Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County. No. BC375574, Amy D. Hogue, Judge.
Simon, Eddins & Greenstone, Brian P. Barrow for Plaintiffs and Appellants.
DeHay & Elliston, Joanna L. MacQueen; Herrick & Associates, David P. Herrick for Defendant and Respondent.
BOREN, P.J.
INTRODUCTION
Plaintiffs and appellants, the family members of a man who died from asbestos-related mesothelioma, appeal from summary judgment granted in favor of the respondent, Pneumo-Abex, LLC (Abex). In moving for summary judgment, Abex argued and presented evidence showing that plaintiffs’ only evidence of exposure to asbestos-containing Abex products was inadmissible hearsay, and therefore that plaintiffs could not prove causation. In their opposition, plaintiffs did not address the issues of admissibility and hearsay, and did not present any evidence of exposure differing from the sort that Abex had identified as inadmissible. The trial court agreed with Abex that the evidence was inadmissible and granted summary judgment.
On appeal, plaintiffs now make various arguments, which were never made in the trial court, that their exposure evidence was admissible. We hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding the exposure evidence inadmissible. Since plaintiffs could not prove causation without admissible evidence, summary judgment was properly granted.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Decedent Donald Smalley died of mesothelioma in September 2007. Following his death, Smalley’s family members filed a first amended complaint for wrongful death. The complaint alleged that Smalley was exposed to asbestos-containing products, including through his work as an electrician, and that this exposure caused his mesothelioma. Abex, a manufacturer of automotive brake pads and other brake-related “friction” products, was one of approximately 30 named defendants. Abex manufactured and sold asbestos-containing brake products until 1987.
Plaintiffs identified Mitchell and Michael Smalley, sons of Donald Smalley and two of the plaintiffs in the case, as the witnesses with knowledge of Smalley’s alleged exposure to asbestos-containing Abex products. Depositions were taken of Mitchell and Michael. Each testified that Smalley routinely changed the brakes on the family vehicles, and that they knew he used Abex brakes.
For ease and clarity of reference, we refer to Mitchell and Michael Smalley by their first names in this opinion, with no disrespect intended.
Abex brought a motion for summary judgment. In support of this motion, Abex presented plaintiffs’ responses to interrogatories, requests for admissions, and requests for production, as well as plaintiffs’ case report. It also submitted pertinent portions from the transcripts of Mitchell’s and Michael’s depositions.
The primary argument in Abex’s motion was that the only identification of Smalley’s exposure to Abex brakes came from Mitchell’s and Michael’s deposition testimony, that the pertinent testimony was hearsay and inadmissible, and that therefore plaintiffs could not establish the causation necessary to prove their claims. Abex presented portions of Mitchell’s testimony stating that he knew his father used Abex brakes because he saw Abex-labeled packaging holding the brake parts. Abex argued that such testimony was inadmissible pursuant to DiCola v. White Brothers Performance Products, Inc. (2008) 158 Cal.App.4th 666 (DiCola), which found a package label to be hearsay when used to identify the product in the package. (Id. at p. 680.) Abex also argued that Michael’s testimony, stating that he knew his father purchased Abex brakes because he would hear him ask for Abex brakes at the auto parts store, was inadmissible hearsay because it relied on out-of-court statements offered for the sole purpose of proving Smalley purchased Abex brakes.
Plaintiffs filed an opposition to the motion for summary judgment but, strangely, did not address any of Abex’s hearsay and admissibility arguments. Rather, plaintiffs merely argued that Abex did not satisfy its initial burden in moving for summary judgment, and that the burden therefore never shifted to plaintiffs to show a triable issue of material fact. Plaintiffs also asserted that there was “plentiful evidence” that Smalley was exposed to asbestos from working with Abex brakes. In support of this assertion, plaintiffs submitted the entirety of Mitchell’s and Michael’s deposition transcripts, and repeatedly cited to the same pieces of testimony throughout the response to Abex’s separate statement. None of the cited testimony, however, showed that either Michael or Mitchell had a basis for believing that Smalley used Abex brakes aside from seeing the labeling on the packaging or hearing him ask for them. Moreover, the testimony cited by plaintiffs in their separate statement of additional material facts provided additional examples of the type of testimony that Abex had argued was inadmissible hearsay.
