Opinion
Action by the Sloss-Sheffield Steel & Iron Company against the United States.
Petition dismissed.
Plaintiff sues to recover $776,400.75, alleged overpayment of tax for 1918, with interest. The basis of the suit is that an allowance of $1,752,078.38 for amortization of war facilities should have been allowed as a deduction from income for 1918 instead of having been apportioned to the years 1918 to 1921, inclusive, in proportion to expenditures in the construction of the facilities, and accordingly deducted from income for those years.
Special findings of fact:
1. The plaintiff, a New Jersey corporation, was organized in 1899, and has its principal office and place of business in Birmingham, Ala. It kept its books and made its returns on the accrual basis. It filed its original income and profits tax return for 1918 and June 14, 1919, showing a tax of $905,006.21, which was paid in four installments during 1919. May 12, 1920, it filed an amended 1918 return, reporting an additional tax of $31,896.26, which was paid on that date, with interest of $1,506.11.
In its returns for 1918 plaintiff deducted from gross income $2,502,959 as 'Loss due to war-time construction of byproduct coke ovens' which it had charged off its books pursuant to a resolution adopted by its executive committee and board of directors October 18, 1918, as follows: 'Resolved, That this board direct that the loss which has accrued to the company by reason of its contract obligation to the Government of the United States and to the Semet-Solvay Company, and its performance of such, which loss amounts to the sum of two million five hundred and two thousand nine hundred and fifty-nine ($2,502,959) dollars, should now be charged off on the books of the company from the earnings of the fiscal year 1918 by appropriate entries of items made under the direction of its executive and accounting officers.'
2. February 15, 1927, the Commissioner mailed to plaintiff a 60-day notice showing his determination of a deficiency for 1918 of $2,559,151.17 and overassessments for 1917 and 1919. In this determination of the deficiency the Commissioner disallowed the claimed deduction for amortization. Thereafter, on April 9, 1927, a conference was had between plaintiff and the representatives of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue with reference to the decision for the years 1917, 1918, and 1919, particularly in regard to plaintiff's claimed deductions for amortization, depreciation, and obsolescence. This conference resulted in an agreement between the plaintiff and the Bureau with reference to the total of the allowances for amortization, depreciation, and obsolescence to be deducted from plaintiff's income. The parties also agreed that the deductions for depreciation of mining equipment and obsolescence of old coke ovens should be allowed against income for 1917, 1918, and 1919, and these matters are not involved here. But they disagreed as to the year or years in which the allowance for amortization of war facilities should be deducted, and this disagreement presents the question involved in this case. The agreement as to the total of the allowance for amortization was evidenced by a memorandum as follows:
'Conference with the above-named taxpayer [plaintiff] held in the office of the head of engineering division today in which amortization claims were discussed and explained in detail by the taxpayer. On the cost of a byproduct coke plant amounting to $6,147,608.35, exclusive of land, amortization in the amount of $2,599,000.00-odd is claimed. Basis of this claim includes an amount stated to be due to lower normal post-war replacement costs of a similar plant and amount representing loss of postwar value on account of excessive operating costs of the present plant and excessive freight charges due to the location of the present plant. 'A general discussion of all the above-enumerated points was had with the taxpayer and its representatives, and it was agreed that an allowance of 28 1/2% of cost as amortization would be recommended. This allowance gives consideration to a normal post-war replacement cost of a similar plant and to loss of fair market value of the plant due to its excessive costs of operation and also to excessive freight costs, both of which will continue throughout the life of the present plant. The allowance on this basis is $1,752,068.38 [sic]. 'The taxpayer accepts the decision as reached in this conference today and the allowance recommended herein. It is therefore recommended that the case be closed on this basis and forwarded to the sixty-day conference unit for such further action as may be proper.'
At this conference the defendant's officials insisted amortization allowance should be spread over the taxable years 1918, 1919, 1920, and 1921 on the basis of expenditures made in the construction of the facilities, the construction of which was begun in 1918 under a contract with the War Department to furnish the government with war supplies, whereas plaintiff insisted that the entire amortization allowance of $1,752,078.38 should be confined to the year 1918 and allowed in full as a deduction from gross income for that year. No agreement was reached as to allocation of the amortization allowance.
