Opinion
No. 10-04-00174-CR.
January 3, 2007. Do not publish
Appeal from the 248th District Court Harris County, Texas Trial Court No. 970,282.
Before CHIEF Justice GRAY, Justice VANCE, and Justice REYNA (Chief Justice GRAY concurs in the judgment. A separate opinion will not be issued.)
MEMORANDUM OPINION
After the trial court denied Patrick Dell Sloan's suppression motion, Sloan pleaded guilty to possession with the intent to deliver cocaine in the amount of 4 grams or more but less than 200 grams. Sloan entered his plea without the benefit of a plea bargain and also pleaded true to an enhancement allegation. The court sentenced him to seventeen years' imprisonment. Sloan contends in two points that: (1) the court abused its discretion by denying his suppression motion because he was arrested without a warrant or probable cause; and (2) he received ineffective assistance of counsel. We will affirm.
Background
The arresting officer Eric Newman was on patrol after midnight on the date in question when he saw a car backed into a parking space with its parking lights on and the engine running. It was the only vehicle in the parking lot, and it was located in an area "well known to be high in narcotics, prostitution, and other Uniform Part 1 crimes," which Newman explained to include robberies and burglaries. The area was "pretty secluded and dark." Newman saw that Sloan was the only occupant of the car. Sloan appeared to be asleep in the driver's seat, which was reclined. Newman testified that he was concerned under the circumstances that Sloan was "a potential victim," experiencing medical distress, or perhaps intoxicated. When Newman made contact, Sloan "was very slow to respond, both verbally and in his movement skills." At Newman's request, Sloan retrieved his identification from his wallet,but he just kind of sat there and stared at it for several seconds, almost as if he'd forgotten what he was doing. And I asked him, Sir, can I see your ID again? Before he — kind of brought him back to what we were doing at that point in time before he finally gave me his identification.Newman then had Sloan get out of the car. He conducted a pat-down search for weapons which disclosed none. Based on Sloan's impaired responsiveness, Newman was concerned that he might by under the influence of phencyclidine (PCP), which Newman explained can cause a person to be "very up and down," ranging from being "lethargic" to "almost impossible to control." Newman handcuffed Sloan and placed him in the backseat of the patrol car for officer safety as he completed his investigation. Newman intended to investigate the car because it was registered to a female who lived a few blocks away and he wanted to determine whether it had a cracked steering column or other indications that it had been recently stolen (and not yet reported). He also intended to check Sloan's identification to determine if there were any pending warrants for his arrest and to check the interior of the car for evidence of any substance which would explain Sloan's condition. He found no evidence that the car had been stolen and no sign of any intoxicating substances. The warrant check on Sloan's identification came back clear. At that point, Newman decided to release Sloan. However, when he got Sloan out of the patrol car, he observed "an obvious amount of crack cocaine" where Sloan had been sitting and "what looked like . . . crack cocaine on [Sloan's] pants as well." The substance Newman observed tested positive for the presence of cocaine. A subsequent search revealed that Sloan had a baggy containing more than 12 grams of crack cocaine concealed in his underwear.
Unlawful Arrest
Sloan contends in his first issue that the court abused its discretion by denying his suppression motion because he was arrested without a warrant or probable cause. Specifically, Sloan argues that he was under arrest at the moment Newman handcuffed him but Newman did not have probable cause to justify an arrest until after he discovered the cocaine in the backseat of the patrol car and on Sloan's pants.[A]n appellate court "should afford almost total deference to a trial court's determination of the historical facts that the record supports especially when the trial court's fact findings are based on an evaluation of credibility and demeanor." An appellate court "should afford the same amount of deference to trial court's rulings on `application of law to fact questions,' also known as `mixed questions of law and fact,' if the resolution of those ultimate questions turns on an evaluation of credibility and demeanor." Finally, an appellate court may conduct a de novo review where the resolution of mixed questions of law and fact do not turn on an evaluation of credibility and demeanor.Montanez v. State, 195 S.W.3d 101, 106 (Tex.Crim.App. 2006) (quoting Guzman v. State, 955 S.W.2d 85, 89 (Tex.Crim.App. 1997)). In denying Sloan's suppression motion, the court stated on the record that it believed Newman had detained Sloan under the circumstances, that the detention was reasonable, and that the use of handcuffs did not convert the detention into an arrest. Sloan concedes in his brief that Newman's original decision to investigate the circumstances "was not unreasonable." See Horton v. State, 16 S.W.3d 848, 851-52 (Tex.App.-Austin 2000, no pet.) (investigative detention justified where EMT's "found themselves confronted after midnight with an unidentified man in a parked car who appeared to be unconscious"). When an officer is engaged in an investigative detention involving a vehicle, "the general rule is that [the detention] can last no longer than necessary to effect the purpose of the stop." Kothe v. State, 152 S.W.3d 54, 63 (Tex.Crim.App. 2004). Once the purpose of the stop is resolved and no basis for a further detention exists, the person detained "should be promptly released." Id.
However, there is an additional component to a routine traffic stop — the license and warrants check. On a routine traffic stop, police officers may request certain information from a driver, such as a driver's license and car registration, and may conduct a computer check on that information. It is only after this computer check is completed, and the officer knows that this driver has a currently valid license, no outstanding warrants, and the car is not stolen, that the traffic-stop investigation is fully resolved. It is at this point that the detention must end and the driver must be permitted to leave.Id. at 63-64 (footnotes omitted). Here, the record supports the court's finding that that initial detention lasted only long enough for Newman to confirm (1) whether the car was stolen or contained readily apparent evidence which would explain Sloan's condition and (2) whether Newman had any outstanding warrants. The use of handcuffs did not automatically convert the detention into an arrest. Balentine v. State, 71 S.W.3d 763, 771 (Tex.Crim.App. 2002). Under the circumstances, Newman "did only that which was reasonably necessary to ensure his own safety while investigating" the circumstances. Id. Thus, the "detention did not evolve into an arrest simply because appellant was escorted to the patrol car and handcuffed." Id. Accordingly, we overrule Sloan's first issue.