Opinion
No. 84847
01-12-2023
Cheryl Ann SLADER, Appellant, v. Cory Lawrence COLLEY, Respondent.
ORDER DISMISSING APPEAL
When initial review of the docketing statement and documents before this court revealed a potential jurisdictional defect, this court ordered appellant to show cause why this appeal should not be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. Specifically, it did not appear that the decree was appealable as a final judgment under NRAP 3A(b)(1) where the decree leaves the determination of community debts and property unresolved and provides that a holiday and vacation custody schedule will be addressed in further proceedings. See Lee v. GNLV Corp. , 116 Nev. 424, 426, 996 P.2d 416, 417 (2000) ("[A] final judgment is one that disposes of all the issues presented in the case, and leaves nothing for the future consideration of the court, except for post-judgment issues such as attorney's fees and costs.").
Having considered appellant's response, this court is not convinced that the decree is a final appealable judgment. Appellant concedes in her response that division of the parties’ community debts and property and establishment of a holiday and vacation custody schedule remain pending issues for the district court's consideration. To the extent appellant asserts that the decree is appealable as a final custody order, see NRAP 3A(b)(7), the assertion lacks merit because the decree does not finally resolve the issue of custody. See Sicor, Inc. v. Sacks , 127 Nev. 896, 900, 266 P.3d 618, 620 (2011) (explaining that this court "routinely dismiss[es] appeals from interim custody orders that contemplate further district court proceedings before entry of a final custody order"). And it does not appear that any other statute or court rule allows an appeal from the decree. See Brown v. MHC Stagecoach, LLC , 129 Nev. 343, 345, 301 P.3d 850, 851 (2013) (this court "may only consider appeals authorized by statute or court rule"). Accordingly, this court lacks jurisdiction and
Given this dismissal, respondent's pro se motion for an extension of time to file a reply to appellant's response is denied as moot.
Any affirmative relief requested in appellant's response is denied.