Opinion
Case No. 5:00CV27
June 5, 2001
ORDER
In accordance with the opinion filed this date,
IT IS ORDERED that the motion to dismiss and for summary judgment filed by the Allegan County Community Mental Health (dkt. # 28) is GRANTED and the action against the agency is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the motion for summary judgment filed by Allegan County, William Deetz and Kim Higgs (dkt # 26) is GRANTED IN PART. Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on plaintiff's First Amendment claim. Accordingly, Count 3 of plaintiff's complaint is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that plaintiff's remaining claims against defendants Allegan County, Deetz and Higgs, as set forth in Counts 1 and 2 of plaintiff's complaint, are REMANDED to the Allegan County Circuit Court.
OPINION
This case originally was filed in the Allegan County, Michigan, Circuit Court and was removed to this court by defendants on the basis of federal question jurisdiction, in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and 1441. The action raises three counts: (1) tortious interference with contract against defendant William Deetz only; (2) retaliatory discharge in violation of public policy against defendants Higgs, Deetz and Allegan County; and (3) retaliatory discharge and interference with employment in violation of First Amendment rights against defendants Allegan County and Allegan County Community Mental Health. The matter presently is before the court on motions by all defendants to dismiss and/or for summary judgment.
For the reasons that follow, I conclude that defendants are entitled to summary judgment on plaintiff's First Amendment claim. Having dismissed the only federal claim, the court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining claims, which are remanded to the Allegan County Circuit Court. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367, 1441(c).
I.
Allegan County Community Mental Health ("ACCMH") is an agency of Allegan County. The Board of Directors of the ACCMH is appointed by the Allegan County Board of Commissioners. Thereafter, the board of the ACCMH appoints a director, who has final authority to hire and fire employees. All employees of the ACCMH are employees of Allegan County.
Plaintiff Roy Slinkman was employed by Allegan County in a data management position until he resigned effective December 29, 2000 in order to accept a new position with ACCMH, which was scheduled to begin January 3, 2001. On his application for employment with ACCMH, plaintiff requested that his current employer not be contacted, a request the ACCMH honored. (Complaint, Ex. G., p. 2.) During his interview with ACCMH, Slinkman admits he was asked by the management information systems coordinator of ACCMH, Patrick Thebert-Wright, whether he had any significant problems with the county. (Pl. dep. p. 28.) Plaintiff also admits that he told Thebert-Wright that he had no problems with the county. (Pl. dep. p. 28.) It is undisputed that Thebert-Wright told plaintiff that the ability to work closely and cooperatively with the county was an important criterion for the position. (Thebert-Wright dep. pp. 10-11; Brinkley dep. p. 33.)
On December 28, 1999, Slinkman drafted a letter to the Board of Commissioners. (Complaint, Ex. A.) In that letter, Slinkman expressed his belief that the county had failed to abide by a contractual agreement to pay its workers an additional 1%. Slinkman also expressed his concerns about the unprofessional behavior of two county employees: William Deetz, the Human Resource Director, and Kim Higgs, the County Administrator. Plaintiff advised the commissioners that both his resignation and that of a co-worker, Steve Sedore, were precipitated by the concerns expressed in the letter. Plaintiff stated, "I regret that I cannot be a part of an institution that harbors such questionable, unprofessional and crass disregard of human relations and contractual obligations." (Complaint, Ex. A., p. 2.)
The letter was given to the commission on December 28, 1999, and plaintiff expressed his intent to speak to the commission on December 29, 1999. (Pl. dep. p. 110.) On December 28, defendant Higgs summoned plaintiff to his office, placed him on paid administrative leave, and asked him to leave the building immediately. (Deetz dep. pp. 15-17; Higgs dep. p. 30.) Both Higgs and Deetz testified at deposition that various prior incidents, including a change in system passwords, together with the tone of the letter gave them concerns that plaintiff was a security risk. Id. In addition, defendant Deetz advised plaintiff's new employer, Paul Brinkley, that plaintiff had made a complaint to the Board of Commissioners. (Brinkley dep. pp. 13-14; Deetz dep. pp. 21-23.)
Deetz also faxed to Brinkley a copy of plaintiff's letter. Id. Plaintiff was contacted by his new employer before the time he was scheduled to speak to the Board of Commissioners. (Thebert-Wright dep. pp. 15-17; Pl. dep. pp. 35-40.) At that time, ACCMH coordinator of management information systems, Patrick Thebert-Wright, advised plaintiff that "you have every right to stand up and address them [commissioners] as a citizen of the United States. But I — we need time to discuss this and to take a look at what it means for us and for you. Could you delay this?" (Thebert-Wright dep. p. 16.) Plaintiff did not delay meeting with the Board of Commissioners and did not call Thebert-Wright back, as requested. Both Thebert-Wright and Brinkley attended the meeting and testified at deposition that plaintiff was argumentative and showed poor judgment, raising further concerns about his ability to work with the county. (Thebert-Wright dep. pp. 17-18; Brinkley dep. p. 26.)
Thebert-Wright and Brinkley met with plaintiff on December 30, 2000 to discuss the issue. Plaintiff stated that he did not believe the issues addressed in his complaint to the Board of Commissioners would interfere with his relationships with anyone at the county. (Brinkley dep. pp. 27-29; Thebert-Wright dep. p. 24; Pl. dep. p. 46.) Brinkley and Thebert-Wright found plaintiff's reasoning disturbing, reflecting poor judgment. (Brinkley dep. p. 35; Thebert-Wright dep. p. 24.) After hearing plaintiff's responses to their questions, Brinkley`advised plaintiff that the job offer was withdrawn. (Brinkley dep. p. 28.)
II.
Defendants Allegan County, Deetz and Higgs move to dismiss and for summary judgment on all claims. Defendant Allegan County Community Mental Health (ACCMH) moves for summary judgment on the First Amendment claim, as the only claim brought against the ACCMH.
A. Standards of Review
Under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), a complaint may be dismissed if "it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief." Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957); Hishon v. King Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984). The complaint must be construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and its well-pleaded facts must be accepted as true. Morgan v. Church's Fried Chicken, 829 F.2d 10, 12 (6th Cir. 1987). However, the court need not accept as true legal conclusions or unwarranted factual inferences. Lewis v. ACB Business Serv., Inc., 135 F.3d 389, 405 (6th Cir. 1998). A complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted when it is clear that no relief could be granted under any set of facts that could be proved consistent with the allegations of the complaint. Jones v. City of Carlisle, 3 F.3d 945, 947 (6th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1177 (1994).
On a motion for summary judgment, the court must consider all pleadings, depositions, affidavits and admissions and draw all justifiable inferences in favor of the party opposing the motion. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). The party moving for summary judgment has the burden of pointing the court to the absence of evidence in support of some essential element of the opponent's case. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986); Street v. J. C. Bradford Co., 886 F.2d 1472, 1479 (6th Cir. 1989). Once the moving party has made such a showing, the burden is on the nonmoving party to demonstrate the existence of a genuine issue for trial. Id.
In order to prove that a triable issue exists, the nonmoving party must do more than rely upon allegations, but must come forward with specific facts in support of his or her claim. Id. After reviewing the whole record, the court must determine "whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law." Booker v. Brown Williamson Tobacco Co., Inc., 879 F.2d 1304, 1310 (6th Cir. 1989) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 251-52 (1986)). "`[D]iscredited testimony is not [normally] considered a sufficient basis'" for defeating the motion. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256-57 (quoting Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 512 (1984)). In addition, where the factual context makes a party's claim implausible, that party must come forward with more persuasive evidence demonstrating a genuine issue for trial. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323-24; Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586-87; Street, 886 F.2d at 1480.
B. Retaliation in Violation of First Amendment
It is well established that a government employer cannot "condition public employment on a basis that infringes the employee's constitutionally protected interest in freedom of expression." Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 142 (1983). Retaliation by a government employer against an individual who exercises his First Amendment rights constitutes a First Amendment violation. Perry v. McGinnis, 209 F.3d 597, 604 (6th Cir. 2000) (citing Zilich v. Longo, 34 F.3d 359, 364 (6th Cir. 1994)).
The Supreme Court has set forth a three-pronged test, commonly referred to as the " Pickering test," for proving a prima facie First Amendment claim of retaliatory discharge. Perry, 209 F.3d at 604. Under the Pickering test, plaintiff must demonstrate the following elements: (1) that the speech was about a matter of public concern, Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 143 (1983); (2) that the plaintiff's interest in making the statement outweighs the employer's interest in promoting operational efficiency, Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968); and (3) that the speech at issue was a substantial or motivating factor for the adverse employment action, Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 287 (1977). See Perry, 209 F.3d at 604 (citing Supreme Court cases). The first two prongs of the test involve questions of law, while the third generally involves a question of fact. See id. at 604 n. 4; Rahn v. Drake, 31 F.3d 407, 411 (6th Cir. 1994).
1. Public Concern
Both the Allegan County defendants and ACCMH contend that plaintiff's complaint to the Board of Commissioners was not regarding a matter of public concern. In Connick, the Supreme Court characterized speech upon matters of public concern as speech "relating to any matter of political, social, or other concern to the community." Id. at 146. In determining whether a matter is public, the court must consider the content, form and context of a given statement. Id. at 147-48. The Connick Court expressly rejected the notion that all matters arising in public employment involve matters of public concern:
To presume that all matters which transpire within a government office are of public concern would mean that virtually every remark and certainly every criticism directed at a public official would plant the seed of a constitutional case. While as a matter of good judgment, public officials should be receptive to constructive criticism offered by their employees, the First Amendment does not require a public office to be run as a round table for employee complaints over internal office.Id. at 149.
Here, little basis exists for finding plaintiff's complaint to involve a matter of public concern. Plaintiff's complaint was based on a decision by the county Board of Commissioners to conduct a wage study and to adopt a pay raise that would bring the pay of county employees higher than the median wage in the community for comparable employment. The county had entered into an agreement with the labor union that in January 1999, the county would pay to county employees 1% more than the median wage found by the wage study and an additional 1% wage increase in July of 1999. (Motion of Allegan County, Ex. 2, p. 34.) After the wage study results came back, the county granted pay increases to 108% of the median wages found in the wage study — well in excess of the 1% required by the contract. (Motion of Allegan County, Ex. 3.) Plaintiff received an 11% pay raise. (Motion of Allegan County, Ex. 4.) Plaintiff took the position, however, that the county owed an additional 1% increase beyond whatever wage it adopted because at the time of its vote, it merely adopted the wage study. (Pl. dep. pp. 70-71.) The union did not take plaintiff's position. (Pl. dep. pp. 77-78.) Plaintiff's letter claimed one other employee had taken his view. (Complaint, Ex. A.)
Thus, plaintiff's complaint appears to raise a wage dispute involving only two people. Plaintiff's other concern involved varying complaints about the demeanor and professionalism of Deetz and Higgs. In particular, plaintiff raised the resignation of the second employee, assertedly on the basis of the wage issue and rude treatment by Deetz and Higgs. Plaintiff, however, was not present during the alleged rude behavior. (Pl. dep. pp. 73, 100.)
As a result, the content of the complaint appears to affect individual employment concerns and does not appear the type of public concern addressed by Connick. See Snider v. Belvedere Tp., 216 F.3d 616, 620 (7th Cir. 2000) (where primary complaint is about implementation of a salary increase, matter is not one of public concern). Nor does plaintiff's demand become public simply because he invokes an alleged breach of collective bargaining agreement. See Lynn v. Smith, 628 F. Supp. 283 (M.D.Pa. 1985) (alleged violation of collective bargaining agreement does not raise matter of public concern where plaintiff did not follow appropriate administrative and legal procedures for claiming a breach).
Moreover, the manner in which plaintiff addressed his concern focused on the personal aspect of the dispute. The tone of his letter was insulting not only to the Board of Commissioners, but also to Deetz and Higgs. Plaintiff demanded action within 30 days and advised that he could not "be a part of an institution that harbors such questionable, unprofessional and crass disregard of human relations and contractual obligations." Thus the "content, form, and context" of the statement suggest that it should not be considered protected speech. See Davis v. West Comm. Hosp., 755 F.2d 455, 461-62 (5th Cir. 1985) (demands for apologies and complaints of lack of consideration in various matters are not matters of public concern). As a result, plaintiff's complaint fails to meet the first element of the Picketing test.
