Opinion
CASE NO.: 03-80567-CIV-HURLEY
January 21, 2004
ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT CAMILLE FRANZONI'S MOTION TO DISMISS
THIS CAUSE comes before the court upon Defendant, Camille Franzoni's motion to dismiss pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 upon which relief can be granted. Upon review of the motion, the plaintiff's response, and relevant case law, the court denies Ms. Franzoni's motion to dismiss. Plaintiff's complaint alleges a set of facts that, if proven, would allege the violation of a clearly established constitutional right and, thus, defeat Ms. Franzoni's qualified immunity protection.
BACKGROUND
At all relevant times herein, plaintiff S.M. was a foster child in the care and custody of the Florida Department of Children and Families ("DCF"). S.M. alleges that in 1998, contrary to the express advice of her treating professionals, she was illegally and inhumanely confined in a secure lock down facility at the South County Children's Crisis Stabilization Unit ("CCSU") where her freedom and mobility were severely curtailed for thirteen months. At the CCSU, S.M. alleges she was effectively cut off from communication with the outside world; was subjected to strip searches, invasive medical proceedings and psychiatric testing; and had every aspect of her life documented and observed in a prison-like setting. S.M. alleges that her unlawful imprisonment at the CCSU for thirteen months exacerbated her mental condition, caused her condition to deteriorate, and required the use of undue physical (four point) and chemical (psychotropic) restraints.
In addition to filing a complaint against the CCSU and her treating physicians, S.M. also seeks to hold Ms. Franzoni individually liable for the damage caused by her detention, Ms. Franzoni was the Program Administrator for DCF District 9's (Palm Beach County) Alcohol, Drug Abuse, and Mental Health ("ADM") Program. S.M. alleges that Ms. Franzoni was aware of S.M.'s individual circumstances and was deliberately indifferent to her safety and welfare when she failed to take any action to remove S.M. from the CCSU.
Ms. Franzoni moves to dismiss the complaint filed against her by arguing that she is protected by qualified immunity. Ms. Franzoni claims that no statutes or case law clearly establishes that she can be held individually liable for violations such as those alleged by S.M. Plaintiff claims Ms. Franzoni acted with deliberate indifference to her welfare and, thus, is not protected under qualified immunity.
JURISDICTION AND VENUE
This court has federal question jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 because the plaintiff's complaint raises claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The court also possesses supplemental jurisdiction over the plaintiff's state law claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a).
Venue is proper in this district pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(2) because a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claims occurred in Palm Beach County in the Southern District of Florida.
DISCUSSION A. STANDARD OF RE VIEW
A motion to dismiss is appropriate only when it is demonstrated "`beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief." Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957). For the purposes of a motion to dismiss, the complaint is construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and all facts alleged by the plaintiff are accepted as true. See Hishon v. King Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984); see also Wright v. Newsome, 795 F.2d 964, 967 (11th Cir. 1986) ("[W]e may not . . . [dismiss] unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of the claims in the complaint that would entitle him or her to relief") (citation omitted). Furthermore, the threshold is "exceedingly low" for a complaint to survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. Ancata v. Prison Health Servs., Inc., 769 F.2d 700, 703 (11th Cir. 1985). Regardless of the alleged facts, however, a court may dismiss a complaint on a dispositive issue of law. See Marshall County Bd. Of Educ. v. Marshall County Gas Dist., 992 F.2d 1171, 1174 (11th Cir. 1993).
B. DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS
1. Qualified Immunity Under 42 ILS.C. § 1983
Qualified immunity protects government officials performing discretionary functions from suits in their individual capacities unless their conduct violates "clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known." Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730 2002 (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)). Qualified immunity "protect[s] from suit `all but the plainly incompetent or one who is knowingly violating federal law.'" Lee v. Ferraro, 284 F.3d 1188, 1194 (11th Cir. 2002) (quotingWillingham v. Loughnan, 261 F.3d 1178, 1187 (11th Cir. 2001). Questions of qualified immunity should be resolved at the earliest possible stage in the litigation. Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 227 (1991). A district court should therefore grant the defense of qualified immunity on a motion to dismiss if the complaint "fails to allege the violation of a clearly established constitutional right."Chesser v. Sparks, 248 F.3d 1117, 1121 (11th Cir. 2001).
To receive qualified immunity, government officials must first prove that they were acting within their discretionary authority. Vinvard v. Wilson, 311 F.3d 1340, 1346 (11th Cir. 2002). In this case, it is clear — and undisputed — that Ms. Franzoni's actions within DCF were within her discretionary authority.