In 1919 plaintiff had received from the War Department $1,525,207.30 in full settlement for the cancellation of its contract, as hereinafter mentioned, under which the War Department had agreed to purchase certain war supplies at stated prices. This amount was included in plaintiff's income for 1919 and the tax paid thereon.
April 11, 1927, plaintiff waived the time allowed by section 274(a) of the Revenue Act of 1926 (26 USCA § 1048) to file a petition with the Board of Tax Appeals and elected to proceed by claim for refund and suit after payment with respect to the points of difference between the parties.
3. On April 14, 1927, the Commissioner advised plaintiff that its tax liability for 1917, 1918, and 1919, as shown in the notice of February 15, 1917, had been redetermined with the result that the deficiency for 1918 had been changed to $1,722,867.52, and that the net income for each of the years 1917 to 1919, inclusive, had been recomputed by allowing additional deductions for depreciation and obsolescence of properties other than the war facilities, by including in income for 1919 the amount received from the War Department in settlement of the cancellation of the contract and by allowing the amortization allowance of $1,752.078.38 as deductions from gross income in the amounts of $816,242.61 for 1918, $653,180.17 for 1919, $270,791.09 for 1920, and $11,864.51 for 1921.
The Commissioner made the foregoing allocation of the amortization allowance on the basis of the expenditures made year by year in the construction of the plant referred to in finding 6 on account of which amortization was allowed. The total cost of the plant was $6,147,608.35 and its post war residual value $4,395,529.97, thus making an amortization allowance of $1,752,078.38. The expenditures made each year and the spread of amortization on the basis of such expenditures as made by the Commissioner were as follows:
-------------------------------------------
Gross expenditures
Amortization deductions allowed
-------------
-------------
-------------
1918.........
$2,863,992.51
$816,242.61
1919.........
2,291,847.38
653,180.17
1920.........
950,138.84
270,791.09
1921.........
41,629.62
11,864.51
-------------
-------------
Total....
$6,147,608.35
$1,752,078.38
-------------------------------------------
4. April 27, 1927, on notice and demand, plaintiff satisfied the Commissioner's determination of deficiency in tax for the year 1918 of $1,722,867.52, together with $11,796.57 interest thereon, by paying the balance thereof due after certain set-offs had been made; the net payment amounting to $1,572,171.67.
5. April 23, 1931, plaintiff filed with the collector a claim for refund, with interest, of $1,469,399.42 of the sum of $1,722,867.52, so assessed and satisfied, on the ground, in so far as herein material, that its war facilities amortization period ended during the year 1918, and that the Commissioner's allocation of such amortization (shown in finding 3) was incorrect.
The Commissioner has rendered no decision thereon, and no refund of any portion of the amount claimed has been made.
6. On June 26, 1918, the plaintiff entered into a formal contract with the War Department of the United States represented by Colonel Samuel McRoberts acting under authority from the Secretary of War as contracting officer whereby plaintiff undertook to construct and equip for the production of toluol, ammonium sulphate, and benzol, which were articles contributing to the prosecution of the war in which the United States was then engaged, a 120-oven by-product coke oven plant having an estimated coking capacity of 2,400 tons of coal a day, and in all respects fully equipped for the manufacture of coke and residuals, including the three by-products above mentioned; the United States to take and pay for such by-products at agreed prices, limited in respect to the benzol to its requirements, with an election on the part of the United States to require the substitution of ammonia liquor for ammonium sulphate. The contract stated that it should be in force from the date thereof and terminate at the end of two years from the average date of the beginning of the operation of the ovens to be constructed thereunder by plaintiff at its expense and contained no clause providing for its cancellation.
A copy of the contract is in evidence as Plaintiff's Exhibit 7, and is made a part hereof by reference.
7. September 16, 1918, plaintiff entered into a subcontract with Semet-Solvay Company, whereby that company was to construct the plant covered by the plaintiff's prime contract with the United States. Construction was begun in 1918 and substantially completed on or about May 1, 1920. The plant so constructed did not, prior to its completion, produce any of the products called for by the contract of June 26, 1918, and for reasons hereinafter shown no such products were delivered at any time to the United States.
