Opinion
No. 2-251 / 01-1315.
Filed June 19, 2002.
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Johnson County, KRISTIN HIBBS, Judge.
Dena Sleeth appeals the judgment entered in the district court on her tort action against defendants. AFFIRMED.
Martin A. Diaz, Iowa City, for appellant.
Matthew J. Nagle and Amy L. Reasner of Lynch Dallas, P.C., Cedar Rapids, for appellee.
Considered by MAHAN, P.J., and MILLER and HECHT, JJ.
Dena Sleeth appeals the judgment entered in the district court on her tort action against defendants, Tony and Doug Louvar. She claims the district court improperly instructed the jury on the "aggravation" theory of recovery and seeks a new trial on damages. We affirm.
On April 1, 1998, Sleeth was in an automobile accident with Tony Louvar, who was driving a car owned by Doug Louvar. After the accident Sleeth experienced pain in her knees. She had surgery on her left knee on October 7, 1998. Her physician, Dr. David Hart, determined Sleeth had significant arthritis in her knee and that this condition was likely present before the collision. He stated the collision would have aggravated her pre-existing condition of osteoarthritis. Dr. Hart also testified, "I mean, she had a significant pre-existing condition that essentially would get her this impairment rating based on just her condition, whether or not she was in a car accident."
Sleeth filed a tort suit against the Louvars. The Louvars admitted responsibility for the accident but denied they were the cause of Sleeth's injuries. The district court instructed the jury on an aggravation theory and an eggshell plaintiff theory. The jury entered a verdict for Sleeth and awarded her damages of $15,000. Sleeth filed a motion for new trial, claiming the court should not have instructed the jury on the aggravation theory. The court denied the motion, and Sleeth appealed.
We review for corrections of errors at law. Iowa R. App. P. 6.4. We review jury instructions to decide if they are a correct statement of the law and are substantially supported by the evidence. Bride v. Heckart, 556 N.W.2d 449, 452 (Iowa 1996). Error in giving or refusing to give a particular instruction does not warrant reversal unless the error is prejudicial to the party. Sonek v. Warren, 522 N.W.2d 45, 47 (Iowa 1994).
Both parties rely on Waits v. United Fire Casualty Company, 572 N.W.2d 565, 578 (Iowa 1997), which provides:
United Fire suggests that it is improper for the court to give both an eggshell plaintiff instruction and an aggravation instruction. It contends the trial court should decide which instruction fits the proven facts and give only that instruction. We disagree. Where there is testimony that establishes a factual basis for both instructions, a trial court does not commit reversible error by submitting both instructions to the jury. It is the jury's responsibility to resolve factual disputes, not the court's responsibility. Moreover, we can envision situations where the principles embodied in both instructions might apply. For example, if the prior condition has caused some disability or pain that is aggravated by the second injury and at the same time the additional harm resulting from the second injury is greater than it would have been in the absence of the prior injury, the jury would need both instructions to accurately determine the defendant's liability. Applying the aggravation rule and the eggshell plaintiff rule in the example given, the jury should compensate the plaintiff for the entire pain and disability resulting from the defendant's fault but not for any pre-existing pain and disability.
Sleeth asserts she did not have any pain or disability in her knees prior to the accident and, therefore, there was not sufficient evidence to justify submission of the aggravation instruction. While Sleeth testified she did not have any pain in her knees before the accident, the jury may have found this testimony was not credible. Sleeth testified she had popping in her knees since she was a child. There was also a question concerning whether Sleeth's symptoms in her right knee arose sometime after her problems with her left knee, which could lead to the conclusion her problems with her right knee were caused by arthritis and not the collision. Furthermore, we note Dr. Hart testified Sleeth's impairment could be based on just her arthritis, "whether or not she was in a car accident." Under the facts in this case, we determine the district court properly instructed the jury on both the aggravation and eggshell plaintiff theories.
We affirm the judgment of the district court.
AFFIRMED.