A claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel requires a showing both that counsel's performance was deficient and that the deficiency prejudiced the outcome of the defendant's appeal. Sloan v. Sanders, 271 Ga. 299 ( 519 SE2d 219) (1999); Battles v. Chapman, 269 Ga. 702 (1) ( 506 SE2d 838) (1998). As to the deficiency component, this Court has held that when analyzing whether appellate counsel's performance was deficient, "the controlling principle is `whether (appellate counsel's) decision was a reasonable tactical move which any competent attorney in the same situation would have made.'
[Cit.]" Sloan v. Sanders, 271 Ga. 299, 300 ( 519 SE2d 219) (1999). "[W]e accept the habeas court's factual findings and credibility determinations unless clearly erroneous, but we independently apply the legal principles to the facts.
To obtain habeas corpus relief on a claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, a petitioner must satisfy the two-prong test of Strickland v. Washington, 466 U. S. 668, 687 ( 104 SC 2052, 80 LE2d 674) (1984) — that appellate counsel was deficient in failing to raise an issue on appeal and that the deficiency prejudiced the defense. Shorter v. Waters, 275 Ga. 581 ( 571 SE2d 373) (2002); Sloan v. Sanders, 271 Ga. 299 ( 519 SE2d 219) (1999); Battles v. Chapman, 269 Ga. 702 ( 506 SE2d 838) (1998).Nelson v. Hall, 275 Ga. 792, 793 ( 573 SE2d 42) (2002).
Battles v. Chapman, 269 Ga. 702 ( 506 SE2d 838) (1998). See Sloan v. Sanders, 271 Ga. 299 ( 519 SE2d 219) (1999). At the first scheduled hearing on his motion for new trial, Hunter stated that he was dissatisfied with appointed counsel and wanted to be represented by retained counsel.
In this case, Brewer alleges that both his trial counsel as well as his appellate counsel were deficient, and that but for his appellate counsel's deficient performance, he would have been granted a new trial on the basis of trial counsel's deficient performance. Sloan v. Sanders, 271 Ga. 299, 300 ( 519 SE2d 219) (1999). During Brewer's trial for burglary and child molestation, two allegedly improper evidentiary admissions occurred.
Accord State v. Smith, 276 Ga. 14, 16 ( 573 S.E.2d 64) (2002).Nelson v. Hall, 275 Ga. 792, 794 ( 573 S.E.2d 42) (2002), quotingSloan v. Sanders, 271 Ga. 299, 300 ( 519 S.E.2d 219) (1999). Phillips contends that appellate counsel's performance was deficient in failing to raise a claim that the State failed to establish the chain of custody for the substance that a crime lab expert identified at trial as cocaine.
To obtain habeas corpus relief on a claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, a petitioner must satisfy the two-prong test ofStrickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 ( 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674) (1984) — that appellate counsel was deficient in failing to raise an issue on appeal and that the deficiency prejudiced the defense. Shorter v. Waters, 275 Ga. 581 (___ S.E.2d ___) 2002); Sloan v. Sanders, 271 Ga. 299 ( 519 S.E.2d 219) (1999);Battles v. Chapman, 269 Ga. 702 ( 506 S.E.2d 838) (1998). In Nelson's case, the habeas court correctly determined that counsel's performance was constitutionally inadequate due to his failure to challenge a jury instruction which omitted the essential element of bodily injury. Had counsel enumerated this issue on appeal, Nelson's judgment of conviction for kidnapping with bodily injury would most certainly have been overturned.
Shorter filed a petition for habeas corpus, contending that Kleinrock's performance was deficient because he did not raise trial counsel's failure to request or join in Shaw's request for the reckless conduct charge when asserting trial counsel's ineffectiveness before the Court of Appeals. Shorter contends that this deficiency prejudiced his case and that but for this deficient performance, there is a reasonable probability the Court of Appeals would have reversed his conviction for the very same reason it reversed co-defendant Shaw's conviction. See Sloan v. Sanders, 271 Ga. 299, 300 ( 519 S.E.2d 219) (1999) (prejudice prong of ineffectiveness claim satisfied by showing that outcome of appeal would have been different). The habeas court, in considering Shorter's contention that Kleinrock's performance was deficient, looked to Battles v. Chapman, supra, for guidance.
To establish ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, Stanford was also required to satisfy both prongs of Strickland: that appellate counsel was deficient in failing to raise the issue and that the deficiency prejudiced the defense. Sloan v. Sanders, 271 Ga. 299 ( 519 S.E.2d 219) (1999); Battles v. Chapman, supra at (1). In evaluating such a claim, we apply the test established inBattles, supra.
253 Ga. 82, 83 ( 316 S.E.2d 749). 271 Ga. 299, 300 ( 519 S.E.2d 219). 270 Ga. 22(1), 23 ( 504 S.E.2d 670).