Slocum v. D'S Jayes Valley Rest. Cafe

10 Citing cases

  1. COX v. ROLLING ACRES GOLF COURSE CORP

    532 N.W.2d 761 (Iowa 1995)   Cited 4 times
    In Cox v. Rolling Acres Golf Course Corp., 532 N.W.2d 761 (Iowa 1995), the Iowa Supreme Court cited all three cases for the proposition that "[c]omplicity on the part of the injured party is an absolute bar to recovery under [the dram shop act]."

    Dram shop acts, such as Iowa Code section 123.92, provide innocent parties who are injured as a result of the intoxication of other persons, a cause of action against the parties from whom the intoxicants were procured. Slager v. HWA Corp., 435 N.W.2d 349, 351 (Iowa 1989). Complicity on the part of the injured party is an absolute bar to recovery under section 123.92. Slager, 435 N.W.2d at 351; Martin v. Heddinger, 373 N.W.2d 486, 488 (Iowa 1985); Berge v. Harris, 170 N.W.2d 621, 625 (Iowa 1969); cf. Slocum v. D's Jayes Valley Restaurant Cafe, Inc., 582 N.Y.S.2d 544, 545, 182 A.D.2d 981, 982 (App. Div. 1992); Vandenburg v. Brosnan, 514 N.Y.S.2d 784, 784-85, 129 A.D.2d 793, 793-94 (App. Div. 1987), aff'd, 70 N.Y.2d 940, 524 N.Y.S.2d 672, 519 N.E.2d 618 (1988). The rationale supporting this defense is that the goal of the dram shop statute is to protect innocent parties, not those who have participated in the intoxicated person's intoxication.

  2. O'Rourke v. Chew

    36 Misc. 3d 1223 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2012)

    Regarding whether plaintiff O'Rourke is precluded from recovering under the Dram Shop Act based on his level of involvement in the purchase of the beer, the term “procure” is not defined in either the General Obligations Law or the Alcoholic Beverage Control Law and the term must therefore be given its ordinary and usual meaning, which is “to get possession of: obtain, acquire ... to get possession of by particular care or effort” ( see Slocum v. D's & Jayes Val. Rest. & Café, Inc., 182 A.D.2d 981, 982, 582 N.Y.S.2d 544 [3d Dept 1992]; see also Fox v. Clare Rose Beverage, Inc., 262 A.D.2d 526, 527, 692 N.Y.S.2d 658 [2d Dept 1999], lv denied94 N.Y.2d 755, 701 N.Y.S.2d 711 [1999] ). The term “procure” includes using one's own money to purchase alcohol for another, contributing money to the purchase of the alcohol, and giving away alcohol to another after purchasing it with one's own money ( see Slocum v. D's & Jayes Val. Rest. & Café, Inc., 182 A.D.2d 981, 982, 582 N.Y.S.2d 544;Dodge v. Victory Mkts., 199 A.D.2d 917, 606 N.Y.S.2d 345 [3d Dept 1993]; Prunty v. Keltie's Bum Steer, 163 A.D.2d 595, 559 N.Y.S.2d 354 [2d Dept 1990]; Campbell v. Step/Lind Rest. Corp., 143 A.D.2d 111, 531 N.Y.S.2d 576 [2d Dept 1988]; Vandenburg v. Brosnan, 129 A.D.2d 793, 514 N.Y.S.2d 784;see also Fox v. Clare Rose Beverage, Inc., 262 A.D.2d 526, 527,supra ).

