Opinion
No. 05-18-00726-CR
05-31-2019
CHAD ERIC SLOAN, Appellant v. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
On Appeal from the 86th Judicial District Court Kaufman County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. 17-10089-86-F
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before Justices Whitehill, Partida-Kipness, and Pedersen, III
Opinion by Justice Whitehill
A jury convicted appellant of possession of a controlled substance, methamphetamine, in an amount of one gram or more but less than four grams. The trial court assessed punishment at five years in prison, probated for five years.
In a single issue, appellant argues the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction because the evidence does not show that he possessed the substance. As discussed below, we conclude that viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the verdict, the logical force of all of the direct and circumstantial evidence is such that a rational jury could find beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant possessed methamphetamine. We thus affirm the trial court's judgment.
I. BACKGROUND
On the morning he was arrested, appellant thought someone was after him, made his way to a stranger's doorstop, and borrowed a phone to call 911. When the police arrived, appellant was kneeling next to an in-ground water meter box in the stranger's yard. Then, he ran toward the street, discarded two firearms, and emptied his pockets. The police found an Altoids tin containing approximately 2.84 grams of methamphetamine inside the meter box and appellant was arrested. A jury convicted appellant of possession of a controlled substance, methamphetamine, in an amount of one gram or more but less than four grams and the court assessed punishment at five years in prison, probated for five years and a $750 fine. This appeal followed.
II. ANALYSIS
A. Standard of Review and Applicable law
We review the sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction by viewing all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict to determine whether any rational fact finder could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979). This standard gives full play to the fact finder's responsibility to resolve testimonial conflicts, weigh the evidence, and draw reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts. Id. at 319; Murray v. State, 457 S.W.3d 446, 448 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015). And the fact finder is the sole judge of the evidence's weight and credibility. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 38.04; Dobbs v. State, 434 S.W.3d 166, 170 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014).
Appellant argues the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to support his conviction. But the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has abolished factual sufficiency. See Howard v. State, 333 S.W.3d 137, 138 n.2 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011). We therefore consider only whether the evidence was legally sufficient.
Thus, when performing an evidentiary sufficiency review, we may not re-evaluate the weight and credibility of the evidence and substitute our judgment for that of the factfinder's. See Montgomery v. State, 369 S.W.3d 188, 192 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012). Instead, we determine whether the necessary inferences are reasonable based upon the evidence's cumulative force viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict. Murray, 457 S.W.3d at 448. We must presume that the factfinder resolved any conflicting inferences in the verdict's favor and defer to that resolution. Id. at 448-49.
The standard of review is the same for direct and circumstantial evidence cases; circumstantial evidence is as probative as direct evidence in establishing guilt. Acosta v. State, 429 S.W.3d 621, 625 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014).
To prove possession of a controlled substance, the State was required to prove that appellant knowingly or intentionally possessed a controlled substance in the applicable penalty group without a valid prescription. See TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 481.115(a). Intent to possess requires proof that appellant (i) exercised care, control, or management over the substance, and (ii) knew the substance was contraband. See id. §481.112 (a); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 1.07(a)(39) (possession is actual care, custody, control, or management).
A defendant's mere presence is insufficient to establish possession. Tate v. State, 500 S.W.3d 410, 413 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016). But when combined with other evidence, presence or proximity may be sufficient to establish possession. Evans v. State, 202 S.W.3d 158, 162 (Tex. Crim. App 2006).
Possible affirmative links that may exist either singly or in combination, include: (1) whether the defendant was present when the drugs were found; (2) whether the drugs were in plain view; (3) whether the drugs were found in proximity to and accessible to the defendant; (4) whether the defendant was under the influence of drugs when arrested; (5) whether the defendant possessed other contraband or drug paraphernalia; (6) whether the defendant made incriminating statements when arrested; (7) whether the defendant attempted to flee; (8) whether the defendant made furtive gestures; (9) whether there was an odor of drugs; (10) whether the defendant owned or had the right to possess the place where the drugs were found; (11) whether the place the drugs were found was enclosed; (12) the amount of drugs found; (13) whether the defendant possessed weapons; and (14) whether the defendant possessed a large amount of cash. Id. at 162. No set formula of facts exists that would dictate a finding of affirmative links sufficient to support an inference of knowing possession of contraband. Porter v. State, 873 S.W.2d 729, 732 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1994, pet. ref'd). The number of links is less important than the "logical force" or degree to which the links, alone or in combination, tend to affirmatively link the accused to the contraband. Evans, 202 S.W.3d at 162.
