Skokie Gold St. Liq. v. Seagrams Sons

44 Citing cases

  1. Weglarz v. Bruck

    128 Ill. App. 3d 1 (Ill. App. Ct. 1984)   Cited 21 times
    Determining ethical wall to be appropriate only where attorney could clearly and effectively demonstrate that he had no knowledge of the confidences and secrets of former client

    Thus, where, as in this case, there are facts which suggest that the former client (Weglarz) may indeed have disclosed confidences to attorney O'Brien, we must apply the standard test carved out by the courts in numerous cases involving this issue. See Novo Therapeutisk Laboratorium A/S v. Baxter Travenol Laboratories, Inc. (7th Cir. 1979), 607 F.2d 186; Skokie Gold Standard Liquors, Inc. v. Joseph E. Seagram Sons, Inc. (1983), 116 Ill. App.3d 1043, 452 N.E.2d 804; La Salle National Bank v. Triumvera Homeowners Association (1982), 109 Ill. App.3d 654, 440 N.E.2d 1073. • 1 The "Chinese wall" defense notwithstanding, the relevant test for disqualification under these facts is: where any substantial relationship can be shown between the subject matter of a former representation and that of a subsequent adverse representation, the latter will be prohibited. ( Skokie Gold Standard Liquors, Inc. v. Joseph E. Seagram Sons, Inc. (1983), 116 Ill. App.3d 1043, 1051, 452 N.E.2d 804; La Salle National Bank v. Triumvera Homeowners Association (1982), 109 Ill. App.3d 654, 664, 440 N.E.2d 1073.)

  2. S K Handtool Corp. v. Dresser Industries, Inc.

    246 Ill. App. 3d 979 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993)   Cited 37 times
    Noting that a party who attempts to use disqualification motions as a harassment tool may be subject to sanctions

    However, this court will engage in an independent review of questions of law presented by the order. Skokie Gold Standard Liquors, Inc. v. Joseph E. Seagram Sons, Inc. (1983), 116 Ill. App.3d 1043, 1054, 452 N.E.2d 804, 812; see also Freeman v. Chicago Musical Instrument Co. (7th Cir. 1982), 689 F.2d 715, 721 (trial courts enjoy no advantage over appellate courts in formulation of ethical norms). There remains the question of which law is applicable.

  3. Harris v. Harris

    196 Ill. App. 3d 815 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990)   Cited 34 times
    In Harris, the petitioner had failed to appear at her scheduled deposition on four occasions, two of which had been ordered by the court.

    Petitioner will not be heard to complain about precluded evidence which she never offered. Petitioner places great reliance on Skokie Gold Standard Liquors, Inc. v. Seagram Sons, Inc. (1983), 116 Ill. App.3d 1043, 452 N.E.2d 804, in support of her per se conflict argument. Skokie is not a per se conflict case. It involved the propriety of the disqualification of an attorney for alleged violations of Canons 4 (the preservation of client confidences and secrets) and 9 (the avoidance of the appearance of impropriety) of the Illinois Code of Professional Responsibility (107 Ill.2d Canon 4, Canon 9). (116 Ill. App.3d at 1046.)

  4. First National Bank v. St. Charles National Bank

    504 N.E.2d 1257 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987)   Cited 25 times
    Holding that a party waived an attorney conflict by delaying 16 months before asserting it

    The relevant test under the Code is "`where any substantial relationship can be shown between the subject matter of a former representation and that of a subsequent adverse representation, the latter will be prohibited.'" ( Skokie Gold Standard Liquors, Inc. v. Joseph E. Seagram Sons, Inc. (1983), 116 Ill. App.3d 1043, 1051, 452 N.E.2d 804, quoting La Salle National Bank v. Triumvera Homeowners Association (1982), 109 Ill. App.3d 654, 664, 440 N.E.2d 1073.) In cases where, as here, the question involves resolution of factual issues, the trial court's determination will not be disturbed unless unsupported by the evidence.

  5. Schwartz v. Hamblen

    276 Ill. App. 3d 1018 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995)   Cited 1 times

    The determination on a motion to disqualify lies within the trial court's discretion, and a reviewing court will reverse only when the trial court has abused its discretion. Skokie Gold Standard Liquors, Inc. v. Joseph E. Seagram Sons, Inc. (1983), 116 Ill. App.3d 1043, 1053, 452 N.E.2d 804, 812. Under the Rules of Professional Conduct (134 Ill.2d R. 1.9(a)(1)), when the subject matter of a prior representation is substantially related to the subject matter of a subsequent adverse representation, the latter representation is prohibited.

