Opinion
24A-JT-1739
12-30-2024
In re the Termination of the Parent-Child Relationship of: S.C., C.C., and P.C. (Minor Children) v. Indiana Department of Child Services, Appellee-Petitioner and S.L. (Mother) and F.C. (Father), Appellants-Respondents
Attorneys for Appellant S.L. Luisa M. White Austin C. Harris Legal Aid Corp. of Tippecanoe County Lafayette, Indiana Attorney for Appellant F.C. Michael B. Troemel Lafayette, Indiana Attorneys for Appellee Theodore E Rokita Attorney General of Indiana David E. Corey Supervising Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this Memorandum Decision is not binding precedent for any court and may be cited only for persuasive value or to establish res judicata, collateral estoppel, or law of the case.
Appeal from the Tippecanoe Superior Court The Honorable Jason A. Thompson, Special Judge Trial Court Cause Nos. 79D03-2312-JT-69, 79D03-2312-JT-70, 79D03-2312-JT-71
Attorneys for Appellant S.L. Luisa M. White Austin C. Harris Legal Aid Corp. of Tippecanoe County Lafayette, Indiana
Attorney for Appellant F.C. Michael B. Troemel Lafayette, Indiana
Attorneys for Appellee Theodore E Rokita Attorney General of Indiana
David E. Corey Supervising Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana
MEMORANDUM DECISION
MATHIAS, JUDGE
[¶1] S.L. ("Mother") and F.C. ("Father") appeal the trial court's termination of their parental rights over their minor children, C.C., S.C., and P.C. ("Children"). Between them, Mother and Father raise four issues for our review, which we consolidate and restate as the following two issues:
1. Whether the trial court clearly erred when it found and concluded that the reasons that resulted in the Children's removal from Parents' care will not be remedied.
2. Whether termination of Parents' parental rights over Children is in Children's best interests.
[¶2] We affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[¶3] Mother and Father are the parents of C.C. (d/o/b May 28, 2018), SC (d/o/b February 17, 2020), and P.C. (d/o/b November 22, 2022). P.C. was born approximately three months premature and has serious medical issues. At his birth in the hospital, P.C.'s blood tested positive for cocaine. Accordingly, hospital officials informed the Indiana Department of Child Services ("DCS").
[¶4] Parents were initially "only minimally cooperative" with DCS. Ex. Vol. 1, p. 99. DCS thus obtained a court order compelling Parents to allow DCS case workers into the family home and to drug screen Children. At that time, DCS learned that the Parents were being evicted from their home and were staying at a hotel in Lafayette. Inside Parents' hotel room, a DCS case worker noticed the smell of marijuana. DCS obtained hair samples from C.C. and S.C. as well as the hospital blood-test results for P.C. All three Children tested positive for cocaine and THC. Parents also submitted to drug screens in December 2022 and both tested positive for cocaine and THC.
[¶5] On January 6, 2023, DCS obtained authority to remove Children from Parents' care based on Parents' drug abuse. DCS took custody over P.C., who remained in the NICU, that same day. However, as case workers arrived at Parents' hotel room, Mother "fled the scene with C.C. and S.C.," and Father "was uncooperative with DCS" regarding their whereabouts. Father's App. Vol. 2,p. 56.
The cover page of volume 2 of Father's Appendix appears to identify it as volume 11.
[¶6] Parents, C.C., and S.C. "fled the state . . . to Memphis" where they resided with Mother's mother before moving into a hotel room on a month-to-month basis. Id. Around mid-January, Mother's mother contacted DCS and informed a case worker that Parents and Children were in Memphis. DCS, working with Tennessee authorities, removed C.C. and S.C. from Parents' care and returned them to Indiana.
[¶7] Thereafter, the trial court adjudicated the Children to be Children in Need of Services ("CHINS") and ordered Parents to participate in various services, including substance abuse programs and counseling sessions. The court further permitted supervised visitations upon Parents' successful completion of clean drug screens.
[¶8] Although Children had been returned to Indiana, Parents chose to remain in Tennessee. DCS family case manager ("FCM") Caitlin Dunn had "many discussions" with Parents regarding DCS's inability to provide out-of-state services. Tr. Vol. 2, p. 81. For example, FCM Dunn attempted to arrange for Father to meet virtually with an Indiana-licensed therapist via a Tennessee provider. However, because the therapist was not also licensed in Tennessee, the provider was "unable to continue to provide [Father] services." Id. at 92. FCM Dunn also contacted a DCS-counterpart in Tennessee to try and "assist [M]other and [F]ather in locating services." Id. Her Tennessee counterpart provided Mother and Father with a "list of potential service providers in Tennessee," but Parents did not "complete any services." Id. at 93. FCM Dunn informed Parents that DCS could not pay for out-of-state services; likewise, her Tennessee counterpart informed Parents that Tennessee would not pay for services for an Indiana case.