2. Plaintiff's Interest in Making Statement vs. Employer's Interest
Plaintiff's claim also does not meet the second requirement for establishing a claim of retaliation for the exercise of First Amendment rights. Plaintiff cannot show that his interest in making the statement outweighs the employer's interest in promoting operational efficiency and workplace harmony. Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568. Plaintiff admits that he was asked about any dispute he may have had with the County before ACCMH made an offer of employment. Plaintiff argues that he does not consider a close working relationship with the county administration to be an official part of his job duties because the ACCMH does not have a written job description stating the requirement. However, he does not dispute that he was told that the ability to work with county employees was an important job criterion.
In balancing the interests of public speech and employer interests, the court must determine whether the public value of the speech is outweighed by legitimate governmental interests. Courts have recognized as pertinent considerations whether the speech impairs discipline by superiors, has a detrimental impact on close working relationships, undermines a legitimate goal or mission of the employer, impedes the performance of the speaker's duties, or impairs harmony among co-workers. See Perry, 209 F.3d at 607 (reciting list of considerations that may outweigh speaker's interest) (citing Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 388 (1987)); Meyers v. City of Cincinnati, 934 F.2d 726 (6th Cir. 1991)).
Here, plaintiff's speech was of limited public interest, if any. The speech, however, was made in a highly confrontational manner, insulting two county employees with whom the ACCMH expected plaintiff to cooperate. The speech also raised an issue that plaintiff had specifically denied during his interview, which itself raised questions about his honesty and judgment. In addition, the ACCMH had significant interests in retaining credibility in light of the independence it had been permitted from county oversight, independence that could be impaired by plaintiff's hostility and poor judgment. Finally, plaintiff's position placed him in charge of sensitive access to shared information systems of both the County and ACCMH. Any question of his loyalty raised significant concerns about his ability to sabotage systems.
Taken together, plaintiff's interest in the speech in question does not outweigh the interests of the ACCMH and Allegan County in workplace harmony and the cooperative relationship between ACCMH and the larger county administration. As a consequence, plaintiff's First Amendment claim fails on both of the first two prongs of the Pickering test and Count III of plaintiff's complaint must be dismissed.
B. Supplemental State-Law Claims
District courts have "broad discretion in deciding whether to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims." Musson Theatrical, Inc. v. Federal Express Corp., 89 F.3d 1244, 1254 (6th Cir. 1996); see also Pinney Dock Transport Co. v. Penn Cent. Corp, 196 F.3d 617, 620 (6th Cir. 2000); 28 U.S.C. § 1367, 1441(c). In deciding whether to exercise its supplemental jurisdiction, a district court should consider the interests of "judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity." Musson, 89 F.3d at 1254 (quoting Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350 (1988)). The court should balance the interests of judicial economy and the avoidance of multiplicity of litigation against needlessly deciding state-law issues. Landefeld v. Marion Gen. Hosp., Inc., 994 F.2d 1178, 1182 (6th Cir. 1993). "When all federal claims are dismissed before trial, the balance of considerations usually will point to dismissing the state law claims, or remanding them to state court if the action was removed." Musson, 89 F.3d at 1254-1255.
The court finds that the balance of considerations in this case weigh against the exercise of supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiff's remaining state-law claims. The case originally was filed in state court and the state law claims turn on questions entirely distinct from the First Amendment issue in this case. The state court remains the better forum for deciding these distinct claims. Accordingly, plaintiff's state-law claims in Counts 1 and 2 of his complaint are remanded to the Allegan County Circuit Court.
III.
For the foregoing reasons, the motion to dismiss and for summary judgment filed by the Allegan County Community Mental Health (dkt. # 28) is GRANTED and the action against the agency is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
The motion for summary judgment filed by Allegan County, William Deetz and Kim Higgs (dkt # 26) is GRANTED IN PART.
Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on plaintiff's First Amendment claim. Accordingly, Count 3 of plaintiff's complaint is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
Plaintiff's remaining claims against defendants Allegan County, Deetz and Higgs, as set forth in Counts 1 and 2 of plaintiff's complaint, are REMANDED to the Allegan County Circuit Court.