Slick Oil Co. v. Coffey

23 Citing cases

  1. St. Louis-San Francisco Railway Co. v. Kilgore

    1961 OK 261 (Okla. 1961)   Cited 8 times
    In St. Louis-San Francisco Railway v. Kilgore, 366 P.2d 936 (Okla. 1961), the plaintiff was awarded $35,000 in a personal injury action as a result of a train-automobile collision.

    The above case was cited with approval in the case of Hembree Chevrolet v. Southard, Okla., 339 P.2d 771. See also Chicago, R.I. P. Ry. Co. v. Fontron Loan Trust Co., 89 Okla. 87, 214 P. 172; Oklahoma Portland Cement Co. v. Dow, 98 Okla. 44, 224 P. 168; Independent Cotton Oil Co. v. Beacham, 31 Okla. 384, 120 P. 969; Slick Oil Co. v. Coffey, 72 Okla. 32, 177 P. 915; Gypsy Oil Co. v. Green, 82 Okla. 147, 198 P. 851; City of Sapulpa v. Deason, 81 Okla. 51, 196 P. 544, and Southern Kansas Stage Lines Co. v. Crain, 185 Okla. 1, 89 P.2d 968. Proper consideration as to whether the verdict is excessive and the result of prejudice and passion necessitates a review of the facts concerning the nature and extent of the injuries.

  2. Public Service Co. of Oklahoma v. Hawkins

    194 Okla. 272 (Okla. 1944)   Cited 14 times

    Upon thorough review of the contentions here we are likewise convinced that the ends of justice require that we hold this verdict for $50,750 to be excessive, and that we should remand this cause to the trial court with directions to grant a new trial unless the plaintiff files a remittitur in the sum of $15,000. See, also, C., R.I. P. Ry. Co. v. Fontron Loan Trust Co., Adm'r, 89 Okla. 87, 214 P. 172; Oklahoma Portland Cement Co. v. Dow, 98 Okla. 44, 224 P. 168; Independent Cotton Oil Co. v. Beacham. 31 Okla. 384, 120 P. 969; Slick Oil Co. v. Coffey, 72 Okla. 32, 177 P. 915; Gypsy Oil Co. v. Green, 82 Okla. 147, 198 P. 251, and City of Sapulpa v. Deason, 81 Okla. 51, 196 P. 544. In its discussion of the Brooks Case, supra, defendant asserts that it points to the correlative proposition that the consideration of the question of excessive damages involves careful examination of the court's instructions, and that the court in this case erred in instructing the jury to the effect that plaintiff might recover for loss of contributions which she might ". . . reasonably have anticipated receiving from her husband for such period of the time as she might reasonably have been expected to live. . . ."

  3. Carpenter v. Kurn

    348 Mo. 1132 (Mo. 1941)   Cited 10 times
    In Carpenter v. Kurn, 157 S.W.2d 213, 215 (Mo. 1941), this Court said that where an experiment was made under similar or approximately similar circumstances, any dissimilarity goes to weight and not admissibility.

    er, 111 S.W.2d 47; Smith v. Welles, 326 Mo. 525, 31 S.W.2d 1014; Poague v. Kurn, 140 S.W.2d 13; Elkins v. St. Louis Pub. Serv. Co., 74 S.W.2d 600; Stanton v. Jones, 332 Mo. 631, 59 S.W.2d 648; Fiedler v. St. Louis, I.M. S. Ry. Co., 107 Mo. 645, 18 S.W. 847; Yakubinis v. M., K. T. Ry. Co., 137 S.W.2d 504; Larey v. M.-K.-T. Ry. Co., 331 Mo. 949, 64 1137 S.W.2d 681; Cotton v. Ship-by-Truck Co., 337 Mo. 270, 85 S.W.2d 80. (4) Respondent's Instruction 1 is proper. Stanich v. Western Union Tel. Co., 153 S.W.2d 54; Schultz v. Smercina, 318 Mo. 486, 1 S.W.2d 113; Silliman v. Munger Laundry Co., 44 S.W.2d 159, 329 Mo. 235; Smithers v. Barker, 111 S.W.2d 47. (5) The verdict is not excessive nor the result of bias or prejudice. Big Jack Mining Co. v. Parkinson, 41 Okla. 125, 137 P. 678; St. Louis-S.F. Ry. Co. v. Henson, 247 P. 92; Ponca City v. Reed, 242 P. 164; Oklahoma Transportation Co. v. Martin, 91 P.2d 74; Coker v. Moose, 68 P.2d 504; Missouri-Kansas-Texas Ry. Co. v. Herron, 55 P.2d 95; Slick Oil Co. v. Coffey, 177 P. 915; Bohling v. Asbridge, 203 P. 894; Stottel v. Chicago, R.I. P. Ry. Co., 18 S.W.2d 433; O'Donnell v. Baltimore Ohio Ry. Co., 26 S.W.2d 929; Moran v. Atchison, T. S.F. Ry. Co., 48 S.W.2d 881; Armstrong v. Mobile Ohio Ry. Co., 55 S.W.2d 460; Noce v. St. Louis-S.F. Ry. Co., 85 S.W.2d 637. [214] TIPTON, P.J.

