoting Green v. N.J. Mfrs. Ins. Co., 160 N.J. 480, 492 (1999)). Here, even were we to disagree with the judge's evidentiary rulings, taken in context, the rulings did not result in a denial of justice.
Affirmed. I hereby certify that the foregoing is a true copy of the original on file in my office.
CLERK OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION