Sluzar v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company

13 Citing cases

  1. Ragona v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.

    62 F. Supp. 2d 665 (N.D.N.Y. 1999)   Cited 7 times
    Surveying recent comparable cases and awards

    See Gayton, 558 N.Y.S.2d at 745. In Sluzar v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 223 A.D.2d 785, 636 N.Y.S.2d 171 (3d Dep't 1996), the Third Department upheld an award of $250,000 for past pain and suffering and $250,000 for future pain and suffering where the plaintiff sustained substantial injuries to her back and hands when she was struck by a car while riding her bicycle. There, the court noted that the plaintiff was a physically active person and her injuries had a "profound" impact on her ability to perform her household and numerous recreational activities. Id. at 172.

  2. Rounds v. Rush Trucking Corp.

    51 F. Supp. 2d 374 (W.D.N.Y. 1999)

    In contrast, Plaintiff cites several cases in which jury verdicts for past pain and suffering over a period of less than five years in excess of $100,000 were approved. See, e.g., Gardner v. Federated Department Stores, supra (damages for past pain and suffering experienced by department store patron who was falsely imprisoned and battered by store security personnel was not excessive under New York law, inasmuch as patron suffered from ear aches, lockjaw, temporomandibular joint syndrome and atypical anxiety disorder); Sluzar v. Nationwide Mutual Ins. Co., 223 A.D.2d 785, 636 N.Y.S.2d 171 (3d Dep't. 1996) (upholding awards of $250,000 for past pain and suffering and $250,000 for future pain and suffering as not excessive for bicyclist's injuries caused by collision with defendant where bicyclist, who was 40-years old at time of accident, sustained substantial and painful injuries to hand and back, was unable to resume swimming, bicycling, running, and hiking, and experienced reduced ability to perform household activities such as cooking, cleaning, and gardening); and Sevilla v. State, 111 A.D.2d 1046, 490 N.Y.S.2d 351 (3d Dep't. 1985) (reducing to $750,000 from $1.2 million for past pain and suffering incurred over five year period based on severe permanent painful injuries which required hospitalization for 2 1/2 months, including brain damage which caused plaintiff to become more dependent upon her husband, although she had since made a reasonably good recovery).

  3. City of Binghamton v. Serafini

    8 A.D.3d 835 (N.Y. App. Div. 2004)   Cited 12 times

    None of these issues has been preserved for appellate review. With respect to the interrogatories, plaintiff failed to object to the verdict sheet at trial (see CPLR 4110-b, 5501 [a] [3]; Sluzar v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 223 A.D.2d 785, 786). Similarly, plaintiff failed to preserve for appellate review, by an appropriate objection, its current arguments concerning erroneous jury charges (see Pyptiuk v. Kramer, 295 A.D.2d 768, 771).

  4. Morales v. City of New York

    270 A.D.2d 239 (N.Y. App. Div. 2000)

    Contrary to the appellant's contention, the jury verdict on the issue of damages, as reduced, did not deviate materially from what would be reasonable compensation (see, CPLR 5501[c]; Salazar v. Fries Assocs., 251 A.D.2d 210; Sluzar v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 223 A.D.2d 785; Van Deusen v. Norton Co., 204 A.D.2d 867). THOMPSON, J.P., FEUERSTEIN, SCHMIDT, and SMITH, JJ., concur.

  5. Skellham v. Hendricks

    270 A.D.2d 619 (N.Y. App. Div. 2000)   Cited 7 times
    In Skellham v. Hendricks, 270 A.D.2d 619, 704 N.Y.S.2d 684 (3d Dept. 2000), the plaintiff was a postmaster who was not able to return to that occupation as a result of the motor accident.

    Under these circumstances, the jury's award of $20,000 for past lost earnings and $200,000 for future lost earning capacity was reasonable and supported by the record (see, Severino v. Schuyler Meadows Club, 225 A.D.2d 954, 958; Reed v. Harter Chair Corp., 185 A.D.2d 547, 549; Balmaceda v. Perez, 182 A.D.2d 983, 984, lv denied 80 N.Y.2d 755). Finally, we are of the view that the jury's award of damages to Mark Skellham in the amount of $250,000 for past pain and suffering and $130,000 for future pain and suffering did not deviate materially from what would be reasonable compensation (see, CPLR 5501 [c]; Sluzar v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 223 A.D.2d 785, 786; Van Deusen v. Norton Co., 204 A.D.2d 867, 870-871; Campell v. City of Elmira, 198 A.D.2d 736, 738, affd 84 N.Y.2d 505). Mercure, J.P., Peters, Spain and Graffeo, JJ., concur.

  6. Edwards v. Stamford Healthcare Society Inc.

    267 A.D.2d 825 (N.Y. App. Div. 1999)   Cited 13 times

    Testimony indicated that the prognosis for his injuries is poor and some will worsen with the passage of time with the probability that future surgery will be required. Given the nature and extent of plaintiff's injuries, his treatment therefor and prognosis thereon, an award of $38,000 for past pain and suffering and $150,000 for 20 years of future pain and suffering materially deviates from what would be reasonable compensation with reference to both the objective criteria by which such damages are assessed and in comparison to what has been determined to be reasonable compensation in cases involving comparable injuries (see, Stedman v. Bouillon, supra, at 877; see also, Barrowman v. Niagara Mohawk Power Corp., 252 A.D.2d 946, 948,lv denied 92 N.Y.2d 817; Armbruster v. Buffalo China, 247 A.D.2d 880, 881-882; Douglass v. St. Joseph's Hosp., 246 A.D.2d 695, 697, supra;Sluzar v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 223 A.D.2d 785, 785-786;Fenocchi v. City of Syracuse, 216 A.D.2d 864, 865; Inya v. Inde Hyundai Inc., 209 A.D.2d 1015). Consequently, plaintiff is entitled to a new trial to determine damages for past and future pain and suffering.

  7. Osiecki v. Olympic Regional Development Auth

    256 A.D.2d 998 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998)   Cited 40 times
    In Osiecki v Olympic Regional Dev. Auth., 256 AD2d 998, 999 (3d Dept 1998), one of the plaintiffs with a life expectancy of 38.7 more years suffered injuries including TMJ.

    Because pain and suffering awards are not subject to precise quantification, examination of comparable cases is necessary to determine whether the award materially deviated from reasonable compensation ( see, Karney v. Arnot-Ogden Mem. Hosp., 251 A.D.2d 780, lv denied 92 N.Y.2d 942). A thorough review of the record and an examination of similar cases has revealed a broad range of verdicts for injuries of this nature ( see, Diorio v. Scala, 183 A.D.2d 1065; Leonard v. Unisys Corp., 238 A.D.2d 747; Sluzar v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 223 A.D.2d 785; Mangiafridda v. Mahyedin, 248 A.D.2d 200; Balmaceda v. Perez, 182 A.D.2d 983, lv denied 80 N.Y.2d 755); but we agree with Supreme Court that the jury's awards for future pain and suffering were excessive and not justified. However, affording proper deference to the jury's findings of serious and permanent injuries ( see, Levine v. East Ramapo Cent. School Dist., 192 A.D.2d 1025), the record does not support Supreme Court's drastic reduction.

  8. DePasquale v. Morbark Industries, Inc.

    254 A.D.2d 450 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998)   Cited 19 times

    In addition, notes from the jury during its deliberations evidenced persistent confusion on the issue of "causation". Under these circumstances, a new trial was the appropriate remedy ( see, e.g., Marine Midland Bank v. Russo Produce Co., 50 N.Y.2d 31, 40; Cortes v. Edoo, 228 A.D.2d 463, 465; Sluzar v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 223 A.D.2d 785, 786; Trotter v. Johnson, 210 A.D.2d 946, 947; Vera v. Bielomatik Corp., 199 A.D.2d 132; McStocker v. Kolment, 160 A.D.2d 980, 981; Leal v. Simon, 147 A.D.2d 198, 205-206). Joy, J. P., Friedmann, Krausman and Luciano, JJ., concur.

  9. Wroblewski v. National Fuel Gas Distr. Corp.

    247 A.D.2d 917 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998)   Cited 6 times

    In any event, aside from the credibility issues concerning that evidence, it is undisputed that plaintiff sustained a severe and disabling back injury. Defendant's expert acknowledged that plaintiff"has a severe fracture of the anterior vertebrae at T-12" with a "70% loss of height of the vertebral body in that * * * anterior part", that her back problem has progressively worsened, and that her complaints of pain were consistent with her injury. We conclude, therefore, that the award of $10,000 for past pain and suffering is inadequate; it deviates materially from what is reasonable compensation for plaintiff's past pain and suffering (see, Tariq v. Miller, 240 A.D.2d 395; Sluzar v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 223 A.D.2d 785; Brown v. Stark, 205 A.D.2d 725). We further conclude that the jury's failure to award any damages for future pain and suffering is contrary to the weight of evidence.

  10. Preston v. Young

    239 A.D.2d 729 (N.Y. App. Div. 1997)   Cited 33 times
    Holding that in finding a type 8 injury, the limitation in use does not have to be permanent

    In addition, we note that this issue has not been properly preserved for review ( see, Grzesiak v. General Elec. Co., 68 N.Y.2d 937, 938-939; Barry v. Manglass, 55 N.Y.2d 803, 806). Plaintiffs failed to raise the purported inconsistencies before the jury was discharged ( compare, Peters v. Port Auth. Trans-Hudson Corp., 234 A.D.2d 205), depriving Supreme Court and the jury of the opportunity to take corrective action on the allegedly inconsistent verdict ( see, e.g., Grzesiak v. General Elec. Co., supra; Barry v. Manglass, supra; Sluzar v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 223 A.D.2d 785, 786; Strauss v. Huber, 161 A.D.2d 629; but see, Vera v. Bielomatik Corp., 199 A.D.2d 132). Under these circumstances we must find that Supreme Court erred in setting aside the verdict on this issue.