[¶9] In July, Mother ceased communicating with DCS, and FCM Dunn was unable to locate Mother. Mother appeared for a virtual visit between Father and P.C. in November. However, Parents did not participate in any in-person visits with Children following the removal of the Children from Parents' care. After the November 2023 virtual visit, FCM Dunn again lost contact with Mother until April 2024. Father did not attend further visits with Children.
[¶10] DCS filed its petitions to terminate Parents' parental rights in December 2023. Father moved back to Indiana the next month. In February 2024, Father submitted to his first drug screen since December 2022; he failed that drug screen and several ensuing drug screens, including testing positive for cocaine. In April 2024, Mother also returned to Indiana. Fifteen days before the final fact-finding hearing on DCS's termination petitions, she submitted to her first drug screen. That result was negative but with a note of caution on THC content as the result appeared to be abnormal. At the ensuing fact-finding hearing, both FCM Dunn and the Children's CASA opined that termination of Parents' parental rights was in Children's best interests.
[¶11] Following the fact-finding hearing, the court found and concluded that the conditions that resulted in Children's removal from Parents' care will not be remedied. The court also found and concluded that termination of Parents' rights over Children is in Children's best interests. This appeal ensued.
Standard of Review
[¶12] Indiana appellate courts have long adhered to a highly deferential standard of review in cases involving the termination of parental rights, and we will set aside a judgment terminating a parent-child relationship only if it is clearly erroneous. To determine whether a termination decision is clearly erroneous, we apply a two-tiered standard of review to the trial court's findings of facts and conclusions thereon. Bester v. Lake Cnty. Off. of Fam. & Child., 839 N.E.2d 143, 147 (Ind. 2005). First, we determine whether the evidence supports the findings; second, we determine whether the findings support the judgment. Id. "Findings are clearly erroneous only when the record contains no facts to support them either directly or by inference." In re A.D.S., 987 N.E.2d 1150, 1156 (Ind.Ct.App. 2013), trans. denied. We neither reweigh the evidence nor assess witness credibility. In re S.K., 124 N.E.3d 1225, 1230-31 (Ind.Ct.App. 2019). And we will accept unchallenged factual findings as true. See In re S.S., 120 N.E.3d 605, 614 n.2 (Ind.Ct.App. 2019).
[¶13] It is well-settled that the parent-child relationship is one of society's most cherished relationships. See, e.g., In re A.G., 45 N.E.3d 471, 475 (Ind.Ct.App. 2015), trans. denied. Indiana law thus sets a high bar to sever that relationship by requiring DCS to prove several elements by clear and convincing evidence. Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(c) (2024). Only two of those elements need to be addressed in this appeal: (1) whether there is a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in Children's removal or the reasons for placement outside of Parents' home will not be remedied; and (2) whether termination of Parents' parental rights is in Children's best interests. I.C. § 31-35-2-4(c)(3), (d)(3).
[¶14] Clear and convincing evidence need not establish that the continued custody of a parent is wholly inadequate for a child's very survival. Bester, 839 N.E.2d at 148. It is instead sufficient to show that the child's emotional and physical development are put at risk by the parent's custody. Id. If the trial court finds DCS's allegations in the petition to be true, the court shall terminate the parentchild relationship. I.C. § 31-35-2-8(a).
1. The trial court's conclusion that the reasons that resulted in Children's removal from Parents' care are not likely to be remedied is supported by the record.
[¶15] We first consider Parents' argument that the trial court clearly erred when it concluded that the reasons that resulted in Children's removal from their care are not likely to be remedied. In determining whether the trial court erred when it concluded that the conditions that led to a child's removal and continued placement outside a parent's home will not be remedied, we engage in a two-step analysis. K.T.K. v. Ind. Dep't of Child Servs., 989 N.E.2d 1225, 1231 (Ind. 2013). First, "we must ascertain what conditions led to [the child's] placement and retention in foster care." Id. Second, we must determine whether the record supports the trial court's assessment that "there is a reasonable probability that those conditions will not be remedied.'" Id. (quoting In re I.A., 934 N.E.2d 1132, 1134 (Ind. 2010)). In this step, the trial court must assess a parent's fitness at the time of the termination proceeding, taking into consideration any evidence of changed conditions and balancing a parent's recent improvements against "habitual pattern[s] of conduct to determine whether there is a substantial probability of future neglect or deprivation." In re E.M., 4 N.E.3d 636, 643 (Ind. 2014) (quoting K.T.K., 989 N.E.2d at 1231). "Where there are only temporary improvements and the pattern of conduct shows no overall progress, the court might reasonably find that . . . the problematic situation will not improve." In re A.H., 832 N.E.2d 563, 570 (Ind.Ct.App. 2005). DCS "is not required to provide evidence ruling out all possibilities of change; rather, it need only establish 'that there is a reasonable probability that the parent's behavior will not change.'" In re A.D.S., 987 N.E.2d 1150, 1157 (Ind.Ct.App. 2013) (quoting In re Kay L., 867 N.E.2d 236, 242 (Ind.Ct.App. 2007)), trans. denied.
