Lastly, to the extent an ambiguity in a contract exists, we resolve it "by applying the statutory rules of construction to ascertain the intent of the parties."Gilbert v. Canterbury Farms, LLC, 346 Ga. App. 804, 810 (3), 815 S.E.2d 303 (2018) (punctuation omitted); accord Skylake Prop. Owners Ass’n, Inc,v. Powell, 281 Ga. App. 715, 716 (1), 637 S.E.2d 51 (2006); see Bickfordv.Yancey Dev. Co., 276 Ga. 814, 816 (3), 585 S.E.2d 78 (2003) ("In the area of real property law, rights and restrictions relating to covenants that run with the land must be certain and unequivocal.").
[Cit.] Skylake Property Owners Assn. v. Powell, 281 Ga. App. 715, 716 (1) ( 637 SE2d 51) (2006). Section 5.4.8 of the Covenants pertains to the question of signage in Godley Park as follows:
Summer-Minter Assoc. v. Giordano, 231 Ga. 601, 605 ( 203 SE2d 173) (1974). See also Race Investments v. Hull, 278 Ga. App. 477, 482 (1) (a) ( 629 SE2d 26) (2006) (while the right to amend "is very broad, it may not be exercised after a case has been tried and a judgment rendered therein which has not been set aside or vacated"). Compare Skylake Property Owners Assn. v. Powell, 281 Ga. App. 715 (3) ( 637 SE2d 51) (2006) (a petition could be amended without leave of the court where there was no pretrial order and no ruling on a motion for summary judgment). Thus, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing appellants' attempt to amend the petition post-judgment.
If the court determines that an ambiguity exists, however, a jury question does not automatically arise, but rather the court must first attempt to resolve the ambiguity by applying the rules of construction[.] Skylake Property Owners Assn. v. Powell , 281 Ga. App. 715, 716 (1), 637 S.E.2d 51 (2006) (citations and punctuation omitted). Further, under OCGA § 13-2-2 (2), "[w]ords generally bear their usual and common signification[.]"
Moreover, the amended complaint was filed before the trial court ruled on the motion, and we presume the trial court considered the entire record before reaching its decision. See Southwest Health & Wellness v. Work , 282 Ga. App. 619, 627 (2) (d), 639 S.E.2d 570 (2006) ; Skylake Property Owners Assn. v.Powell , 281 Ga. App. 715, 720 (3), 637 S.E.2d 51 (2006). Compare City of Chickamauga v. Hentz , 300 Ga. App. 249, 684 S.E.2d 372 (2009) (party was not required to renew motion for judgment on the pleadings after plaintiff amended complaint because cause of action had not changed).
Accordingly, the trial court did not err in denying Homelife's motion for summary judgment on its claim that the assessments at issue were invalid. See generally Skylake Property Owners Assn. v. Powell , 281 Ga. App. 715, 720 (2), 637 S.E.2d 51 (2006). 5. Homelife contends that the trial court erred in failing to find that the Declaration precludes the Association's claim for unjust enrichment.
(Punctuation omitted.) Skylake Property Owners Assn. v. Powell , 281 Ga. App. 715, 716 (1), 637 S.E.2d 51 (2006), quoting Mitchell v. Cambridge Property Owners Assn. , 276 Ga. App. 326, 326-327 (1), 623 S.E.2d 511 (2005). (a) Time Properties argues that the covenants are ambiguous because paragraph 15 provides for automatic renewal "unless abolished or amended as provided in [p]aragraph 10," but paragraph 10 prohibits the cutting of trees and does not address abolition or amendment.
A pending motion for summary judgment will not preclude a party from amending his or her complaint. See Skylake Property Owners Ass'n. v. Powell , 281 Ga.App. 715, 720, 637 S.E.2d 51 (2006). “[A]nd there is no prohibition against pleading a new cause of action[.]”
And a pending dispositive motion will not preclude a party from amending his or her pleading. See Skylake Property Owners Assoc. v. Powell, 281 Ga.App. 715, 720(3), 637 S.E.2d 51 (2006). Finally, a motion for leave to amend a complaint to add additional claims against existing defendants is superfluous if it is made before entry of a pretrial order.