Abex thereafter filed a reply brief, pointing out plaintiffs’ failure to address the hearsay and admissibility arguments. Abex’s response to plaintiffs’ separate statement of additional material facts also stated that the testimony regarding the purchase of Abex parts was inadmissible hearsay.
Prior to the hearing on the motion for summary judgment, the trial court issued a tentative ruling to grant the motion on the ground argued by Abex, that the only evidence connecting Smalley to Abex was Mitchell’s and Michael’s deposition testimony, the relevant parts of which were inadmissible hearsay. After the tentative ruling was issued, plaintiffs briefly addressed the hearsay problem at the hearing, arguing that at least one piece of Michael’s testimony was not hearsay.
The court took the matter under submission, and later that day issued an order granting summary judgment in favor of Abex and against plaintiffs. The order stated how Mitchell and Michael were plaintiffs’ sole witnesses for purposes of brake product identification, and that their testimony that Smalley worked with asbestos-containing Abex products rested on inadmissible hearsay. The court held that without admissible evidence that Smalley was exposed to the products, Abex was entitled to summary judgment. Judgment was later entered. Plaintiffs appeal.
DISCUSSION
In general, we review a trial court’s decision on summary judgment de novo, determining independently whether the facts not subject to dispute support summary judgment. (Intel Corp. v. Hamidi (2003) 30 Cal.4th 1342, 1348.) Doubts are resolved in favor of the party opposing the judgment, and we are not bound by the trial court’s reasons for the summary judgment ruling. (Conte v. Wyeth, Inc. (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 89, 97; M.B. v. City of San Diego (1991) 233 Cal.App.3d 699, 703–704; Knapp v. Doherty (2004) 123 Cal.App.4th 76, 85.) Evidentiary rulings made in the context of summary judgment, however, are generally subject to an abuse of discretion review. (Landale-Cameron Court, Inc. v. Ahonen (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 1401, 1407; In re S.A. (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 1128, 1135; Alexander v. Codemasters Group Limited (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 129, 140 fn. 3.)
Plaintiffs make two primary arguments in seeking reversal of the summary judgment: first, that Abex did not meet its initial burden in moving for summary judgment, and, second, that the trial court improperly found the relevant deposition testimony was inadmissible hearsay. The first argument is subject to de novo review. The second argument centers around the trial court’s evidentiary ruling, which will not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion.
I. Abex Met Its Initial Burden in Moving for Summary Judgment
Plaintiffs argue that Abex failed to meet its initial burden in moving for summary judgment because it did not submit any affirmative evidence showing that Smalley did not use its brake products. They contend that Abex’s presentation of plaintiffs’ discovery responses and deposition testimony was insufficient, and that Abex was obligated to produce evidence showing “affirmative reasons” why Smalley could not have used Abex brakes, such as the brakes being unavailable during the relevant time period or being incompatible with the vehicles at issue. Plaintiffs also argue that the trial court improperly drew factual inferences in Abex’s favor.
Summary judgment must be granted if the papers show an absence of triable issues of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (c).) A defendant meets its initial burden on summary judgment by showing that one or more elements of the plaintiff’s cause of action cannot be established, or that the cause of action is subject to a complete defense. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(2).) The burden then shifts to the plaintiff to show a triable issue of fact as to that cause of action or defense. (Ibid.)
The standards applicable to these burdens were comprehensively explained by our Supreme Court in Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826 (Aguilar), which identified several burdens applicable to summary judgment motions in general. First, throughout the summary judgment process, the party moving for summary judgment generally bears the burden of persuasion that there is no triable issue of material fact and that summary judgment is proper as a matter of law. (Id. at p. 850). This burden is subject to the standard of proof that would be required at trial. (Ibid.) Second, the moving party bears an initial burden of production “to make a prima facie showing of the nonexistence of any triable issue of material fact; if he carries his burden of production, he causes a shift, and the opposing party is then subjected to a burden of production of his own to make a prima facie showing of the existence of a triable issue of material fact.” (Ibid.) Third, the manner in which a party carries its burden of persuasion and/or production depends on the applicable burden of proof at trial. (Id. at p. 851.) Thus, if a defendant moves for summary judgment against a plaintiff who would bear a preponderance of evidence burden of proof at trial, the defendant “must present evidence that would require a reasonable trier of fact not to find any underlying material fact more likely than not....” (Ibid., original italics.)
