Skoug v. Minton

3 Citing cases

  1. Kadiak Fish. Co. v. Murphy Diesel Co.

    70 Wn. 2d 153 (Wash. 1967)   Cited 36 times
    In Kadiak, for instance, the court ruled that the exception applied because the “manufacturer knew the identity, purpose, and requirements of the purchaser's specifications” and shipped the product directly to the purchaser.

    It is only when the collateral matter is clearly inserted deliberately, wantonly, or collusively for the purpose of prejudicing the jury that it calls for mistrial or new trial. See, for example, Edwards v. Burke, 36 Wn. 107, 78 P. 610 (1904); Robinson v. Hill, 60 Wn. 615, 111 P. 871 (1910); Armstrong v. Yakima Hotel Co., 75 Wn. 477, 135 P. 233 (1913); Moy Quon v. Furuya Co., 81 Wn. 526, 143 P. 99 (1914); Jensen v. Schlenz, 89 Wn. 268, 154 P. 159 (1916); Gianini v. Cerini, 100 Wn. 687, 171 P. 1007 (1918); Rust v. Washington Tool Hardware Co., 101 Wn. 552, 172 P. 846 (1918); Skoug v. Minton, 145 Wn. 119, 259 P. 15 (1927); Lander v. Shannon, 148 Wn. 93, 268 P. 145 (1928); Gaskill v. Amadon, 179 Wn. 375, 38 P.2d 229 (1934); Carlson v. P.F. Collier Son Corp., 190 Wn. 301, 67 P.2d 842 (1937); Williams v. Hofer, 30 Wn.2d 253, 191 P.2d 306 (1948); Anderson v. Dobro, 63 Wn.2d 923, 389 P.2d 885 (1964).

  2. Curtis v. Ficken

    52 Idaho 426 (Idaho 1932)   Cited 16 times
    In Curtis v. Ficken, 52 Idaho 426, 16 P.2d 977, this court held that evidence of insurance is proper where such evidence was admitted to show bias or interest of a witness.

    A party against whom a witness is called is permitted to show by cross-examination that such a witness has an interest, direct or collateral, in the result of the trial, or such a relationship to one party that bias might arise, and this right is not to be abridged or denied because incidentally facts may be developed by such cross-examination tending to show that the defendant is protected by insurance. ( Jessup v. Davis, 115 Neb. 1, 211 N.W. 190, 56 A.L.R. 1403, and note, pp. 1439-1543; Skoug v. Minton, 145 Wn. 119, 259 P. 15; Cozad v. Raisch Improvement Co., 175 Cal. 619, 166 P. 1000; Lenahan v. Pittston Coal Min. Co., 221 Pa. 626, 70 Atl. 884.) GIVENS, J.

  3. Lander v. Shannon

    268 P. 145 (Wash. 1928)   Cited 11 times

    The witness testified that he represented an insurance company, and upon further questioning, named the insurance company. This, we think, was legitimate cross-examination and not wilfully injected into the case, for the sole purpose of prejudicing the jury, under our decisions in the following cases: Moy Quon v. Furuya Co., 81 Wn. 526, 143 P. 99; Donaldson v. Great Northern R. Co., 89 Wn. 161, 154 P. 133; Rust v. Washington Tool Hardware Co., 101 Wn. 552, 172 P. 846; Skoug v. Minton, 145 Wn. 119, 259 P. 15. See, also, Bennett v. Portland, 265 Pac. (Ore.) 433. [7] Neither does the award by the jury in the full amount demanded for the injuries received by respondent and the permanent damage done to him, appear excessive or in any way the result of passion or prejudice.