Once the government officials have established that they were acting within the scope of their discretionary authority, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show that qualified immunity is inappropriate.Id. The Supreme Court has set forth a two part analysis for determining whether qualified immunity is appropriate. Dalrymple v. Reno, 334 F.3d 991, 995 (11th Cir. 2003) (citing Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001). The court must first ask the threshold question whether the facts alleged, taken in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, show that the government officials' conduct violated a constitutional right. Id. If the complaint alleges the violation of a constitutional right, the court must then determine whether that right was clearly established at the time of the violation.Id.
2. Violation of a Clearly Established Constitutional Right
According to the plaintiff, the constitutional right implicated in this case is the fundamental liberty interest of a child in physical custody of the state to be safe and free from harm. The Eleventh Circuit, inTaylor v. Leadbetter, 818 F.2d 791 (11th Cir. 1987) held that a child involuntarily committed to the custody of the state has a liberty interest in the safety of her environment that is grounded in the historic liberty interest protected under the due process clause.Id. at 795 (citing Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 315 (1982)). The Taylor court stated that there is a constitutional right "to be free from the infliction of unnecessary pain, as that interest is protected by the fifth and fourteenth amendments, and the fundamental right to physical safety as protected by the fourteenth amendment." Id. Plaintiff, therefore, has alleged facts that satisfy the threshold question set forth in Saucier of whether Ms. Franzoni's conduct, if proven true, violated a constitutional right.
Ms. Franzoni claims no cases or statutes existed prior to 1998 which clearly established that DCF officials can be held individually liable for failing to ensure that a mentally ill child is not unnecessarily detained in a children's crisis stabilization unit. In Taylor, however, the Eleventh Circuit confirmed that "a child confined in a mental health facility . . . may prevail in a section 1983 action against state officials . . . where it is alleged and the proof shows that the state officials were deliberately indifferent to the welfare of the child." Id. at 797. Since the Eleventh Circuit decidedTaylor in 1987, Ms. Franzoni had explicit notice that if she exhibited deliberate indifference to her duties as a DCF officer, she could be held individually liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
3. Deliberate Indifference
Where there is a clearly established right, it is the role of the courts to determine whether the state official acted with deliberate indifference to those duties delineated through prior case law. The Eleventh Circuit defines deliberate indifference as: 1) subjective knowledge of a risk of serious harm; 2) disregard of that risk; 3) by conduct that is more than mere negligence. McElligott v. Foley, 182 F.3d 1248, 1255 (11th Cir. 1999). In Farrow v. West, 320 F.3d 1235 (11th Cir. 2003), a case dealing with a prison detainment analogous to the CCSU detainment in this case, the Eleventh Circuit held that a plaintiff must allege facts tending to prove that "the official knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety" to prove deliberate indifference. Id. at 1245. This sentiment is echoed in Taylor where the court held that children "will be faced with the difficult problem of showing actual knowledge of abuse or that agency personnel deliberately failed to learn what was occurring."Taylor, 818 F.2d at 796.
Viewing the complaint in the light most favorable to the Plaintiff, S.M. alleges that Ms. Franzoni: 1) was aware of the severe shortage of mental health placements in District 9 (Palm Beach County); 2) was aware that the shortage was exposing foster children to substantial risk of harm; 3) was aware that the shortage was causing foster children with severe mental health needs, such as S.M., to deteriorate while in state care; 4) had the means and ability to ensure that foster children with severe mental health needs were treated in accordance with professional judgment; and 5) failed to take any action to correct these unconstitutional conditions. (Compl. at ¶¶ 18-22; 79-82; 88-90).
Plaintiff also claims that Ms. Franzoni had actual knowledge of Plaintiff's individual situation. Specifically, the complaint alleges that Ms. Franzoni: l) was aware of plaintiff's individual circumstances; 2) had knowledge that plaintiff was being unconstitutionally held at the CCSU against the judgment of her treating professionals; 3) knew that a juvenile dependency court had ordered plaintiff's removal from this inappropriate facility; 4) knew that plaintiff's serious mental health needs were not being met; and 5) failed to take and action to remove her from the CCSU. (Compl. at ¶¶ 75, 77, 90-91). Construing these facts as true, plaintiff presents enough facts to prove that Ms. Franzoni acted with deliberate indifference as to S.M.'s constitutional rights. Plaintiff also presents facts that, if proven, show, at a minimum, that S.M.'s situation was not alleviated because Ms. Franzoni "deliberately failed to learn what was occurring" to S.M., thus satisfying the burden for deliberate indifference under Taylor, Taylor, 818 F.2d at 796. Therefore, Plaintiff has alleged sufficient facts to survive Ms. Franzoni's motion to dismiss.
CONCLUSION
Viewing S.M.'s allegations in their most favorable light, the court finds that plaintiff has alleged sufficient facts to survive a motion to dismiss based on qualified immunity. This issue can certainly be revisited in the summary judgment stage if plaintiff's allegations are weakened through the discovery process.
Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED and ADJUDGED that Camille Franzoni's motion to dismiss [DE # 48] is DENIED DONE.