The Aguilar decision noted how, under federal standards for summary judgment, a defendant need not present evidence showing that an element of a cause of action cannot be established; rather, the defendant may simply point out that the plaintiff does not possess and cannot reasonably obtain necessary evidence. (Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th p. 845.) The law in California, on the other hand, still requires a defendant moving for summary judgment to produce evidence. (Id. at pp. 854-855.) Nevertheless, California summary judgment law has changed so that it now largely conforms to its previously more liberal federal counterpart. (Id. at pp. 848-849.) Thus, a defendant moving for summary judgment is not required “to conclusively negate an element of the plaintiff’s cause of action.” (Id. at p. 853.) The defendant need only show that one element of the plaintiff’s cause of action cannot be established, and may do this by presenting evidence that the plaintiff does not possess and cannot reasonably obtain evidence needed to establish the element. (Id. at p. 854.) The defendant can make this showing by presenting evidence obtained through discovery. (Id. at pp. 854-855.)
We find that Abex met its initial burden of production by making a prima facie showing that plaintiffs did not have and could not obtain admissible evidence necessary to show causation. In order for plaintiffs to state a viable claim, they had to be able to prove Smalley’s exposure to asbestos-containing Abex products. “A threshold issue in asbestos litigation is exposure to the defendant’s product. The plaintiff bears the burden on this issue. (Rutherford v. Owens-Illinois, Inc. (1997) 16 Cal.4th 953, 975-976; Lineaweaver v. Plant Insulation Co. (1995) 31 Cal.App.4th 1409, 1415-1416.) If there has been no exposure, there is no causation. (Dumin v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp. (1994) 28 Cal.App.4th 650, 655.)” (McGonnell v. Kaiser Gypsum Co. (2002) 98 Cal.App.4th 1098, 1103.) In an asbestos case, a plaintiff can prove causation by showing that the plaintiff’s or decedent’s exposure to the defendant’s asbestos-containing product was in reasonable medical probability a substantial factor in contributing to the aggregate dose of asbestos inhaled or ingested by the plaintiff or decedent, and thus to the risk of developing asbestos-related cancer. (Ibid.; Rutherford, at pp. 976-977.) Abex’s presentation of evidence showing that plaintiffs did not have and could not produce admissible evidence proving exposure was proper, and sufficient to shift the burden to plaintiffs. (See Rio Linda Unified School Dist. v. Superior Court (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 732, 741 [summary judgment required because only evidence of causation was inadmissible hearsay]; Wiz Technology, Inc. v. Coopers & Lybrand (2003) 106 Cal.App.4th 1, 16 [lack of admissible evidence supporting causation mandated summary judgment].)
Plaintiffs contend that Abex was required to submit “affirmative evidence” showing that Smalley was not, and could not have been, exposed to asbestos-containing Abex products. This is not the law, however. Abex was not required to conclusively negate the causation element of plaintiffs’ claim. (Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 853.) Equally unconvincing is plaintiffs’ argument that Abex was improperly allowed to shift the burden just by pointing out deficiencies. Abex did more than simply contend plaintiffs lacked necessary evidence. In support of its motion, Abex presented plaintiffs’ discovery responses from throughout the case, demonstrating plaintiffs’ sole reliance on Mitchell’s and Michael’s testimony to prove Smalley’s exposure to the asbestos-containing Abex products, and Abex sufficiently showed that the relevant portions of the testimony were inadmissible hearsay. It thus presented prima facie evidence of plaintiffs’ inability to prove causation.
As for plaintiffs’ argument that the trial court improperly drew inferences in Abex’s favor, this argument confuses the court’s function in determining whether Abex met its initial burden with the court’s function of ruling on the admissibility of evidence. Plaintiffs could not prove their claims without admissible evidence that Smalley was exposed to Abex’s asbestos-containing products (See McGonnell v. Kaiser Gypsum Co., supra, 98 Cal.App.4th at p. 1103), and the trial court did not improperly favor Abex in making this determination.