  3. O'Rourke v. Chew

    2012 N.Y. Slip Op. 32001 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2012)

    The court thus finds that Hess is not entitled to summary judgment dismissing the complaint on these grounds (seeSullivan v Mulinos of Westchester, Inc.,73 AD3d 1018, supra; Johnson v Verona Oil, Inc., 36 AD3d 991, supra: Johnson v Plotkin, 172 AD2d 88, supra). Regarding whether plaintiff O'Rourke is precluded from recovering under the Dram Shop Act based on his level of involvement in the purchase of the beer, the term "procure" is not defined in either the General Obligations Law or the Alcoholic Beverage Control Law and the term must therefore be given its ordinary and usual meaning, which is "to get possesion of: obtain, acquire ... to get possession of by particular care or effort" (see Slocum v D's & Jayes Vat. Rest. & Cafe, Inc., 182 AD2d 981, 982, 582 NYS2d 544 [3d Dept 1992]; see also Fox v Clare Rose Beverage, Inc., 262 AD2d 526, 527, 692 NYS2d 658 [2d Dept 1999], lv denied 94 NY2d 755. 701 NYS2d 711 [1999]). The term "procure" includes using one's own money to purchase alcohol for another, contributing money to the purchase of the alcohol, and giving away alcohol to another after purchasing it with one's own money (see Slocum v D's & Jayes Val. Rest. & Cafe, Inc., 182 AD2d 981, 982, 582 NYS2d 544; Dodge v Victory Mkts., 199 AD2d 917, 606 N YS2d 345 [3d Dept 1993]; Prunty v Keltie's Bum Steer, 163 AD2d 595, 559 NYS2d 354 [2d Dept 1990]; Campbell v Step/Lind Rest. Corp., 143 AD2d 111, 531 NYS2d 576 [2d Dept 1988]; Vandenburg v Brosnan, 129 AD2d 793, 514 NYS2d 784; see also Fox v Clare Rose Beverage, Inc., 262 AD2d 526. 527, supra).

  4. McNeill v. Rugby Joe's, Inc.

    298 A.D.2d 369 (N.Y. App. Div. 2002)   Cited 23 times

    Finally, the defendant Michael Burns, s/h/a William Burns, is entitled to summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against him since there is no issue of fact as to his liability under the Dram Shop Act. There is no evidence demonstrating that he either sold alcohol to, or procured alcohol for, the plaintiffs' decedent (see Fox v. Clare Rose Beverage, 262 A.D.2d 526; Slocum v. D's Jayes Val. Rest. Cafe, 182 A.D.2d 981, 982). S. MILLER, J.P., CRANE, COZIER and RIVERA, JJ., concur.

  5. Fox v. Clare Rose Beverage, Inc.

    262 A.D.2d 526 (N.Y. App. Div. 1999)   Cited 7 times
    Finding no liability where the distributor did not directly serve the alcohol to individuals at the party and had no opportunity to supervise the service of alcohol at the party or the consumption of alcohol by the partygoers

    Liability may not attach on the theory that Clare Rose unlawfully assisted in the procuring of the beer. The term "procure" is not defined in either the General Obligations Law or the Alcoholic Beverage Control Law and the term is therefore to be given its ordinary and usual meaning, which is "to get possession of: obtain, acquire * * * to get possession of by particular care or effort" ( see, Slocum v. D's Jayes Val. Rest. Cafe, Inc., 182 A.D.2d 981, 982). The term "procure" includes using one's own money to purchase alcohol for another, contributing money to the purchase of the alcohol, and giving away alcohol to another after purchasing it with one's own money ( see, Slocum v. D's Jayes Val. Rest. Cafe, Inc., supra, at 982; Dodge v. Victory Mkts., 199 A.D.2d 917; Prunty v. Keltie's Bum Steer, 163 A.D.2d 595; Campbell v. Step/Lind Rest. Corp., 143 A.D.2d 111; Vandenburg v. Brosnan, 129 A.D.2d 793, affd 70 N.Y.2d 940).

  6. Bregartner v. Southland Corp.

    257 A.D.2d 554 (N.Y. App. Div. 1999)   Cited 3 times

    This created a question of fact as to whether Groene assisted in procuring alcohol for the minor driver of the car. The term "assisting in procuring" alcohol includes "using one's own money to purchase alcohol for another", and "contributing money to the purchase of alcohol" ( Slocum v. D's Jayes Val. Rest. Cafe, 182 A.D.2d 981, 982; see also, Soto v. Montanez, 201 A.D.2d 875; Dodge v. Victory Mkts., 199 A.D.2d 917; Powers v. Niagara Mohawk Power Corp., 129 A.D.2d 37, 41). A question of fact also remains as to whether the minor driver of the car was intoxicated or impaired at the time of the accident, as the detective who investigated the accident noted that his eyes were glassy and that he had the smell of alcohol on his breath a short time after the accident.

