Moreover, the trial court was under no duty to prepare findings of fact and conclusions of law in the absence of a timely request. (Rule 232, Cal. Rules of Court; Small v. Smith (1971) 16 Cal.App.3d 450, 455 [ 94 Cal.Rptr. 136].) There was no error.

Ettinger in turn relied on cases holding that this heightened standard of proof applies in proceedings to disbar an attorney or to suspend or revoke a real estate license. ( Id. at p. 855, citing Furman v. State Bar (1938) 12 Cal.2d 212, 229 [ 83 P.2d 12] ( Furman); Small v. Smith (1971) 16 Cal.App.3d 450, 457 [ 94 Cal.Rptr. 136] ( Small); Realty Projects, Inc. v. Smith (1973) 32 Cal.App.3d 204, 212 [ 108 Cal.Rptr. 71] ( Realty Projects); see also Kapelus v. State Bar (1987) 44 Cal.3d 179, 184, fn. 1 [ 242 Cal.Rptr. 196, 745 P.2d 917] ( Kapelus); cf. San Benito Foods v. Veneman (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 1889, 1892-1895 [ 58 Cal.Rptr.2d 571] [heightened standard of proof not required in proceeding to revoke nonprofessional food processing license]; Mann v. Department of Motor Vehicles (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 312, 318-320 [ 90 Cal.Rptr.2d 277] [same with respect to vehicle salesperson's license].) Although Owen does not cite any case that holds the clear and convincing evidence standard of proof applies in a licensed contractor disciplinary proceeding, the Registrar does not dispute that the higher standard would apply in a proceeding seeking suspension, or revocation of a contractor's license.

Appellant contends that in cases involving the revocation or suspension of professional licenses, a higher degree of proof is warranted. In support of this contention, appellant cites such cases as Furman v. State Bar (1938) 12 Cal.2d 212 [ 83 P.2d 12]; Realty Projects, Inc. v. Smith (1973) 32 Cal.App.3d 204 [ 108 Cal.Rptr. 71]; and Small v. Smith (1971) 16 Cal.App.3d 450 [ 94 Cal.Rptr. 136], concerning disciplinary actions against attorneys and real estate brokers. Both Realty Projects and Small required that a professional licensing agency must use a higher standard of proof in disciplinary proceedings against professional licensees.

In administrative proceedings involving the disciplining of licensees the correct standard of proof to be applied would appear to be "convincing proof to a reasonable certainty." (See Furman v. State Bar, 12 Cal.2d 212, 229 [ 83 P.2d 12]; Small v. Smith, 16 Cal.App.3d 450, 457 [ 94 Cal.Rptr. 136].) Appellants contend that in this case the department's hearing officer did not use this standard of proof.

In proceedings for the disbarment of attorneys or for the revocation of real estate licenses, the courts have held that "guilt must be established to a reasonable certainty . . . and cannot be based on surmise or conjecture, suspicion or theoretical conclusions, or uncorroborated hearsay." ( Small v. Smith (1971) 16 Cal.App.3d 450, 457 [ 94 Cal.Rptr. 136].) The same degree of proof should be required for the revocation of a teaching certificate.

(Evid. Code, § 115.) In determining the proper standard of proof to apply in administrative license revocation proceedings, courts have drawn a clear distinction between professional licenses such as those held by doctors (Ettinger v. Board of Medical Quality Assurance (1982) 135 Cal.App.3d 853, 856), lawyers (Furman v. State Bar (1938) 12 Cal.2d 212, 229), and real estate brokers (Small v. Smith (1971) 16 Cal.App.3d 450, 457), and nonprofessional or occupational licenses such as those held by food processors (SanBenito Foods v. Veneman (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 1889, 1894) and vehicle salespersons (Mann v. Department of Motor Vehicles (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 312, 318-319.) Proceedings to revoke professional licenses apply the clear and convincing evidence standard of proof while proceedings to revoke nonprofessional or occupational licenses apply the preponderance of the evidence standard of proof.

[Citations.]" ( Small v. Smith (1971) 16 Cal.App.3d 450, 454-455 [ 94 Cal.Rptr. 136].) Applying the aforementioned rule of appellate review, the record reveals that in late 1982, Clayton Means placed his two homes on the market for sale.

Business and Professions Code section 10176, subdivision (j) provides that the Commissioner may upon verified complaint investigate the actions of any person engaged in the business and may suspend or revoke a real estate license for certain specified conduct, including "[a]ny other conduct, whether of the same or a different character than specified in this section, which constitutes fraud or dishonest dealing." (7) Petitioners cite the case of Small v. Smith (1971) 16 Cal.App.3d 450, 456 [ 94 Cal.Rptr. 136], for the proposition that "dishonest dealing" in the context of a real estate disciplinary proceeding necessarily includes "the element of bad faith. . . . [I]t means fraud, deception, betrayal, faithlessness." Respondent contends on the other hand that a real estate broker often acts in a confidential and fiduciary capacity, requiring that the term "honesty" be given the broadest possible meaning.

Nonetheless, California courts have considered the term dishonesty within various statutory schemes and have relied on the common understanding as described in Hogg v. Real Estate Commissioner (1942) 54 Cal.App.2d 712, 717 [129 Cal.Rptr. 709], involving fraud, deception, betrayal, faithlessness; absence of integrity; a disposition to cheat, deceive, or defraud. (See Small v. Smith (1971) 16 Cal.App.3d 450, 456 [ 94 Cal.Rptr. 136]; Midway School Dist. v. Griffeath (1946) 29 Cal.2d 13, 18 [ 172 P.2d 857]; Taylor v. Bureau of Private Investigators (1954) 128 Cal.App.2d 219, 228 [ 275 P.2d 579]; Gee v. California State Personnel Bd. (1970) 5 Cal.App.3d 713, 718-719 [ 85 Cal.Rptr. 762]; Catricala v. State Personnel Bd. (1974) 43 Cal.App.3d 642, 648-649 [ 118 Cal.Rptr. 89] .) Chodur has not carried his burden of showing the inappropriateness of such a standard. "Dishonest dealing" is not void for vagueness either on its face or in application to the instant case.

On appeal, we normally presume the trial court made all findings necessary to support the judgment. ( Milligan v. Hearing Aid Dispensers Examining Com. (1983) 142 Cal.App.3d 1002, 1004-1005, fn. 3 [ 191 Cal.Rptr. 490]; Small v. Smith (1971) 16 Cal.App.3d 450, 455 [ 94 Cal.Rptr. 136].) However, the judgment here recites only that the court applied the independent judgment rule and denied the petition, nothing more.