The doctrine of res judicata precludes the litigation in a later case of matters actually decided, and matters that could have been litigated, in an earlier action between the same parties for the same cause of action. Sleeper v. Hoban Family P'ship, 157 N.H. 530, 533, 955 A.2d 879 (2008). For the doctrine to apply, three elements must be established: (1) the parties must be the same or in privity with one another; (2) the same cause of action must be before the court in both instances; and (3) a final judgment on the merits must have been rendered in the first action.
"Res Judicata precludes the litigation in a later case of matters actually decided, and matters that could have been litigated, in an earlier action between the same parties for the same action." Sleeper v. Hoban Family Partnership, 157 N.H. 530, 533 (2008), citing Meier v. Town of Littleton, 154 N.H. 340, 342 (2006). In order for the doctrine to apply, "three elements must be met: (1) the parties must be the same or in privity with one another; (2) the same cause of action must be before the court in both instances; and (3) a final judgment on the merits must have been rendered in the first action."
“The applicability of res judicata is a question of law that we review de novo.” Sleeper v. Hoban Family P'ship, 157 N.H. 530, 533, 955 A.2d 879 (2008). “Res judicata precludes the litigation in a later case of matters actually decided, and matters that could have been litigated, in an earlier action between the same parties for the same cause of action.
For the "pre-existing substantive legal relationship" exception, "[q]ualifying relationships include, but are not limited to, preceding and succeeding owners of property, bailee and bailor, and assignee and assignor." Taylor, 553 U.S. at 894; see also Walker, 238 A.3d 1096 (citing Sleeper v. Hoban Family P'Ship, 157 N.H. 530, 533 (2008)) ("Qualifying relationships include that between a property owner and his successor in interest.")); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 43 (1982) ("A judgment in an action that determines interests in real or personal property: (1) With respect to the property involved in the action: (a) Conclusively determines the claims of the parties to the action regarding their interests; and (b) Has preclusive effects upon a person who succeeds to the interest of a party to the same extent as upon the party himself.").
Res judicata precludes litigation "in a later case of matters actually decided, and matters that could have been litigated, in an earlier action between the same parties for the same cause of action." Sleeper v. Hoban Family P'ship, 157 N.H. 530, 533 (2008). For the doctrine to apply, "(1) the parties must be the same or in privity with one another; (2) the same cause of action must be before the court in both instances; and (3) a final judgment on the merits must have been rendered in the first action."
While the term "privity" includes a variety of pre-existing substantive legal relationships such as that between a property owner and the property owner's successor in interest, Sleeper v. Hoban Family P'ship, 157 N.H. 530, 534 (2008), "we have used the term more broadly to refer to a functional relationship, in which, at a minimum, the interests of the non-party were in fact represented and protected in the prior litigation," id. (quotation omitted). Having reviewed the record before us, we agree with the trial court's conclusion that, in this case, "a 'functional relationship' exists between Plaintiff Chalifour and the plaintiffs in the [previous litigation], because her interests were in fact represented and protected in the prior litigation."
The term "cause of action" is defined as the right to recover, regardless of the theory of recovery. Meier v. Town of Littleton, 154 N.H. 340, 343, 910 A.2d 1243 (2006) (quotation omitted); seeSleeper v. Hoban Family P'ship, 157 N.H. 530, 534, 955 A.2d 879 (2008) (defining "cause of action collectively to refer to all theories on which relief could be claimed on the basis of the factual transaction in question" (quotation omitted)). "Generally, in determining
"Although generally res judicata does not apply to nonparties to the original judgment, this rule is subject to exceptions." Sleeper n Hoban Family P'ship, 157 N.H. 530, 533 (2008). One exception concerns "a variety of pre-existing substantive legal relationships between the person to be bound and a party to the judgment."
(quoting In re Est. of Bergquist, 166 N.H. 531, 100 A.3d 510, 512 (2014))); see also id. (explaining that "[t]he term 'cause of action' is defined as the right to recover, regardless of the theory of recovery" and that to determine "whether two actions are the same cause of action for the purpose of applying res judicata, [a court considers] whether the alleged causes of action arise out of the same transaction or occurrence." (first quoting Meier v. Town of Littleton, 154 N.H. 340, 910 A.2d 1243, 1246 (2006); then quoting Sleeper v. Hoban Fam. P'ship, 157 N.H. 530, 955 A.2d 879, 883 (2008))). Volokh also asserts that First Amendment and common law principles create a presumptive right of the public to know Doe's name now that he has filed suit.
Under New Hampshire law, in order to determine whether the same causes of action were present in both cases, the court considers whether the causes of action arise out of the same transaction or occurrence. See Sleeper v. Hoban Family Partnership, 157 N.H. 530, 534, 955 A.2d 879, 883 (2008) (citing In re University Syst. of New Hampshire, 147 N.H. 626, 629, 795 A.2d 840, 843 (2002)). Here, all three actions clearly arise out of the same transaction or occurrence, i.e., Griffin's arrest in August 2004 on a charge that he violated a protection order.