It is fundamental that courts of equity do not have jurisdiction to enjoin the commission of a crime, but courts have recognized that if grounds for equitable intervention are present an injunction may issue even though the conduct objected to is also a crime. Those cases in which relief has been granted in a situation of this type have usually been based on one of two theories: (1) the license is a franchise in the nature of a property right which equity will protect, (see, e.g., Neil v. Gimbel Bros. Inc. 330 Pa. 213, optometrists; Sloan v. Mitchell, 113 W. Va. 506, physicians; Smith v. Illinois Adjustment Finance Co. 326 Ill. App. 654, attorneys); (2) the unlicensed practice may constitute a public nuisance, which equity will abate. (See, e.g., People ex rel. Bennett v. Lamon, 277 N.Y. 368, chiropractors.)

Cecil et al. v. Clark et al., supra. Adverting again to the question of enjoining interference with property rights, we are aware that in Sloan v. Mitchell, 113 W. Va. 506, 168 S.E. 800, it was held that the right to practice medicine was a valuable property right and the unauthorized practice of medicine by Mitchell, the defendant, was enjoined. Similarly, it has been held that the right to practice law is a property right. Unger v. Landlords' Management Corporation (N. J.) 168 A. 229; Fitchette v. Taylor (Minn.)

People v. Barbiere, 33 Cal.App. 770 [166 P. 812], and State v. Fanning, 96 Neb. 123 [ 147 P. 215], are distinguishable from this case on the ground that in them the courts were passing upon statutes which specifically declared places conducted in violation of those statutes to be public nuisances and provided for their abatement. Such cases as Dworken v. Apartment House Owners Assn., 38 Ohio App. 265 [ 176 N.E. 577], Unger v. Landlords' Management Corp., 114 N.J. Eq. 68 [ 168 A. 229], and Sloan v. Mitchell, 113 W. Va. 506 [ 168 S.E. 800], proceeded on a theory foreign to this action. In those cases holders of licenses to practice a profession were allowed to enjoin unlicensed defendants from practicing the same profession in competition with them.

" Butcher v. Maybury, 8 F.2d 155, 158 (W. D. Wash. 1925). "Cases are legion holding, in one way or another, that the right of a licentiate to practice his profession is a property right, or a right in the nature of a property right, or a valuable franchise, or a valuable privilege." Sloan v. Mitchell, 113 W. Va. 506, 509-10, 168 S.E. 800 (1933); see also Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 576-78, 92 S.Ct. 2701, 33 L.Ed.2d 548 (1972); Lee v. Board of Education, 181 Conn. 69, 72, 434 A.2d 333 (1980); Burden v. Hoover, 9 Ill.2d 114, 118, 137 N.E.2d 59 (1956). Thus, the first prong of the test for determining aggrievement, the existence of a specific personal and legal interest in the subject matter of the decision, has been satisfied with respect to this plaintiff.

Thus Chapter 93, Sections 9 and 15, Acts of the Legislature, 1882, relating to the qualifications of persons permitted to practice medicine in the State of West Virginia, has been held valid by this Court in State v. Dent, 25 W. Va. 1, and the decision in that case was affirmed by the Supreme Court of the United States in Dent v. State of West Virginia, 129 U.S. 114, 9 S.Ct. 231, 32 L.Ed. 623. In State v. Morrison, supra, this Court held that the requirements of examination and license to practice medicine, contained in Sections 8A, 9, 10, and 11, Chapter 150, Barnes' Code, 1923, which was later incorporated in Code, 30-3, are constitutional; and in point 1 of the syllabus in the case of Sloan v. Mitchell, 113 W. Va. 506, 168 S.E. 800, this Court held: "The right of a licensed physician and surgeon to practice his profession is a valuable franchise in the nature of a property right * * *." To the same effect see Dent v. West Virginia, supra and West Virginia State Medical Assn. v. Public Health Council of West Virginia and Its Members, 125 W. Va. 152, 23 S.E.2d 609.