8. December 7, 1918, defendant's contracting officer sent to the plaintiff and the plaintiff in due course received the following communication:
'1. By direction of the Chief of Ordnance you are requested in the public interest immediately to suspend further operations under your contract or order with the United States, War-Ord-No. P 10844-1107 E, and to order no further materials or facilities and, except in cases of proved necessity, enter into no further subcontracts, make no further commitments, and incur no further expenses in connection with the performance of said contract or order. '2. This request is made with a view to the negotiation of a 'settlement contract' providing for the cancellation, settlement, and adjustment of your existing contract or order, in a manner which will permit of a prompt settlement. '3. Please acknowledge receipt of this notice immediately and indicate your decision as to compliance with or rejection of this request. Forward your acknowledgment in duplicate to the district office indicated below. Upon notice of your compliance a representative of the Ordnance Department will forthwith take up with you the proposed negotiation.'
On December 7, 1918, the plant was about 30 per cent. completed.
9. December 30, 1918, plaintiff replied to the above notice protesting in writing to the Procurement Division, Ordnance Office, War Department, that the suspension was a breach of contract, that the contractor hoped to amortize the extra cost of construction from sale to the government of the material which it had agreed to purchase, and declining assent to suspension of operations, stating that it would 'without consenting to the breach committed by such suspension, assent to the suspension' provided: (1) The government would pay the contractor its disbursements, with interest and overhead, upon the construction of the plant and assume the obligations therefor, the government to take over the entire plant covered by the contract of construction, or, in the alternative (2) the government would pay the cost of construction in excess of that over prewar times, the construction to continue.
January 4, 1919, plaintiff submitted to the War Department three propositions, the first two substantially as embodied in the letter of December 30, 1918, and the third as follows: 'Payment for plant output for two-year period of contract on the basis of the difference between the contract price and a price to be determined as near as may be by estimating the average price of commodities for the two-year period beginning September 1, 1919.' At the same time plaintiff protested that the suspension was a breach of the contract. With this letter plaintiff submitted an estimate of $3,009,635.31 on proposition (1), $2,502,959 on proposition (2), and $2,114,707.50 on proposition (3).
10. Conferences between plaintiff and the officials of defendant were had in February and March, 1919, relative to settlement. The defendant's representatives were unwilling to accept the first two propositions. The third was submitted at their suggestion and was accepted by them on the condition that plaintiff would complete the plant. This was agreed to, and the parties came to the final understanding on or before March 11, 1919, which is embodied in the award approved May 23, 1919, hereinafter referred to.
March 22, 1919, plaintiff submitted to the Secretary of War a statement of claim for adjustment of its agreement above mentioned, which claim was approved and recommended to the Secretary by the Ordnance Claims Board.
May 23, 1919, there was approved by authority of the Secretary of War an award to plaintiff of $1,525,207.30 'in full adjustment, payment, and discharge' of the aforesaid contract, War--Ord. No. P10844-1107 E, the subcontractor Semet-Solvay Company agreeing to look to plaintiff for its compensation. This award was accepted by the plaintiff and the amount thereof paid to it in 1919. It was included by the Commissioner as income for 1919 in his computation of plaintiff's taxes for that year.
11. The award of $1,525,207.30 was computed by the conferees mentioned in finding 10 as follows: The Semet-Solvay Company estimated the probable consumption of coal for the contract period at 1,905,000 tons, the plaintiff at 1,825,000 tons, and the officials of the War Department at 1,647,928 tons. The average, 1,792,643 tons, was used as a basis for settlement of the contract suspended. This tonnage was reduced to gallons of toluol by taking as a factor 0.42 as the result of burning a ton of coal, making 752,910 gallons of toluol. The difference between the contract and the post war price was fixed at $1.325 a gallon, resulting in a difference of $997.605.75. For the ammonium sulphate a factor of 24.22 was used, resulting in 43,417,813 pounds, or 21,708.9 tons. The corresponding difference in price was fixed at $30, making $651,267. The total for toluol and ammonium sulphate thus amounted to $1,648,872.75. It was agreed that 6 per cent. for one and a quarter years should be deducted for cash discount, and the result was $1,525,207.30. This amount was arrived at by compromise.
12. Obsolescence of plaintiff's old coke plant in the amount of $453,368.48 was first claimed in its return of income for 1920 and was allowed by the Commissioner as a loss for that year. Thereafter the sum was claimed by the plaintiff as a deduction for 1918, which was allowed by the Commissioner as a deduction and by him spread over the years 1918, 1919, and 1920, as follows: 1918, $194,050.26; 1919, $194,050.26; and 1920, $65,267.96; totaling $453,368.48. This allocation was made without restoration of this amount to income for 1920.