  6. Herbes v. Graham

    180 Ill. App. 3d 692 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989)   Cited 26 times
    Finding that counsel for the plaintiff, who was suing a township over its open-space acquisition program, was ineligible to conduct said representation because he had previously engaged in an attorney-client relationship with the township when it interviewed only him for a possible position representing the township in the same program, evidencing the township's intent to hire him and therefore speak freely regarding the program

    • 5, 6 Since an attorney-client relationship existed, the Canons apply, and it must be decided whether they require Morrison's disqualification. A motion to disqualify is directed to the sound discretion of the trial court, whose determination will not be disturbed absent a showing of abuse of discretion. ( Skokie Gold Standard Liquors, Inc. v. Joseph E. Seagram Sons, Inc. (1983), 116 Ill. App.3d 1043, 1053, 452 N.E.2d 804.) Under the Code, where it is shown that the subject matter of a former representation is substantially related to the subject matter of a subsequent adverse representation, the latter representation will be prohibited. ( First National Bank v. St. Charles National Bank (1987), 152 Ill. App.3d 923, 931, 504 N.E.2d 1257; Weglarz v. Bruck (1984), 128 Ill. App.3d 1, 5, 470 N.E.2d 21; Skokie Gold, 116 Ill. App.3d at 1056.) Once a substantial relationship is found between the prior and present representations, it is irrebuttably presumed that confidential information was disclosed in the earlier representation.

  7. Index Futures Group, Inc. v. Street

    516 N.E.2d 890 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987)   Cited 9 times
    In Index Futures Group, the plaintiff sought to disqualify defense counsel after attorneys from plaintiff's firm joined the defense firm.

    " 607 F.2d at 197. The rebuttable presumption rule was first considered and adopted by this court, after considering Nova and its progeny in the Seventh Circuit, in Skokie Gold Standard Liquors, Inc. v. Seagram Sons, Inc. (1983), 116 Ill. App.3d 1043, 452 N.E.2d 804, when it stated: "We find the above reasoning persuasive, since it strikes a balance between the former client's right to protection of its confidences and secrets and the present client's right to counsel of its own choosing, while also bearing in mind the need to prevent the appearance of impropriety."

  8. Kuziel v. Kuziel

    2013 Ill. App. 122612 (Ill. App. Ct. 2013)   Cited 1 times

    el because Figliulo's April 22, 2012 conversation with Anthony did not violate Rule 4.2 where Figliulo and Mesude did not have an attorney-client relationship on that date, Anthony did not make any confidential disclosures to Figliulo, and Anthony's statements were made in the presence of Mesude, who was already aware of Anthony's settlement position. Mesude concludes that the court's order disqualifying her counsel had no basis and, thus, was an abuse of discretion. Mesude also argues that the disqualification of Figliulo and his firm was not warranted because Anthony did not demonstrate any prejudice. ¶ 14 The trial court's factual determinations are reviewed under the deferential abuse of discretion standard, whereas the trial court's application of the law is subject to de novo review. See SK Handtool Corp. v. Dresser Industries, Inc., 246 Ill. App. 3d 979, 989 (1993) (courts of review determine issues involving solely questions of law independent of the trial court's judgment); Skokie Gold Standard Liquors, Inc. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 116 Ill. App. 3d 1043, 1054 (1983) (this court conducts an independent review of questions of law presented by the disqualification order). ¶ 15 Attorney disqualification is a drastic measure because it destroys the attorney-client relationship by prohibiting parties from retaining the counsel of their choice.

  9. In re Marriage of Newton

    955 N.E.2d 572 (Ill. App. Ct. 2011)   Cited 18 times
    Disqualifying counsel and rendering retainer agreement void ab initio when attorneys met with one spouse and then knowingly represented the other spouse in divorce proceedings

    Busey Bank v. Salyards, 304 Ill. App. 3d 214, 217 (1999). See also Skokie Gold Standard Liquors, Inc. v. Joseph E. Seagram Sons, Inc., 116 Ill. App. 3d 1043, 1054 (1983) (this court conducts an independent review of questions of law presented by the disqualification order). "As a general rule, a trial court's decision to award fees is a matter of discretion and will not be disturbed on appeal absent an abuse of discretion."

  10. Gagliardo v. Caffrey

    344 Ill. App. 3d 219 (Ill. App. Ct. 2003)   Cited 20 times

    Where the plaintiffs in an earlier disqualification case also sought a less deferential standard of review and relied upon the very language from Freeman cited by Paulette, this court stated, "[t]he above-quoted language [from Freeman] * * * does not stand for the proposition * * * that the standard of review is different because the evidence was presented by way of affidavit." Skokie Gold Standard Liquors, Inc. v. Joseph E. Seagram Sons, Inc., 116 Ill. App. 3d 1043, 1054, 452 N.E.2d 804 (1983). In rejecting the argument, this court noted that abuse of discretion remained the standard of review applied by the Seventh Circuit in cases where all evidence was presented through affidavits.