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Slade v. Gates

United States District Court, C.D. California
May 1, 2003
Case No. CV01-8244-RMT (C.D. Cal. May. 1, 2003)

Opinion

Case No. CV01-8244-RMT

May 1, 2003


ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART MOTION BY DEFENDANTS DARYL F. GATES, ET AL., TO DISMISS COUNTS FIVE AND SIX OF THE FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT


This matter has come before the court on the motion by defendants Daryl F. Gates, Willie L. Williams, Bernard C. Parks, Hal Bernson, Laura Chick, Nate Holden, Mark Ridley-Thomas, Joel Wachs, Ernani Bernardi, Joy Picus, Zev Yaroslavsky, Raymond C. Fisher, Deirdre Hughes Hill, Barbara Lindemann Schlei, Robert M. Talcott, Reva Tooley, Robert Weil, Stanley Sheinbaum, Jeffrey Gallagher, James K. Hahn, Richard Helgeson, Thomas Hokinson, S. David Hotchkiss, Helen Annette Keller, James Pearson, Philip Shiner, Philip J. Sugar, G. Daniel Woodard, Don Wiston Vincent, II, Lisa Wong, Carmen Mederos, Gerald Holtz, Gustavo Raya and Chief William J. Bratton as successor to Bernard C. Parks in his official capacity only (collectively, "Gates, e1 al.") to dismiss counts five and six of the First Amended Complaint ("FAC") for failure to state a claim pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. By this motion, defendants Gates, et al. contend (1) plaintiff lacks standing to plead a claim under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act ("RICO ") because plaintiff has not suffered an injury to "business or property;" and (2) plaintiff fails to sufficiently allege the predicate act of obstruction of justice in a federal proceeding.

RICO STANDING

To have standing to pursue a RICO claim, plaintiff must have suffered an injury to "business or property" caused by the conduct constituting the violation. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c). Personal injuries are not compensable under RICO Oscar v. University Students Co-operative Association, 965 F.2d 783, 785 (9th Cir. 1992); Berg v. First State Insurance Company, 915 F.2d 460, 464 (9th Cir. 1990).

In the FAC, plaintiff alleges that he suffered a business and/or property injury by reason of lost employment, loss of employment opportunities, and wages and other compensation associated with the loss of employment and other opportunities, He further alleges that he suffered a business and/or property injury because defendant police officers took plaintiff's property and money. Of course, the alleged taking of plaintiff's property and money constitutes "injury to business or property." The issue here is whether the employment loss constitutes injury to business. The conflict is whether employment loss should be construed as a personal injury as it is under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 or as an injury to business as it is under the Clayton Anti-Trust Act.

In this court's previous rulings, it was held that employment losses are personal injuries and not injury to business. The court adopted the reasoning of Section 1983 cases in their conclusion that injuries sustained as a result of unconstitutional searches, false arrest, and false imprisonment are personal injuries and, thus, recoverable under Section 1983. However, upon revisiting this issue, this court has now determined that "injury to business or property" should be construed, instead, by looking to judicial interpretations of the identical language contained in the Clayton Anti-Trust Act. See Fulton v. Plumbers and Steamfitters, 695 F.2d 402, 408 n. 9 (9th Cir. 1982), When two statutes are phrased in identical words, it is proper for the court to look to judicial interpretations of one for guidance in construing the other, Here, not only does RICO share this identical phrase with the Clayton Anti-Trust Act but "there is a clear legislative record of congressional reliance on the Clayton Act when RICO was under consideration. . . . Both statutes share a common congressional objective of encouraging civil litigation to supplement Government efforts to deter and penalize the respectively prohibited practices." Rotella v. Wood, 528 U.S. 549, 557 (2000).

Accordingly, this court concludes that a claim for employment loss could constitute an injury to business and, therefore, plaintiff has standing under RICO to pursue his claim for employment loss,

PREDICATE ACT OF OBSTRUCTION OF JUSTICE

Under RICO, obstruction of justice in a federal proceeding constitutes a predicate act. In the FAC, plaintiff alleges that defendants obstructed justice, but fails to assert whether such obstruction occurred in a federal proceeding. Arguably, such an allegation would be sufficient under the notice pleading requirement. However, in the paragraph immediately following this allegation, plaintiff alleges tampering with and retaliating against witnesses, victims and informants in state court proceedings, which, as alleged, appears to explain the asserted obstruction of justice allegation. As such, it appears from the face of the FAC that plaintiff is alleging obstruction of justice in state court proceedings and not in a federal proceeding.

Accordingly,

IT IS ORDERED that the motion by defendants Gates, et al. to dismiss counts five and six of the First Amended Complaint for failure to state a claim pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is granted, with leave to amend, with respect to the alleged predicate act of obstruction of justice; and denied in all other respects. If plaintiff wishes to include the predicate act of obstruction of justice, he shall file a second amended complaint no later than May 16, 2003.


Summaries of

Slade v. Gates

United States District Court, C.D. California
May 1, 2003
Case No. CV01-8244-RMT (C.D. Cal. May. 1, 2003)
Case details for

Slade v. Gates

Case Details

Full title:H. SLADE, Plaintiff, vs. DARYL F. GATES, et al. Defendants

Court:United States District Court, C.D. California

Date published: May 1, 2003

Citations

Case No. CV01-8244-RMT (C.D. Cal. May. 1, 2003)