[¶16] In his brief on appeal, Father suggests that DCS failed to show that the reasons that resulted in Children's removal will not be remedied because DCS did not do more to "coerce" him to participate in services to reunite him with Children. Father's Br. at 12. For example, Father states that termination of his rights cannot stand because DCS did not attempt to hold him in contempt for his nonparticipation in services. He similarly asserts that, once he returned to Indiana, he was not given sufficient time to comply with services, and the trial court's termination of his rights is "premature." Id. at 13.
[¶17] Similarly, Mother asserts that "DCS did not implement reasonable efforts . . . to terminate these parental rights." Mother's Br. at 20. She alleges that "DCS in Tennessee could not be bothered to drug test the parents." Id. at 19. She also alleges that FCM Dunn "did not follow all DCS procedures" in attempting to obtain Mother's compliance with services. Id.
[¶18] Parents' arguments on appeal disregard the record and our standard of review. Children were removed from Parents' care due to Parents' use of illicit substances and Children's exposure to those substances. Thereafter, FCM Dunn repeatedly informed Parents that DCS could not provide services out of state; despite that information, Parents did not return to Indiana to attempt to participate in services with DCS's assistance. Instead, and despite FCM Dunn's Tennessee counterpart likewise informing Parents that Tennessee would not provide services for an Indiana case, Parents remained in Tennessee. And, there, they did not take any steps to attempt to remedy their substance abuse. Rather, they both simply did not participate in any services.
[¶19] After DCS filed its termination petitions, Parents then returned to Indiana. Father, in turn, failed multiple drug screens. Mother waited until fifteen days before the final fact-finding hearing on DCS's petition to submit her first drug screen, which was negative but noted some caution with respect to THC.
[¶20] Thus, Parents' arguments on appeal are not well-taken. The trial court found that DCS made reasonable efforts to preserve the family, and we agree. Again, FCM Dunn made clear to Parents that DCS would be unable to provide them with out-of-state services. Still, FCM Dunn arranged for a Tennessee counterpart to provide Parents with a list of service providers for Parents to contact. Parents did not do so. Indeed, Parents took no meaningful steps whatsoever to address the reasons underlying the Children's removal from their care.
[¶21] We reject Parents' arguments accordingly.
2. Termination of Parents' parental rights over the Children is in Children's best interests.
[¶22] Mother also argues on appeal that termination of Parents' parental rights is not in Children's best interests. A court's consideration of whether termination of parental rights is in a child's best interests is "[p]erhaps the most difficult determination" a trial court must make in a termination proceeding. E.M., 4 N.E.3d at 647. When making this decision, the court must look beyond the factors identified by DCS and examine the totality of the evidence. A.D.S., 987 N.E.2d at 1158. In doing so, the court must subordinate the interests of the parent to those of the child. Id. at 1155. Central among these interests is a child's need for permanency. In re G.Y., 904 N.E.2d 1257, 1265 (Ind. 2009). Indeed, "children cannot wait indefinitely for their parents to work toward preservation or reunification." E.M., 4 N.E.3d at 648. "[W]e have previously held that the recommendation by both the case manager and child advocate to terminate parental rights, in addition to evidence that the conditions resulting in removal will not be remedied, is sufficient to show by clear and convincing evidence that termination is in the child's best interests." A.D.S., 987 N.E.2d at 1158-59.
[¶23] Here, again, the evidence demonstrates that the conditions that resulted in Children's removal from Parents' care will not be remedied. In addition, both FCM Dunn and the Children's CASA testified to the trial court that termination of Parents' parental rights was in Children's best interests. The trial court's conclusion on this issue is therefore not clearly erroneous, and Parents' arguments to the contrary simply seek to have this Court reweigh the evidence, which we will not do.
Conclusion
[¶24] For all of these reasons, we affirm the trial court's termination of Parents' parental rights over Children.
[¶25] Affirmed.
Brown, J., and Kenworthy, J., concur.