  4. Illinois Bankers Life Ass'n v. Hardy

    174 Okla. 326 (Okla. 1935)   Cited 3 times

    In the absence of such request we find the numbered instruction to be fair and, together with all of the instructions, to fairly submit the issue of fact, and we find no merit in this contention. See St. L. S. F. Ry. Co. v. Crowell, 33 Okla. 773, 127 P. 1063; Chickasha St. Ry. Co. v. Wund, 37 Okla. 582, 132 P. 1078; Dunnington v. Loeser 48 Okla. 636, 149 P. 1161, 150 P. 874; Oil Co. v. Coffee, 72 Okla. 32, 177 P. 915; Lusk v. Kennedy, 73 Okla. 307, 176 P. 502; Weighing Machine Co. v. Bondurant, 137 Okla. 27, 277 P. 665; Grant v. Milam, 20 Okla. 672, 95 P. 424; Chitwood v. Palmer, 101 Okla. 300, 225 P. 969; Kenyon v. Perry et al., 113 Okla. 188, 240 P. 702. The defendant contends that the verdict of the jury is not sustained by the evidence; that the court erred in refusing defendant's requested instruction for a directed verdict, and erred in overruling defendant's motion for judgment non obstante veredicto.

  5. Beasley v. Bond

    173 Okla. 355 (Okla. 1935)   Cited 31 times
    In Beasley v. Bond, 173 Okla. 355, 48 P.2d 299, this court affirmed the ruling of the trial court which allowed evidence to be admitted as to other methods of work as relevant "for the purpose of fully understanding the facts and circumstances in connection with the method of operation."

    Since the servant of an independent contractor is not a servant of the contractee, the contractee is not liable for injuries to such servant caused by the negligence of the contractor, unless the contractee has retained direction and control of the work (Chas. T. Derr Const. Co. v. Gelruth, 29 Okla. 538, 120 P. 253), or furnishes the machinery and appliances (Srick Oil Co. v. Caffey, 72 Okla. 32, 177 P. 915), or unless the negligence consists in a duty which cannot be delegated (Derr Const. Co. v. Gelruth, supra). But "the rule is not affected by a statute making it the duty of owners, contractors, and subcontractors, engaged in designated work to take designated precautions for the safety of their employees, such statutes being intended to apply only to that member of the class enumerated who was engaged in the work designated at the time when the injury occurred."

  6. Taft v. Davidson

    45 P.2d 738 (Okla. 1935)

    Where an instruction given is correct so far as it goes, and a party desires an instruction upon some element of a defense not completely covered by the instruction given, he should present an instruction embodying elements which he desires given, and request that the jury be so instructed; and unless this be done the instruction given will not work a reversal. Slick Oil Co. v. Coffey, 72 Okla. 32, 177 P. 915. Appeal from District Court, Oklahoma County; Sam Hooker, Judge.

  7. Thompson v. Burnett

    27 P.2d 1053 (Okla. 1933)   Cited 4 times

    Chicago, R.I. P. Ry. Co. v. Bradshaw, 122 Okla. 282, 254 P. 725. See, also, Slick Oil Co. v. Coffey, 72 Okla. 32, 177 P. 915; Lusk v. Kennedy, 73 Okla. 307, 176 P. 502; Chickasha St. Ry. Co. v. Wund, 37 Okla. 582, 132 P. 1078; White v. Madison, 16 Okla. 212, 83 P. 798; City of Cushing v. Bay, 82 Okla. 140, 198 P. 877. The instructions as a whole did clearly point out to the jury the facts necessary to be proved by the plaintiff to entitle plaintiff to recover.

  8. Sallee v. Craddock

    4 P.2d 1013 (Okla. 1931)   Cited 1 times

    "It is well settled that, if the instructions given by the court, taken together and considered as a whole fairly present the law of the case, and there is no material conflict between the different paragraphs thereof, this will be sufficient. It is also well settled that, where the court instructs the jury clearly, fairly, and fully upon all phases of the case, it is not error to refuse to give any and all requested instructions. Chickasaw Compress Co. v. Bow, 47 Okla. 576, 149 P. 1166; Chicago, R.I. P. Ry. Co. v. Johnson, 71 Okla. 118, 175 P. 494; Slick Oil Co. v. Coffey, 72 Okla. 32, 177 P. 915; Citizens' Bank of Headrick v. Citizens' State Bank of Altus, 75 Okla. 225, 182 P. 657; Muskogee Electric Traction Co. v. Jackson, 88 Okla. 184, 212 P. 416."

  9. City of Ponca City v. Reed

    115 Okla. 166 (Okla. 1925)   Cited 8 times

    "Where it clearly appears that the jury has committed some palpable error or acted upon some improper bias, influence, or prejudice, or has clearly mistaken the rules of law by which damages are to be regulated, the verdict can be set aside. St. Louis S. F. R. Co. v. Hodge, 53 Okla. 427, 157 P. 60; Slick Oil Co. v. Coffey, 72 Okla. 32, 177 P. 915. And where a verdict is excessive for any of the reasons cited, the Supreme Court may direct a reversal of the cause or give the plaintiff the option to remit the amount held to be excessive and allow the judgment as modified to stand.

  10. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry. Co. v. Bryan

    238 P. 1118 (Okla. 1925)   Cited 5 times

    The court held that these statutes did not deprive the municipalities of regulating the speed of trains within their limits. See, also, Seaboard Air Line Ry. Co. v. Smith, 53 Fla. 375, 43 So. 235. This ordinance of the city being in full force and effect at the time, the court rightfully admitted it in evidence, and there being evidence that the train was running at a rate of speed in excess of that allowed by the ordinance, properly instructed them that the running of trains in excess of that allowed by ordinance or statutes is negligence per se. C., R.I.P. Ry. Co. v. Pitchford, 44 Okla. 197, 143 P. 1146; Dickinson v. Cole, 74 Okla. 79, 177 P. 570. Also see Slick Oil Co. v. Coffey, 72 Okla. 32, 177 P. 915; Oklahoma Producing Refining Corp. v. Freeman, 88 Okla. 166, 212 P. 742. The further contention made by the defendants is that the trial court erred in refusing to give their requested instruction No. 5, which, in effect, would have told the jury that it was the duty of the deceased to look and listen for approaching trains before attempting to cross the track.