Whisenhunt v. State, 152 Ga. App. 829 ( 264 S.E.2d 271). See also Skrine v. State, 244 Ga. 520 ( 260 S.E.2d 900). We consequently find no error in the charge as given.

Whisenhunt v. State, 152 Ga. App. 829 (1979). See also Skrine v. State, 244 Ga. 520 ( 260 S.E.2d 900). It should be noted that the trial judge in his charge used the terms "[i]ntent may be shown ... may be inferred ..." which terms in themselves have only permissive and discretionary force. We must also take issue with appellant's contention that the rebuttable permissive presumption on which the trial court instructed was irrational on the grounds that it was not more likely than not, under the facts in the case at bar, that defendant intended the natural and probable consequences of his actions. "Obviously it is more likely than not that a normal defendant intends the natural and probable consequences of his acts ... [T]he presumption was entirely rational."

Eminently reasonable jurists read just such a charge and found no constitutional violation. See Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. at 333, 105 S.Ct. at 1981 (Rehnquist, J., joined by Burger, C.J., and O'Connor, J., dissenting); Skrine v. State, 244 Ga. 520, 260 S.E.2d 900 (1979) (Georgia Supreme Court unanimously rejects constitutional challenge to Franklin charge). It would be odd indeed if we were to hold that the court had erred in finding that a pro se petitioner was not reasonable in reaching the same conclusion as that reached by justices of the Georgia Supreme Court and of the United States Supreme Court. We do not suggest that a petitioner is excused from omitting a claim every time he can point to one court opinion or one dissent.

). Gunn argues that his second petition should not be dismissed because when he filed his first petition he was not aware that the jury charge given at his trial constituted a basis for federal habeas relief. Although it is true that if Gunn had been represented by counsel on his first habeas petition, his delay in raising the Franklin claim would have been an abuse of the writ, Tucker v. Kemp, 819 F.2d 978, 980 (11th Cir. 1987) ( Franklin is not new law for abuse of the writ purposes where petitioner represented by counsel), a layman unschooled in the law should not be penalized for failing to discern legal intricacies that evaded even federal judges and members of the Georgia Supreme Court. See, e.g., Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307, 105 S.Ct. 1965, 85 L.Ed.2d 344 (1985) (three justices dissenting from holding that Franklin charge violates Sandstrom);Franklin v. Francis, 720 F.2d 1206 (11th Cir. 1983) (reversing district court order that Franklin charge did not violate Sandstrom); Skrine v. State, 244 Ga. 520, 260 S.E.2d 900, 900-01 (1979) ( Franklin charge does not violate Sandstrom). The dissent's insistence that Gunn's pro se status does not excuse his initial failure to raise the Franklin claim disregards precedent of this circuit holding that a pro se petitioner "should not be penalized because his inexperience in jurisprudence left him unaware of claims he had not considered at the time of his first application for habeas corpus." Haley v. Estelle, 632 F.2d 1273, 1276 (5th Cir. 1980); accord Mays v. Balkcom, 631 F.2d 48, 51 (5th Cir. 1980) (because a pro se habeas petitioner "will more than likely not be aware of all the possible set of facts which could result in a granting of relief by way of habeas corpus," a pro se habeas petition filed by a prisoner "should be examined more liberally than one drawn up by an attorney").

In this petition, the appellant presents for the first time a claim that at the guilt/innocence phase of his trial, the jury instructions on intent were unconstitutionally burden-shifting as being in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The appellant argues that in a line of cases commencing with Skrine v. State, 244 Ga. 520 ( 260 S.E.2d 900) (1979), the jury instructions under attack here had been repeatedly upheld by this court; however, the Supreme Court of the United States, on April 25, 1985, in Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. ___ ( 105 S.C. 1965, 85 L.Ed.2d 344) (1985), held that jury instructions virtually identical to those given here are unconstitutionally burden-shifting. The superior court dismissed the appellant's habeas corpus petition as being successive.

In many cases where we have upheld charges to the jury against attacks based on Sandstrom, it appears that the juries were instructed that criminal intent is never presumed, that the burden of proving intent rests on the State, or that intent is always an issue for the jury. Collins v. State, 248 Ga. 687 ( 286 S.E.2d 8) (1982); Wells v. State, 247 Ga. 792 (2) ( 279 S.E.2d 213) (1981); Lackey v. State, 246 Ga. 331 (11) ( 271 S.E.2d 478) (1980); Bridges v. State, 246 Ga. 323 (3) ( 271 S.E.2d 471) (1980); Blair v. State, 245 Ga. 611 (5) ( 266 S.E.2d 214) (1980); Patrick v. State, 245 Ga. 417 (8) ( 265 S.E.2d 553) (1980); Franklin v. State, 245 Ga. 141 (8, 9) ( 263 S.E.2d 666) (1980); Smith v. State, 244 Ga. 814 (4) ( 262 S.E.2d 116) (1979); Skrine v. State, 244 Ga. 520 ( 260 S.E.2d 900) (1979). See also Code Ann. § 26-605.

Taken as a whole, this charge would not lead a reasonable juror to believe that any burden was placed on appellant to disprove malice or intent. Wells v. State, 247 Ga. 792 (2) ( 279 S.E.2d 213) (1981); Lackey v. State, 246 Ga. 331 (11) ( 271 S.E.2d 478) (1980); Franklin v. State, 245 Ga. 141 (8, 9) ( 263 S.E.2d 666) (1980); Skrine v. State, 244 Ga. 520 ( 260 S.E.2d 900) (1979). Nonetheless, we disapprove and will continue to disapprove the practice of casting criminal jury instructions in terms of "presumptions."

Taken as a whole, the charge was not impermissibly burden-shifting as to the element of intent. Similar charges were approved in Lackey v. State, 246 Ga. 331 ( 271 S.E.2d 478) (1980), and Skrine v. State, 244 Ga. 520 ( 260 S.E.2d 900) (1979). 4.

But neither this instruction nor any other instruction lessened its peremptory effect with regard to the issue of intent. It is clear therefore that the trial justice gave a binding and unqualified instruction on the question of intent which could not be ignored by the jurors. The challenged instruction was made without any indication that the presumption could be rebutted, see Skrine v. State, 244 Ga. 520, 521, 260 S.E.2d 900, 901 (1979), or that certain circumstances would allow the jurors to ignore this presumption. See Jacks v. State, 394 N.E.2d at 175.

We agree that, taken as a whole, the charge did not impressibly shift the burden of proof as to intent to the petitioner. Simmons v. State, 246 Ga. 390 ( 271 S.E.2d 468) (1980); Skrine v. State, 244 Ga. 520 ( 260 S.E.2d 900) (1979). 2.