13. The net income for each of the years 1918 to 1921, inclusive, without any deduction for amortization and without any adjustment on account of the obsolescence allowance or the War Department settlement award of $1,525,207.30, is as follows: 1918, $5,654,669.11; 1919, $2,412,242.73; 1920, $2,631,808.68; and 1921, a net loss.
Lyle T. Alverson, of New York City (Johnson & Shores, of New York City, on the briefs), for plaintiff. James A. Cosgrove, of Washington, D. C., and Frank J. Wideman, Asst. Atty. Gen. (Herbert E. Carnes, of Washington, D. C., on the brief), for the United States.
Before BOOTH, C. J., and GREEN, LITTLETON, WILLIAMS, and WHALEY, JJ.
LITTLETON, Judge.
In this suit plaintiff seeks to recover $776,400.75, income and profits tax for 1918, on the ground that a certain determined amortization allowance should be allowed as a deduction from the gross income for 1918 instead of being allocated to the years 1918 to 1921, inclusive.
June 26, 1918, plaintiff entered into a contract with the War Department under which it agreed to construct and equip a plant for the production of toluol, ammonium sulphate, and benzol, which were articles contributing to the prosecution of the war. The United States, through the War Department, agreed to buy the aforementioned products at stated prices during the period of two years from the beginning of the operation of the plant. September 16, 1918, plaintiff entered into a subcontract for the construction of the plant, and its construction was immediately started. The contract with the United States contained no provision for cancellation, but about the date of the Armistice the War Department instructed plaintiff to suspend operations under the contract with a view of adjusting the existing contract by a settlement agreement. When the contract was suspended the construction of the plant was approximately 30 per cent. completed. After various conferences and negotiations, a settlement was finally agreed upon by which plaintiff was paid $1,525,207.30 in full settlement, payment, and discharge of its contract with the War Department. As a part of the settlement plaintiff agreed that it would complete the construction of its plant. The plant was completed May 1, 1920. No products were ever delivered to the War Department through the operation of the plant; the discharge of this obligation in the contract referred to above having been taken care of through the award of $1,525,207.30, hereinbefore referred to, which was paid to plaintiff in 1919.
The parties agree that the total cost of the plant was $6,147,608.35 and that its post war residual value was $4,395,529.97. On that basis the Commissioner of Internal Revenue determined an amortization allowance of $1,752,078.38, being the difference between these amounts, and further determined that in computing plaintiff's tax liability for 1918, 1919, 1920, and 1921 the amortization allowance should be allocated to those years on the basis of the expenditures made in the respective years during the construction of the plant, as follows:
---------------------------------------------
Gross expenditures
Amortization deductions allowed
---------------
-------------
-------------
1918...........
$2,863,992.51
$816,242.61
1919...........
2,291.847.38
653,180.17
1920...........
950,138.84
270,791.09
1921...........
41,629.62
11,864.51
-------------
-------------
$6,147,608.35
$1,752,078.38
---------------------------------------------
Plaintiff contends that the foregoing allocation is improper and that, in lieu thereof, it is entitled to the entire amortization allowance as a deduction from gross income for 1918 instead of having that amount allocated in part to 1918 and the remainder to the other years. Section 234(a)(8) of the Revenue Act of 1921 (42 Stat. 254, 255), which superseded a corresponding provision in the Revenue Act of 1918, provided as follows:
'(a) That in computing the net income of a corporation subject to the tax imposed by section 230 there shall be allowed as deductions: * * * '(8) In the case of buildings, machinery, equipment, or other facilities, constructed, erected, installed, or acquired, on or after April 6, 1917, for the production of articles contributing to the prosecution of the war * * * there shall be allowed, for any taxable year ending before March 3, 1924 (if claim therefor was made at the time of filing return for the taxable years 1918, 1919, 1920, or 1921) a reasonable deduction for the amortization of such part of the cost of such facilities or vessels as has been borne by the taxpayer, but not again including any amount otherwise allowed under this title or previous Acts of Congress as a deduction in computing net income.'
