However, unlike Missouri, a bigamous marriage may become valid under Texas law if "... after the date of the dissolution, the parties have lived together as husband and wife and represented themselves to others as being married." Baqdounes v. Baqdounes , 2009 WL 214508, *4 (Tex. App. Jan. 29, 2009) ; Villegas v. Griffin Industries , 975 S.W.2d 745, 750 (Tex. App. 1998) ("[A]n informal marriage will be recognized as beginning on the date the prior marriage is dissolved."). All opinions and unpublished memorandum opinions in Texas civil cases issued after January 1, 2003 have precedential value, pursuant to Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure Rule 47.7(b).

Jurisdictional recitations in a judgment that is regular on its face import absolute verity and can be attacked only directly, not collaterally. Baqdounes v. Baqdounes, No. 01-07-01102-CV, 2009 WL 214508, at *3 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Jan. 29, 2009, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (citing Akers v. Simpson, 445 S.W.2d 957, 959 (Tex. 1969)); see also Hardin v. Hardin, 597 S.W.2d 347, 350 (Tex. 1980) ("It is well established in Texas that a divorce judgment, unappealed, and regular on its face, is not subject to a collateral attack in a subsequent suit."); Shackelford v. Barton, 156 S.W.3d 604, 606 (Tex. App.—Tyler 2004, pet. denied) (holding that divorce decree could not be collaterally attacked when it was regular on its face and its jurisdictional recitation was sufficient to establish jurisdictional basis for valid judgment). Here, the final divorce decree, which both parties signed as approved and consented to "AS TO BOTH FORM AND SUBSTANCE," contains the following language regarding jurisdiction:

Jurisdictional recitations in a judgment that is regular on its face import absolute verity and can be attacked only directly, not collaterally. Baqdounes v. Baqdounes, No. 01-07-01102-CV, 2009 WL 214508, at *3 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Jan. 29, 2009, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (citing Akers v. Simpson, 445 S.W.2d 957, 959 (Tex. 1969)); see also Hardin v. Hardin, 597 S.W.2d 347, 350 (Tex. 1980) ("It is well established in Texas that a divorce judgment, unappealed, and regular on its face, is not subject to a collateral attack in a subsequent suit."); Shackelford v. Barton, 156 S.W.3d 604, 606 (Tex. App.—Tyler 2004, pet. denied) (holding that divorce decree could not be collaterally attacked when it was regular on its face and its jurisdictional recitation was sufficient to establish jurisdictional basis for valid judgment). Here, the final divorce decree, which both parties signed as approved and consented to "AS TO BOTH FORM AND SUBSTANCE," contains the following language regarding jurisdiction:

See id. at 881. For these reasons, Wagner's attack here is properly classified as collateral, not direct.See also Browning, 698 S.W.2d at 363 (appeal from declaration rendered by one court declaring judgment of another court void is collateral attack); Empire Gas Fuel Co. v. Albright, 126 Tex. 485, 87 S.W.2d 1092, 1096 (1935) (attack on judgment of one court in another court is collateral attack); Baqdounes v. Baqdounes, No. 01-07-01102-CV, 2009 WL 214508, at *2 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] Jan. 29, 2009, pet. denied) ("[The plaintiff's] attack on the prior . . . judgment does not attempt to secure the rendition of a single, correct judgment in place of an earlier one. [The Plaintiff therefore] brings a collateral attack on . . . the decree."). Because Wagner did not mount a direct attack on the Zapata County judgment, the limitations imposed by McEwen and rule 329b do not apply here.