B. Sole Issue: Is the evidence sufficient to support appellant's conviction?
Appellant argues the evidence is insufficient to show he possessed the controlled substance because he was only found in close proximity to the drugs. We disagree.
The evidence shows that one morning, appellant knocked on Julianne Reese's front door. Reese did not know appellant, and when she opened the door she saw that he was wearing jeans with no shirt. Appellant showed Reese his two handguns, told her someone was after him, and asked to use her phone.
Appellant took the phone out into the yard to make his call. When he returned the phone, he asked for a bottle of water. Reese gave him some water, closed the door, and watched appellant.
Appellant called 911. Appellant went to the middle of the yard and held on to a tree with both hands to hold himself up. Then he sat down, but was still holding on to the tree. Reese found his behavior very strange and thought appellant was distraught and nervous or scared about something.
Appellant went past the fence in Reese's driveway to the in-ground water meter box. Reese was not sure if he opened the box, but said he was "real close and could have opened it."
Another neighbor, Jenny Schneider, had been watching appellant from the time he crossed a cow pasture into Reese's yard. Before he entered Reese's yard, appellant was sitting on the fence moving his arm around. Schneider thought appellant's behavior was erratic and that he was "possibly under the influence of something." When Schneider saw that appellant had a gun in his pants and a gun in his hand, she called the police.
Sheriff's deputies Michael Carlisle and Robert Sigmund arrived at the scene in separate vehicles. Deputy Carlisle said that appellant was kneeling by the water box when he arrived. The video from Deputy Sigmund's car shows appellant near the water meter box at that time. Appellant then ran toward the street, discarded his guns, and emptied his pockets of car keys, a key fob, Chapstick, and coins. Photographs from the scene, including the water box, were admitted into evidence.
Sigmund and Carlisle looked in the water meter box and found an Altoids tin containing approximately 2.84 grams of methamphetamine and a vial that, according to Carlisle, is commonly used for carrying drugs such as methamphetamine. Sigmund does not recall seeing any rain spots, dirt, or other signs that the Altoids tin had been in the water meter box for any length of time.
According to Carlisle, appellant said something about chasing shadows, and "sounded a little crazy." He said there was "something definitely wrong about the situation." Sigmund tried to talk to appellant, who was "responsive but semi-responsive." Sigmund gave up because it "didn't sound like it was really going anywhere," and appellant "seemed out of it."
Viewing this evidence in a light most favorable to the verdict, we conclude that there were sufficient links, together with appellant's presence at the scene to establish possession. When the police arrived, appellant was kneeling near the water box where the drugs were found. Appellant chose to approach the box after looking around Reese's front yard after he called the police. A jury could reasonably infer that he did so to discard the drugs before the police arrived.
Moreover, the Altoids tin and the vial did not appear to have been in the water box for any length of time. Appellant appeared to be under the influence of drugs when the police arrived and everyone who observed him thought he was exhibiting unusual behavior.
When the police arrived, appellant's conduct also evidenced consciousness of guilt. See Evans, 202 S.W.3d at 162. He ran away from the water box into the street and then discarded his guns and the items in his pockets. A jury could reasonably conclude that appellant did so to draw the police away from the location where he had just discarded the drugs.
The logical force of all of this evidence is such that a rational jury could conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant knowingly or intentionally possessed the methamphetamine. We therefore conclude that the evidence is sufficient to support the conviction and resolve appellant's sole issue against him.
The trial court's judgment is affirmed.
/Bill Whitehill/
BILL WHITEHILL
JUSTICE Do Not Publish
TEX. R. APP. P. 47
180726F.U05
JUDGMENT
On Appeal from the 86th Judicial District Court, Kaufman County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. 17-10089-86-F.
Opinion delivered by Justice Whitehill. Justices Partida-Kipness and Pedersen, III participating.
Based on the Court's opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial court is AFFIRMED. Judgment entered May 31, 2019