adjusted to allow for the possibility of procuring multiple contractors for road repair work through the same solicitation. Even when a statutory exemption applies, nothing prevents EPWater from engaging in a competitive bidding process. See Patten v. Concho County, 196 S.W.2d 833, 835 (Tex. App-Austin 1946, no writ) (noting that even if a county expenditure is not subject to competitive bidding requirements, commissioners court may still use discretion to use competitive bidding process if "good business management" requires it); see also Skypark Aviation, LLC v. Lind, 523 S.W.3d 869, 875 (Tex. App-Eastland 2017, no pet.) ("[T]he leasing of a county airport for operational purposes is not subject to competitive bidding requirements.
While Attorney General opinions may be persuasive and are entitled to due consideration, they are not binding on the courts. Ex parte Schroeder, 958 S.W.2d 811, 812 n.2 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997) (per curiam); see also Skypark Aviation, LLC v. Lind, 523 S.W.3d 869, 874 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2017, no pet.). Additionally, the attorney general opinions cited by Thomas deal with the ability of a licensed handgun holder to access portions of a multi-purpose government building that are not included in the definition of "premises" in § 46.03.
And even months later, after the May 2016 election and Benson's swearing(s)-in, when the A.G. opined that the incompatibility doctrine precluded Benson's dual office-holding, still there was no "law" to that effect: A.G. opinions, though persuasive, are not controlling authority and are therefore not "law." Comm'rs Court of Titus Cty. v. Agan, 940 S.W.2d 77, 82 (Tex. 1997); Skypark Aviation, LLC v. Lind, 523 S.W.3d 869, 874 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2017, no pet.); City of Houston v. S. Pac. Transp. Co., 504 S.W.2d 554, 557 (Tex. Civ. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1973, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (describing the principle that A.G. opinions "do not have the force of law" as "settled"). Moreover, the trial court's own judgment expressly recognizes that "no one knew that [Benson] could not hold both offices when she filed; therefore[,] no one knew that they could challenge her right to appear on the ballot for both offices."
And even months later, after the May 2016 election and Benson’s swearing(s)-in, when the A.G. opined that the incompatibility doctrine precluded Benson’s dual office-holding, still there was no "law" to that effect: A.G. opinions, though persuasive, are not controlling authority and are therefore not "law." Comm'rs Court of Titus Cty. v. Agan , 940 S.W.2d 77, 82 (Tex. 1997) ; Skypark Aviation, LLC v. Lind , 523 S.W.3d 869, 874 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2017, no pet.) ; City of Houston v. S. Pac. Transp. Co. , 504 S.W.2d 554, 557 (Tex. Civ. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1973, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (describing the principle that A.G. opinions "do not have the force of law" as "settled"). Moreover, the trial court’s own judgment expressly recognizes that "no one knew that [Benson] could not hold both offices when she filed; therefore[,] no one knew that they could challenge her right to appear on the ballot for both offices."