Again, to meet its initial burden, Abex was not required to conclusively negate plaintiffs’ claim. (See Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 850 [“It would make little, if any, sense to allow for the shifting of a burden of persuasion. For if the moving party carries a burden of persuasion, the opposing party can do nothing other than concede”].) Abex’s prima facie showing sufficiently satisfied the moving party’s initial burden. (See id., at p. 851 [“A prima facie showing is one that is sufficient to support the position of the party in question.... No more is called for”].) Plaintiffs still had the opportunity to respond to Abex’s motion, and could have attempted to counter it by showing that the relied-upon testimony was admissible, by presenting admissible evidence that established exposure and causation, or even by presenting competent evidence showing they may be able to obtain admissible evidence but could not present it at the time. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subds. (h), (p)(2).) But, as discussed below, plaintiffs did none of these things.
II. The Burden Shifted to Plaintiffs to Produce Admissible Evidence Raising a Triable Issue of Material Fact.
Once a defendant moving for summary judgment meets its initial burden, the burden then shifts to the plaintiff, who is “subjected to a burden of production of his own to make a prima facie showing of the existence of a genuine issue of material fact.” (Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 845.) The plaintiff cannot satisfy this burden merely through speculation or conjecture, but instead must produce admissible evidence raising a triable issue of fact. (Crouse v. Brobeck, Phleger & Harrison (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 1509, 1524.) “[A] complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party’s case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial. [Citation.]” (Committee to Save the Beverly Highlands Homes Assn. v. Beverly Highlands Homes Assn. (2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 1247, 1261.) Moreover, as we have previously held, “the opposition to summary judgment will be deemed insufficient when it is essentially conclusionary, argumentative or based on conjecture and speculation.” (Wiz Technology, Inc. v. Coopers & Lybrand, supra, 106 Cal.App.4th at 11.)
The primary basis of Abex’s motion for summary judgment was that plaintiffs did not have and could not produce admissible evidence proving Smalley’s exposure to the asbestos-laden Abex products. In response, plaintiffs produced further evidence of the kind already submitted by Abex, showing that Michael and Mitchell’s basis for believing that their father used Abex brakes was from seeing the label on the packaging or hearing him ask for Abex. Plaintiffs complacently concluded there was “plentiful evidence” that Smalley was exposed to asbestos from the Abex brakes.
In their opposition, plaintiffs did not attempt to argue that any of this evidence was admissible. They did not argue that the evidence they presented was not hearsay, or that the evidence fell within an exception to the hearsay rule. The opposition papers did not attempt to distinguish, or even mention, DiCola, supra, 158 Cal.App.4th 666. Plaintiffs did not submit evidence of exposure not subject to Abex’s hearsay objections, or contend they could obtain admissible evidence of exposure. Indeed, the words “hearsay” and “admissibility” did not even appear in plaintiffs’ opposition.
When a defendant meets its initial burden by showing the plaintiff cannot establish an essential element in its case, and the evidence submitted by plaintiff in response does not show that a triable issue of fact with respect to that element exists, “no amount of factual conflicts upon other aspects of the case will affect the result and the motion for summary judgment should be granted.” (Frazier, Dame, Doherty, Parrish & Hanawalt v. Boccardo, Blum, Lull, Niland, Teerlink & Bell (1977) 70 Cal.App.3d 331, 338.) Plaintiffs put their case in the trial court’s hands by disregarding the primary basis of the summary judgment motion, that the only evidence of exposure was inadmissible, apparently hoping the court would make an argument that plaintiffs never made themselves. The risks of this approach should have been obvious. If the court properly found the evidence inadmissible, summary judgment was required.
III. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in Finding Plaintiffs’ Evidence of Exposure Inadmissible
The trial court’s evidentiary rulings are reviewed for abuse of discretion. (Landale-Cameron Court, Inc. v. Ahonen, supra, 155 Cal.App.4th at p. 1407; In re S.A., supra, 182 Cal.App.4th at p. 1135; Alexander v. Codemasters Group Limited, supra, 104 Cal.App.4th at p. 140, fn. 3.) We are not authorized to substitute our judgment of the correct result for the decision of the lower court. (In re Marriage of Eben-King & King (2000) 80 Cal.App.4th 92, 118.) “[A]s long as there exists ‘a reasonable or even fairly debatable justification, under the law, for the action taken, such action will not be here set aside, even if, as a question of first impression, we might feel inclined to take a different view from that of the court below as to the propriety of its action.’ [Citation.]” (Gonzales v. Nork (1978) 20 Cal.3d 500, 507.) We examine whether the trial court abused its discretion in light of the circumstances before it. (Ibid.) The trial court’s decision will be disturbed only if “no judge could have reasonably reached the challenged result. [Citation.]” (Guimei v. General Electric Co. (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 689, 696.)
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining that plaintiffs’ evidence of exposure to Abex’s products was inadmissible, particularly in light of the circumstances before the trial court. Plaintiffs, of course, did not present any argument that any of the exposure evidence was admissible prior to the hearing. At the hearing, the trial court noted that it had read through the relevant deposition testimony showing that the bases for Mitchell and Michael’s belief that their father used Abex brakes was either from viewing packaging with Abex labeling or from hearing him ask for Abex. At the hearing, Plaintiffs finally argued that one piece of Michael’s testimony was admissible: “As I said, people like Coke or Pepsi. He liked Abex brakes. We’d hear Abex. Every time I’d go in, I’d hear him say Abex from being very little. Later when I got older, I was old enough to drive, he would occasionally send me down. There was a few instances where he would send me down for brake parts and ask me to make sure that I got Abex.”
It was not an abuse of discretion for the trial court to find this testimony was inadmissible hearsay. “‘Hearsay evidence’ is evidence of a statement that was made other than by a witness while testifying at the hearing and that is offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted.” (Evid. Code § 1200, subd. (a).) Plaintiffs asserted they knew Smalley used Abex brakes because Michael would “hear Abex, ” he would “hear [Smalley] say Abex, ” and Smalley would “ask [Michael] to make sure that I got Abex.” The content of this testimony, therefore, was of out-of-court statements made by Smalley, which plaintiffs used to show that he used Abex products. In other words, it was hearsay. Given the circumstances before the trial court, where this was the only evidence presented as nonhearsay, and where no hearsay exception was asserted to apply, the court properly acted within its discretion in finding plaintiffs’ evidence of exposure inadmissible.
Plaintiffs did not make any showing or argument below that Mitchell’s testimony, in which he stated he knew his father used Abex brakes because he viewed boxes labeled “Abex, ” was admissible. The trial court based its ruling that the evidence was inadmissible on DiCola, which found a package label reading “Burly Brands” hearsay because it was an extrajudicial assertion “offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted, namely, that the box contained a ‘Burly Brands’... product.” (158 Cal.App.4th at p. 681.) The court did not abuse its discretion in following this reasoning, as Mitchell’s testimony of seeing boxes labeled “Abex” was offered to prove that the boxes contained Abex brakes.
Plaintiffs argue that they presented a third type of testimony, that Smalley preferred Abex brakes and always used them. Plaintiffs never sought to make this distinction in the trial court. In any event, the passages cited by plaintiffs for this argument rely on Smalley “requesting” parts and “asking for” brake parts. The trial court had a reasonable justification for determining that the testimony offered to show Smalley’s exposure to Abex parts was hearsay, particularly in light of plaintiffs’ nonexistent showing to the contrary.
Our decision here is largely dependent on the record in this case, and the issues placed before the trial court. An appellate court’s ruling that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by finding certain evidence inadmissible is not authority for the proposition that similar evidence must be excluded in another case. (Pannu v. Land Rover North America, Inc. (2011) 191 Cal.App.4th 1298, 1318.)
