No. 05-02-01328-CR
Opinion Filed September 10, 2003. DO NOT PUBLISH. Tex.R.App.P. 47
On Appeal from the 195th Judicial District Court, Dallas County, Texas, Trial Court Cause No. F01-60157-TN. AFFIRM
Before Justices MOSELEY, RICHTER, and FRANCIS.
Opinion By Justice RICHTER.
A jury convicted Bryant Keith Small of evading arrest or detention while using a motor vehicle. Appellant had one prior evading arrest conviction. After the jury found him guilty, appellant and the State entered into an agreement for punishment. The trial court found one enhancement paragraph true and sentenced appellant to fifteen years' confinement. In two points of error, appellant contends the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to sustain the conviction. We affirm the trial court's judgment.
Background
At 3:30 a.m. on December 17, 2001, Dallas police officer Monty Henson was on routine patrol in the south Dallas area when he saw a vehicle parked in the 2700 block of Marburg Street. Henson checked the vehicle's license plate number and found it had been reported stolen from Tarrant County. Five minutes later, Henson saw appellant get into the vehicle and drive north onto Malcolm X Boulevard. Henson followed appellant and radioed for backup officers. Officer Clayton Edwards joined Henson within two minutes. After appellant drove a few more blocks, another patrol car pulled behind Edwards. Henson and the two other officers activated the lights and sirens on their patrol cars. Appellant did not pull his vehicle over even though there were no other cars on the road and appellant had many opportunities to fully stop. Henson testified appellant did not speed and stopped at all signs and traffic lights, but appellant refused to stop his vehicle. At one point, five patrol cars with their lights and sirens activated were following appellant. Appellant finally stopped in the 1600 block of Marburg. Henson testified appellant was cooperative and got out of the vehicle and lay on the ground when asked to do so. Appellant told Henson he lived on that street, but appellant did not know the house number. Appellant did not give Henson any explanation for his failure to pull over when the officers activated their lights and sirens. Appellant testified his uncle Walter, who lived in Fort Worth, gave him keys to the vehicle the previous week. Appellant stated the vehicle was a rental car that he had been driving for seven days although his name was not on the rental agreement. Appellant was to return the car on December 17, 2001. Appellant testified he drove to a friend's house in the early morning on December 17, 2001 to find a man named Rashard. When he realized Rashard was not at the friend's house, appellant left after only a few minutes. Appellant saw a police officer looking at the car. The patrol car followed appellant as he drove onto Malcolm X Boulevard. Appellant testified he never intended to evade police, and he did not stop only because he wanted to drive the car to his home located at 1636 Marburg so it would not be towed. Appellant intended to give the car keys to relatives so they could return the car to the rental company. Appellant admitted he could have stopped the car a "couple of times," but stated he was afraid to stop because he had an outstanding warrant for a parole violation and he knew he would be arrested and the car would be towed. Appellant testified the police did not activate their lights and sirens until he was a few blocks from his home. When appellant got out of the car and was arrested, he explained to the officers why he continued driving. Appellant further testified he had a prior evading arrest conviction and a felony conviction. Applicable Law
In reviewing the legal sufficiency of the evidence, we examine the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict to determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 318-19 (1979). In a factual sufficiency review, we determine whether a neutral review of all the evidence demonstrates the proof of guilt is so obviously weak as to undermine confidence in the jury's determination, or the proof of guilt, although adequate if taken alone, is greatly outweighed by contrary proof. See Johnson v. State, 23 S.W.3d 1, 11 (Tex.Crim.App. 2000). The jury is the exclusive judge of the facts provided and of the weight to be given to the testimony. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 38.04 (Vernon 1979). While the reviewing court has some authority to disregard evidence that supports the verdict, it may not substitute its own determination for that of the jury. See Ortiz v. State, 93 S.W.3d 79, 87-88 (Tex.Crim.App. 2002); Scott v. State, 934 S.W.2d 396, 399 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1996, no pet.). The State was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant, while using a vehicle, intentionally fled from a person appellant knew was a peace officer attempting lawfully to arrest or detain him, and appellant had been previously convicted of evading arrest. See Tex. Pen. Code Ann. § 38.04 (Vernon 2003). Discussion
Appellant argues the evidence is legally and factually insufficient because no evidence was introduced establishing he intended to evade police officers. Appellant argues that he only drove a few blocks after officers activated their lights and sirens, and he only intended to drive the vehicle home so it would not be towed. The State responds the evidence is legally and factually sufficient to show appellant intentionally failed to stop his vehicle when officers activated their lights and sirens and he continued to drive while being pursued by several patrol cars. We agree with the State. Henson testified appellant did not pull over and continued to drive after he and other officers activated the lights and sirens on their patrol cars. Edwards testified he and other officers followed appellant with their lights and sirens activated for two to three miles before appellant finally pulled his vehicle over. Appellant testified he was only trying to drive the car home so it would not be towed by police, and he explained the situation to police when he was arrested. Henson testified appellant offered no explanation as to why he failed to pull his vehicle over. Although there were conflicts in the evidence, appellant admitted he was trying to evade police until he could get his car home. Reconciliation of the conflicts was within the exclusive province of the jury. See Goodman v. State, 66 S.W.3d 283, 287 (Tex.Crim.App. 2001). Having reviewed the evidence under the appropriate standards, we conclude it is legally and factually sufficient to support appellant's conviction. See Jackson, 443 U.S. at 318-19; Johnson, 23 S.W.3d at 11. Accordingly, we overrule appellant's two points of error. We affirm the trial court's judgment.