For example, some courts have found that a declaration of emergency can be voided if there is a showing of "bad faith or fraud," it is an "obvious mistake," the declaration is "obviously illusory or tautological," or it is "obviously false and a palpable attempt at dissimulation." Id. P 100 n.65 (quoting Slack v. City of Colo. Springs, 655 P.2d 376, 379 (Colo. 1982); Jefferson Std. Life Ins. Co. v. Noble, 185 Miss. 360, 188 So. 289, 293 (Miss. 1939); Moscow v. Moscow Vill. Council, 29 Ohio B. 284, 29 Ohio B. 285, 504 N.E.2d 1227, 1234 (Ohio Ct. C.P. 1984); Wash. State Farm Bureau Fed'n v. Reed, 154 Wn.2d 668, 115 P.3d 301, 305 (Wash.
); Pouquette v. O'Brien, 55 Ariz. 248, 100 P.2d 979, 982 (Ariz. 1940) ("The existence of a public emergency justifying the suspension of the ordinary constitutional limitations is primarily for the legislature, but the [legislature's] determination . . . is not conclusive . . . [but] open to judicial inquiry."); Slack v. City of Colo. Springs, 655 P.2d 376, 379 (Colo. 1982) ("Only upon a showing of bad faith or fraud are legislative judgments reviewable."); Jefferson Std. Life Ins. Co. v. Noble, 185 Miss. 360, 188 So. 289, 293 (Miss. 1939) ("'[A]s to the respect due to a declaration of this kind by the Legislature[,] . . . . a court is not at liberty to shut its eyes to an obvious mistake'") (quoting Chastleton Corp. v. Sinclair, 264 U.S. 543, 547, 44 S. Ct. 405, 68 L. Ed. 841 (1924)); Osage Outdoor Adver., Inc. v. State Highway Comm'n of Mo., 687 S.W.2d 566, 569 (Mo. App. 1984) ("The legislative declaration of an act to be an emergency measure is entitled to great weight but is not conclusive, because the courts possess the final authority to determine whether an emergency in fact exists."); Moscow v. Moscow Vill. Council, 29 Ohio B. 284, 29 Ohio B. 285, 504 N.E.2d 1227, 1234 (Ohio Ct. C.P. 1984) (finding that municipal legislative authority's determination of emergency may be overturned if it is "obviously illusory or tautological"); Wash. State Farm
If so, our inquiry ends. See Slack v. City of Colorado Springs, 655 P.2d 376, 379 (Colo. 1982) (relying on substantial evidence presented at the public hearing to uphold finding of an emergency); Interstate Trust Bldg. Co. v. Denver Urban Renewal Auth., 172 Colo. 427, 432, 473 P.2d 978, 981 (1970). A determination of necessity or that an area is blighted, however, is not reviewable absent a showing of bad faith or fraud.
When a home rule city enacts emergency legislation in conformity with the provisions of its charter, the legislative declaration of purpose in enacting the emergency measure is presumed valid and will not be reviewed by the courts in the absence of a showing of fraud or bad faith. See Slack v. City of Colorado Springs, 655 P.2d 376, 379 (Colo. 1982); Board of County Commissioners v. City and County of Denver, 193 Colo. 211, 216-17, 565 P.2d 212, 216 (1977); Enger v. Walker Field, 181 Colo. 253, 257-58, 508 P.2d 1245, 1247-48 (1973); McCray v. City of Boulder, 165 Colo. 383, 390, 439 P.2d 350, 354 (1968). If a city charter requires that there be a legislative recitation of the facts constituting the emergency, then such facts must be stated in the emergency measure.
The annexation was and is invalid. See Slack v. City of Colorado Springs, 655 P.2d 376 (Colo. 1982). Since we have determined that the annexation was invalid, it is unnecessary to address plaintiff's other contentions for reversal.
A description must be in substantial compliance with the requirements of the statute. Slack v. City of Colorado Springs, 655 P.2d 376 (Colo. 1982). An immaterial variation from such requirements is not fatal and does not render an annexation void. Adams v. City of Colorado Springs, 178 Colo. 241, 496 P.2d 1005 (1972).