Supporting the view that the right to practice medicine is a property right. See State et al. v. Borah, 51 Ariz. 318, 76 P.2d 757; Dent v. State of West Virginia, 129 U.S. 114, 32 L.Ed. 623; Northern Cedar Co. v. French, 131 Wn. 394, 230 P. 837; Lawrence v. Board of Registration in Medicine, 239 Mass. 424, 132 N.E. 174; Davis v. Board of Registration in Medicine, 251 Mass. 283, 146 N.E. 708; Sloan v. Mitchell, 113 W. Va. 506, 168 S.E. 800; West Virginia State Medical Ass'n v. Public Health Council of West Virginia, 125 W. Va. 152, 23 S.E.2d 609; 41 Am.Jur., Physicians and Surgeons, § 3, p. 135. However, as said in Chenoweth v. State Board of Medical Examiners, 57 Colo. 74, 141 P. 132, 134:

The cases which have sustained the right of individual members of the bar to the remedy of injunction to prevent the unlicensed practice of law accept defendant's major premise but reject his minor premise. They hold that the right of a licentiate to practice his profession is a property right. Dworken v. Apartment House Owners Association of Cleveland, 38 Ohio App. 265, 176 N.E. 577; Land Title Abstract Trust Co. v. Dworken et al., 129 Ohio St. 23, 193 N.E. 650; Unger et al. v. Landlord's Management Corp., 114 N.J. Eq. 68, 168 A. 229; Sloan et al. v. Mitchell, 113 W. Va. 506, 168 S.E. 800; Paul et al. v. Stanley, 168 Wn. 371, 12 P.2d 401; and Fitchette v. Taylor, 191 Minn. 582, 254 N.W. 910, 94 A.L.R. 356. See Annotation at 94 A.L.R. 359.

The right to practice the profession of medicine and surgery "is a valuable franchise in the nature of a property right". Sloan v. Mitchell, 113 W. Va. 506, 168 S.E. 800. The right of Buonanno to exercise that right was affected by the Council's order of revocation, and hence the thirty-day limitation for an appeal is applicable. It is to be noted that Code, 30-1-9, now prescribes a thirty-day limit for presentation of a review and reversal of the action of the Council in revoking a license. After the expiration of the thirty-day period the order of the Council could not be reviewed on appeal to a circuit court.

He can obtain an injunction only if the defendant's unlawful practice threatens irreparable injury to the right. Unger v. Corporation, 114 N. J. Eq. 68; Sloan v. Mitchell, 113 W. Va. 506. Or if criminal proceedings are inadequate. Dworken v. Association, 38 Oh. App. 265; Land Title c. Co. v. Dworken, 129 Oh. St. 23; Goodman v. Company, 28 Oh. N. P. (N.S.) 272. Or the unlawful intrusion is a series of acts from which the common-law remedies afford inadequate protection. Fitchette v. Taylor, 191 Minn. 582 . Or if the unlawful practice is regarded as a public nuisance injuring his property right. Ezell v. Ritholz, 188 S.C. 39. Or if he is in a position to show damage (an allegation that plaintiff's practice has "greatly suffered" being bad on demurrer). Wollitzer v. Company, 266 N. Y. S. 184.

I dismissed the bill on the ground that the defendant was not violating the statute, without considering whether complainants had status to sue. Examples in other states are: Olsen v. Smith (Tex.), 68 S.W. Rep. 320;195 U.S. 332; 25 S.Ct. 52; Merz v. Murchison, 30 Ohio C.C. 646; Taylor v. Dental Laboratory, 29 Ohio C.C. ( N.S.) 451; Sloan v. Mitchell, 113 W. Va. 506; 168 S.E. Rep. 800. The practice indicated by these cases has sprung up because enforcement of regulatory statutes is sometimes neglected by public authorities and is apt to be more vigorous if those who have a direct financial stake are permitted to prosecute.