In article 185, regulations 62, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue provided for the allocation of the 'reasonable deduction' authorized by the statute, as follows: 'The amortization allowance shall be apportioned (a) in cases where the property was employed in the production of articles contributing to the prosecution of the war, over the respective accounting periods of the taxpayer, having reasonable regard to his gross and net income, and where separately ascertainable the income from the facilities upon which amortization is claimed, between January 1, 1918 (or if the property was acquired subsequent to that date, January 1 of the year in which acquired), and the actual or estimated date of cessation of operations as a war facility, and (b) in cases where the property was not completed in time for use in the production of articles contributing to the prosecution of the war, on the basis of the expenditures made on account of which amortization is allowed.'
The Commissioner followed this regulation in his allocation of the determined amortization, but plaintiff insists that such allocation does not result in the allowance of a 'reasonable deduction' whereas defendant takes the opposite view. The statute provides only for a 'reasonable deduction' and makes no provision as to how such deduction shall be determined or allocated. The question presented is whether an application of the Commissioner's regulations in this case reasonably carries out the intent of the statute.
Plaintiff makes some argument that the 1921 act and the regulations promulgated thereunder can have no effect on the case for the reason that the year involved is 1918 and, therefore, is governed by the Revenue Act of 1918. The only material change in the 1921 act from the 1918 act is the addition of a clause making the provision applicable to 'any taxable year ending before March 3, 1924 (if claim therefor was made at the time of filing return for the taxable years 1918, 1919, 1920, or 1921).' Section 234(a)(8). The year in controversy is 1918, and claim was made in the return for that year on account of the item here in controversy. We think the 1921 act is clearly applicable to such a return.
The purpose of the amortization provision has been stated on many occasions by the Board of Tax Appeals and various courts which have had the matter under consideration. Although in the general discussions in those decision lack of harmony in some respects exists, they agree as to the alleviative purpose of the statute and the intendment to relieve taxpayers of unbalanced investments made for was purposes through deductions from gross income. In that manner the excess costs brought about by the prices prevailing during the war period are reduced to costs on a normal or peace-time basis, and, therefore, when a given taxpayer comes to operate war-constructed facilities after the termination of the war, the cost of such facilities, on which the peace-time operation is based, will be a cost comparable to other peace-time constructions. After deductions have been allowed from gross income because of the excess costs, deductions in subsequent years are to be allowed on what has then become the balanced investment. The cost of the war-time plant in the case at bar was $6,147,608.35, whereas its post war value when completed in 1920 was $4,395,529.97, the difference, $1,752,078.38, representing the deduction to be allowed as amortization in order to permit future deductions on the balanced investment of $4,395,529.97.
So far the parties and authorities agree, but the parties differ as to the year or years in which the amortization is to be allowed as a deduction. The position of plaintiff is that the deduction was intended only as relief from high taxes resulting from war profits and that, therefore, the deductions should be made only from profits accruing during the war period. Some support for this view can be found in the discussions by the Board of Tax Appeals in certain decided cases, but a situation fairly analogous to the case at bar has not been presented to that tribunal and, when a careful analysis is made of those cases, much that was said has no controlling influence on the case under consideration. In any event, we are of opinion that in all cases the purpose of the statute in authorizing the allowance of a reasonable deduction cannot be accomplished by having the allowance taken as a deduction from the war profits earned during the war period; on the contrary, we think that each case must be judged on its merits and that it is difficult to set out a definite rule to cover all cases.
