Opinion
2004-384 Q C.
Decided February 17, 2005.
Appeal by tenant from a final judgment of the Civil Court, Queens County (D. Waithe, J.), erroneously denominated as entered December 11, 2003, deemed ( see CPLR 5520 [c]) as from the final judgment entered November 23, 2003, after a trial, awarding landlord possession.
Final judgment unanimously affirmed without costs.
PRESENT: PESCE, P.J., PATTERSON and GOLIA, JJ.
The herein record amply supports the determination that tenant's occupancy did not "constitute the type of ongoing, substantial, physical nexus with the . . . [subject] premises for actual living purposes" that evidences a primary residence ( Emel Realty Corp. v. Carey, 188 Misc 2d 280, 282; see Claridge Gardens v. Menotti, 160 AD2d 544, 544-545). In light of the traditional indicia of primary residence ( see Matter of O'Quinn v. New York City Dept. of Hous. Preservation Dev., 284 AD2d 211; Rules of City of NY, Department of Housing Preservation and Development [28 RCNY] § 3-02 [n] [4]), the proof that tenant obtained publicly-subsidized housing without revealing her ownership of a cooperative apartment, her entry of false information on three successive annual income affidavits, her use of the cooperative premises as her address for federal tax purposes, voting registration, pension plan benefits, and driver's documentation, her admission that her son occupied the subject premises since the lease's inception without listing his occupancy on any form with petitioner (while the only telephone installed at the subject premises was in her son's name), and her proposal, after receiving the termination notice, to transfer to the son the lease and attendant right to primary occupancy, collectively provide ample support for the court's determination that she did not occupy the subject premises as her primary residence.