On appeal, plaintiffs assert for the first time that various hearsay exceptions apply which would render the testimony regarding the package labeling admissible. Abex asserts that these arguments should not be considered because they were not raised in the trial court. Given the circumstances of this case, we agree that principals of forfeiture apply and prevent plaintiffs from belatedly arguing these exceptions. (See DiCola, supra, 158 Cal.App.4th at p. 677; Premier Medical Management Systems, Inc. v. California Ins. Guarantee Assn. (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 550, 564; Waisbren v. Peppercorn Productions, Inc. (1995) 41 Cal.App.4th 246, 263.) “[W]e are not obliged to consider arguments or theories... that were not advanced by plaintiffs in the trial court.” (DiCola, supra, 158 Cal.App.4th at p. 676; see also American Continental Ins. Co. v. C & Z Timber Co. (1987) 195 Cal.App.3d 1271, 1281 [“Generally, the rules relating to the scope of appellate review apply to appellate review of summary judgments. [Citation.] An argument or theory will generally not be considered if it is raised for the first time on appeal”].) This decision is further compelled by the rule that the proponent of a hearsay exception bears the burden of showing the exception applies. (Gatton v. A.P. Green Services, Inc. (1998) 64 Cal.App.4th 688, 693; Byars v. SCME Mortgage Bankers, Inc. (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 1134, 1150.) Plaintiffs did not attempt to show in the trial court that any hearsay exceptions applied, and, moreover, have not shown that the foundational facts necessary for such exceptions were present. They cannot argue now on appeal that the trial court erred by failing to apply unraised exceptions.
The same analysis applies with respect to plaintiffs’ argument that the Abex box labeling was admissible circumstantial evidence. In the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals case relied on by plaintiffs, United States v. Snow (9th Cir. 1975) 517 F.2d 441, the prosecution built a “careful foundation” allowing for the admissibility of the evidence, a piece of tape with the defendant’s name on it that was affixed to a brief case. (Id. at p. 444.) We are, of course, not bound by the federal court’s ruling. (Kirchmann v. Lake Elsinore Unified School Dist. (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 1098, 1105.) In any event, the record reveals no such foundation laid here, and, furthermore, the issue was not raised in the trial court.
IV. Plaintiffs’ Protestations About Improperly Asserted Evidentiary Objections Ring Hollow.
Finally, plaintiffs argue that the trial court’s ruling regarding their evidence of exposure should not be considered under an abuse of discretion standard of review because Abex did not file written objections that complied with California Rules of Court, rule 3.1354. While plaintiffs are correct that asserting objections properly is an important procedural requirement, their argument disregards the posture of Abex’s motion for summary judgment. Abex presented plaintiffs’ evidence of exposure in its moving papers, and argued directly in the papers that the evidence was inadmissible; this, in fact, was the heart of Abex’s motion. Abex was not obligated to file preemptive formal evidentiary objections, or wait until plaintiffs filed their opposition to argue that plaintiffs’ evidence was inadmissible. Although Abex would have been well advised to file formal, rule 3.1354-compliant written objections after plaintiffs submitted their opposition papers, this omission was mitigated by the fact that the hearsay and admissibility issue had been prominently raised in the moving papers and was completely disregarded in the opposing papers. Plaintiffs were not prejudiced by Abex’s failure to file rule 3.1354-compliant evidentiary objections.
Abex also conspicuously argued that plaintiffs’ exposure evidence was inadmissible in its reply brief, as well as in its response to plaintiffs’ separate statement.
Plaintiffs’ argument also disregards the rule that evidentiary objections may be made orally at hearing. (Reid v. Google, Inc. (2010) 50 Cal.4th 512, 525-526.) The primary subject of the hearing on the motion for summary judgment was whether plaintiffs’ evidence constituted inadmissible hearsay. The court raised the issue in its tentative ruling, and plaintiffs’ counsel was given full opportunity to argue it, including by reference to individual pieces of testimony. Plaintiffs never objected, either in writing or at hearing, to Abex’s presentation of its hearsay argument. We are not inclined to deviate from the standard abuse of discretion review for evidentiary rulings, particularly when plaintiffs had plenty of opportunity to object to the alleged deficiencies of Abex’s papers in the trial court and never did so. (Steven W. v. Matthew S. (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 1108, 1117 [“An appellate court will not consider procedural defects or erroneous rulings where an objection could have been, but was not, raised in the court below”]; McGonnell v. Kaiser Gypsum Co., supra, 98 Cal.App.4th at p. 1103.)
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
We concur: DOI TODD, J., CHAVEZ, J.