This view is well illustrated by the case at bar. The contract with the War Department was not made, and construction of the plant in question was not begun until a short time before the Armistice. Plaintiff had substantial profits during 1917 and 1918, but, of course, no profits from the plant with respect to which it now seeks amortization. The profits in 1918 are referred to as war profits, that is, profits created during the period of the war; and the same applies to the profits earned for 1917; but no part of these profits resulted from the operation of war facilities on account of which amortization was allowable. The Revenue Act of 1917 (40 Stat. 300), makes no provision for an amortization allowance, and the provision of the Revenue Act of 1918 (40 Stat. 1078, § 234(a)(8) allowing amortization is applicable only on and after January 1, 1918. The Board of Tax Appeals has held (Appeal of Manville Jenckes Co., 4 B. T. A. 765), and the Commissioner has acquiesced in the decision (C. B. VII-I, p. 20), that commitments made prior to April 6, 1917, with respect to property not actually acquired until after April 6, 1917, but when acquired was devoted to war purposes, are subject to amortization, and therefore the amortization allowable on account thereof may be deducted in a period beginning January 1, 1918. To take care of or provide for the periods in which the deduction should be taken, the Commissioner provided in his regulations (art. 185, regs. 62) that with respect to facilities constructed and completed in time for war used the deduction should be spread over a period beginning January 1, 1918, and ending with the date when the facility ceased to be used for war purposes, except where the facility was acquired subsequent to January 1, 1918, in which event the date of acquisition would be the beginning of the amortization period. Where, however, the facilities were not completed in time for the production of articles contributing to the prosecution of the war, the same article provides that the amortization allowance shall be apportioned on the basis of expenditures for the war facilities; that is, the amount of the determined amortization shall be allocated to the several years in which expenditures were made in proportion to such expenditures. The effect of plaintiff's contention is that, except in the very unusual instance where profits directly traceable to war contracts were realized after 1918, all amortization, whether arising from commitments made prior to April 6, 1917, as outlined above, or from expenditures made in 1917, 1918, or subsequent to 1918, shall be taken in 1918. In other words, the deduction would be thrown into 1918, and this, we think would be 'unreasonable' as opposed to the 'reasonable' deduction contemplated by the statute. We do not think Congress intended such an unusual result by the general term 'reasonable deduction.' A more logical view would seem to be that had such a result been intended, the statute would have made specific provision thereof.
We are further of opinion that even if the amortization allowance is only to be deducted from war profits, it is too narrow a view to say that such profits are only those profits which were earned during the period of active war operations. It may occur that inventories on hand at the close of the war, commitments in various lines of war activities not carried to completion until after the close of the war, or many other factors, may be productive of income from which it would be reasonable to deduct an amortization allowance in order to arrive at the correct taxable income. Such a situation is illustrated in the instant case in which plaintiff received $1,525,207.30 in 1919 in the settlement of the contract on account of which the plant facilities here in question were constructed. The Commissioner determined that such amount was taxable income for 1919, and, while counsel for the defendant now seeks to have that amount treated as contractual amortization, and thus used to reduce the amount of the deduction for amortization allowable under the statute, we are clear that the Commissioner's action was proper. It was not an amount paid in reimbursement for capital costs incurred by plaintiff in the construction of its plant, but in settlement of the contract under which the government was obligated to take certain articles to be manufactured by the plant. The contract, under which settlement and payment were made by the War Department, was a formal contract made in accordance with section 3744, Revised Statutes (41 USCA § 16). If the amortization allowance is to follow closely related income, the deduction should have been taken from income for 1919 in which the amount paid in settlement of the contract suspended was included in income. The Commissioner's regulations do not require such a result, and we think properly so. In the case at bar the plant was begun in 1918 and substantial expenditures were made in that year. No war income was derived from the plant in 1918, though plaintiff did have substantial profits during the war period of that year. Likewise in 1919 there was no income from the plant, but there was substantial income in that year on account of the settlement contract referred to above. By following his regulations and allocating the amortization allowance on the basis of expenditures, the Commissioner allocated approximately 84 per cent. of the amortization allowance to 1918 and 1919 and the balance to 1920 and 1921. We do not know what the situation was in those latter years other than that expenditures for the completion of the plant were then made, but from the record before us we cannot say that the Commissioner's action resulted in other than reasonable deductions for amortization.
It follows therefore that plaintiff's claim for a deduction of the entire amortization allowance in 1918 must be denied. The statute is framed in the most general terms, providing for a 'reasonable deduction,' and further, that such deduction may be allowed for 1918 as well as for subsequent years ending before March 3, 1924. Pursuant to the authority vested in him the Commissioner promulgated the regulations hereinbefore quoted, the application of which we think accomplished the result contemplated by Congress.
The case of Palmer, Trustee v. United States, 67 Ct. Cl. 648, 653, relied upon by plaintiff, involved an entirely different situation. The question there involved was whether amortization which had been determined under the Commissioner's regulations as applicable to a given year, but which was not entirely absorbed in computing income for that year, could, as to the unabsorbed portion, be carried forward and allowed as a deduction in the succeeding year, and this court held in favor of carrying forward that portion of the allowance on the ground of reasonableness. No such issue is now presented. It should be observed, however, that the court did say in that case that a broad construction should be given to the statute to the end that a reasonable deduction may be allowed and that the deduction may not be 'confined to any period, i. e., one year or two years, or a war year or a peace year.'
The petition must be dismissed. It is so ordered.