The principle is firmly entrenched that supervisory officials may be held liable in certain circumstances for the constitutional injuries inflicted by their subordinates. See Slakan v. Porter, 737 F.2d 368 (4th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1035, 105 S.Ct. 1413, 84 L.Ed.2d 796 (1985); Orpiano v. Johnson, 632 F.2d 1096 (4th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 929, 101 S.Ct. 1387, 67 L.Ed.2d 361 (1981); Withers v. Levine, 615 F.2d 158 (4th Cir. 1980). In Slakan, we reasoned that liability is not premised upon respondeat superior but upon "a recognition that supervisory indifference or tacit authorization of subordinates' misconduct may be a causative factor in the constitutional injuries they inflict on those committed to their care."
It is well settled that supervisory officials may be held liable in certain circumstances for the constitutional injuries inflicted by their subordinates. See Shaw v. Stroud, 13 F.3d 791, 799 (4th Cir. 1994); Miltier v. Beorn, 896 F.2d 848, 854 (4th Cir. 1990); Slakan v. Porter, 737 F.2d 368, 372 (4th Cir. 1984);see also Sanders v. Brown, No. 06-2251, 2007 WL 4322569, at *5 (4th Cir. Dec. 11, 2007). The Fourth Circuit set forth three elements necessary to establish supervisory liability under Section 1983:
The Fourth Circuit has held that “[e]stablishing a ‘pervasive' and ‘unreasonable' risk of harm requires evidence that the conduct is widespread, or at least has been used on several different occasions and that the conduct engaged in by the subordinate poses an unreasonable risk of harm of constitutional injury.” Id. at 799 (quoting Slakan v. Porter, 737 F.2d 368, 373-74 (4th Cir. 1984)). The Fourth Circuit has also held that “a plaintiff [o]rdinarily . . . cannot satisfy his burden of proof by pointing to a single incident or isolated incidents . . . for a supervisor cannot be expected . . . to guard against the deliberate criminal acts of his properly trained employees when he has no basis upon which to anticipate the misconduct.”
” Slakan v. Porter, 737 F.2d 368, 372 (4th Cir. 1984). The Fourth Circuit has adopted the following test to determine whether the plaintiff can demonstrate supervisory liability:
Liability of a supervisory official under § 1983 "is premised on 'a recognition that supervisory indifference or tacit authorization of subordinates' misconduct may be a causative factor in the constitutional injuries they inflict on those committed to their care.'" Baynard v. Malone, 268 F.3d 228, 235 (4th Cir. 2001) (citing Slakan v. Porter, 737 F.2d 368, 372 (4th Cir. 1984)). With respect to a supervisory liability claim in a § 1983 action, a plaintiff must allege:
See Helling v. McKinney, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 113 S.Ct. 2475, 2482, 125 L.Ed.2d 22 (1993) (making reference to the "scientific and statistical inquir[ies]" that will be used to determine the seriousness of the harm caused by challenged conditions); Jordan v. Gardner, 986 F.2d 1521, 1526 (9th Cir. 1993) (en banc) (relying on expert testimony to establish psychological impact of challenged measure on inmates). See also Slakan v. Potter, 737 F.2d 368, 378 (4th Cir. 1984) (correctional expert's opinions concerning punitive nature of prison's water hosing practices properly admitted). After the trial was completed, in December 1993, the parties filed proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law on January 28 and February 1, 1994.
Section 1983 liability on the part of the supervisory defendants requires a showing that: (1) the supervisory defendants failed promptly to provide an inmate with needed medical care, see Boyce v. Alizaduh, 595 F.2d 948, 953 (4th Cir. 1979); (2) that the supervisory defendants deliberately interfered with the prison doctors' performance, see Gamble v. Estelle, 554 F.2d 653, 654 (5th Cir. 1977); or (3) that the supervisory defendants tacitly authorized or were indifferent to the prison physicians' constitutional violations. See Slakan v. Porter, 737 F.2d 368, 372 (4th Cir. 1984) (discussing supervisory liability for an inmate's beating by prison guards). Miltier concedes that Gwendolyn had unfettered access to VCCW's medical system. Miltier's claim of supervisory liability appears to rest on the third theory.
Equally well-known, § 1983 provides no basis for vicarious liability. Slakan v. Porter, 737 F.2d 368, 372 (4th Cir. 1984) (recognizing the “firmly established . . . principle that supervisory officials may” not be held vicariously liable under § 1983 “for the constitutional injuries inflicted by their subordinates”).
It is well-established “that supervisory officials may be held liable in certain circumstances for the constitutional injuries inflicted by their subordinates.” Slakan v. Porter, 737 F.2d 368, 372 (4th Cir. 1984) (citations omitted). However, “[l]iability in this context is not premised on respondeat superior, but on a recognition that supervisory indifference or tacit authorization of subordinates' misconduct may be a causative factor in the constitutional injuries they inflict on those committed to their care.”
"[S]upervisory officials may be held liable in certain circumstances for the constitutional injuries inflicted by their subordinates." Shaw v. Stroud, 13 F.3d 791, 798 (4th Cir. 1994) (citing Slakan v. Porter, 737 F.2d 368 (4th Cir. 1984)). This liability, however, "is not premised on respondeat superior but upon 'a recognition that supervisory indifference or tacit authorization of subordinates' misconduct may be a causative factor in the constitutional injuries they inflict on those committed to their care.'" Id. at 798 (quoting Slakan, 737 F.2d at 372-73).