  7. Soto v. Montanez

    201 A.D.2d 875 (N.Y. App. Div. 1994)   Cited 1 times

    Montanez's conduct in procuring alcoholic beverages while intoxicated does not constitute "assisting in procuring liquor for such intoxicated person" within the meaning of General Obligations Law § 11-101. That section imposes liability upon a person who, for example, provides the money for the procurement of alcoholic beverages for an intoxicated person or who actually procures such beverages for an intoxicated person (cf., Slocum v D's Jayes Val. Rest. Cafe, 182 A.D.2d 981; Powers v. Niagara Mohawk Power Corp., 129 A.D.2d 37). It does not impose Dram Shop liability upon the intoxicated individual who personally purchased the alcoholic beverages.

  8. Dodge v. Victory Markets, Inc.

    199 A.D.2d 917 (N.Y. App. Div. 1993)   Cited 32 times
    Permitting cause of action based on sale to intoxicated minor who negligently entrusted vehicle causing injury

    In our view this proposed Dram Shop Act claim, to the extent interposed on behalf of Dodge, legally is insufficient. It is well established that no cognizable cause of action predicated upon a violation of the Dram Shop Act exists in favor of an injured party who procured the alcohol for the person whose intoxication caused the accident (see, e.g., Mitchell v The Shoals, 19 N.Y.2d 338, 340-341; Slocum v D's Jayes Val. Rest. Cafe, 182 A.D.2d 981; Powers v Niagara Mohawk Power Corp., 129 A.D.2d 37, 41; Vandenburg v Brosnan, 129 A.D.2d 793, 794, affd 70 N.Y.2d 940). The term procure has been interpreted to include persons such as Dodge who contributed money toward the purchase of alcohol (see, Powers v Niagara Mohawk Power Corp., supra).

  9. Parker v. Dunn

    43 Misc. 3d 377 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2014)

    However, in the 17 years since the decision was issued, no court appears to have adopted this rationale as a majority opinion. Nor can it be said that Hazlitt's “unlawfully procured”, alcoholic beverages for the Defendant. “The term procure' includes using one's own money to purchase alcohol for another, contributing money to the purchase of the alcohol, and giving away alcohol to another after purchasing it with one's own money” (see, Slocum v. D's & Jayes Val. Rest. & Café, Inc., 182 A.D.2d 981, 582 N.Y.S.2d 544 (3rd Dept., 1992)). Fox v. Clare Rose Beverage, Inc., 262 A.D.2d 526, 692 N.Y.S.2d 658 (2nd Dept., 1999) (after citations omitted).

  10. Rudden v. Bernstein

    2008 N.Y. Slip Op. 30068 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2008)   Cited 2 times

    Liability under General Obligations Law § 11-100 may be imposed only on a person who knowingly causes intoxication by furnishing alcohol to (or assisting in the procurement of alcohol for) persons known or reasonably believed to be underage ( see, General Obligations Law § 11-100; Sherman byShermanvRobinson, supra at 487-488). The term "procure" includes using one's own money to purchase alcohol for another, contributing money to the purchase of alcohol and giving away alcohol to another after purchasing it with one's own money ( Fox v Clare Rose Bev., Inc., 262 AD2d 526, 527, 692 NYS2d 658, lv denied, 94 NY2d 755, 701 NYS2d 711; Slocum v D's Jayes Val. Rest. Café, Inc., 182 AD2d 981, 982, 582 NYS2d 544). General Obligations Law § 11-100 requires a showing that the very minor to whom the intoxicant was sold or furnished became intoxicated, and in his or her intoxicated state injured a third party ( Dodge v Victory MarketsInc., 199 AD2d 917, 919, 606 NYS2d 345).