Precedent has established that the meaning of undefined terms in the EMS Act may be construed in accordance with Black's Law Dictionary. Sklar v. Department of Health, 798 A.2d 268, 276 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2002) (courts look "for the meaning of a statute's word in that statute's definitions, then in the Statutory Construction Act [of 1972, 1 Pa. C.S. §§1501-1991], a law dictionary[,] and, finally, a standard dictionary, in that order"). The Restatement (Second) of Torts confirms the element of intent that is present in recklessness:
Our "review is limited to determining whether constitutional rights were violated, whether an error of law was committed[, ] or whether the necessary findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence." Sklar v. Department of Health, 798 A.2d 268, 273 n.7 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2002). Singha has appeared pro se on Licensee's behalf throughout the proceedings below as well as on appeal to this Court.
Our "review is limited to determining whether constitutional rights were violated, whether an error of law was committed[,] or whether the necessary findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence." Sklar v. Dep't of Health , 798 A.2d 268, 273 n.7 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2002). II. Parties' Arguments
When interpreting a statutory phrase, a court must first look for the meaning of the statute's word or term in that statute's definitions, then in the Statutory Construction Act, then a law dictionary and, finally, a standard dictionary, in that order. Cogan House Twp. v. Lenhart , 197 A.3d 1264, 1268 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2018) (citing Sklar v. Dep't of Health , 798 A.2d 268, 276 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2002) ). Applying the rules of construction, we agree with BPOA that the language of the statute is not ambiguous.
In interpreting that phrase "[w]e must first look for the meaning of a statute's word or term in that statute's definitions, then in the Statutory Construction Act [of 1972 (Statutory Construction Act) ], a law dictionary and, finally, a standard dictionary, in that order." Sklar v. Dep't of Health , 798 A.2d 268, 276 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2002).The definitional section of the SWMA provides no statutory definition for "alteration or development of land.
The Act does not define the term "relocate" and, pursuant to the rules of statutory construction, Vetri NY argues it should be construed in accordance with its common and approved usage. See Section 1903(a) of the Statutory Construction Act of 1972, 1 Pa. C.S. § 1903(a) ; Sklar v. Dep't of Health , 798 A.2d 268, 276 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2002). According to Vetri NY, the common and approved usage of this term, which requires physically moving to a new location, does not support the Secretary's conclusion that "relocation," as used in Section 902(a), means "any situation in which a qualified business chooses to cease operations within a KOZ."
In re Estate of Rowley , 84 A.3d 337, 340 (Pa.Cmwlth.2013). Pennsylvania courts have more specifically held that corporations may not act pro se in court, and that non-attorneys may not represent them, regardless of the individual's status as the corporation's officer, director, shareholders or employee.SeeEstate of Rowley ;Sklar v. Dep't of Health , 798 A.2d 268 (Pa.Cmwlth.2002) ; Spirit of the Avenger Ministries v. Commonwealth , 767 A.2d 1130 (Pa.Cmwlth.2001) ; Walacavage v. Excell 2000, Inc. , 331 Pa.Super. 137, 480 A.2d 281 (1984). “The reasoning behind the rule is that ‘a corporation can do no act except through its agents and that such agents representing the corporation in Court must be attorneys at law who have been admitted to practice, are officers of the court and subject to its control.’ ”
The Moretti Court's definition has been repeatedly upheld. See Sklar v. Dep't of Health, 798 A.2d 268 (Pa.Cmwlth.2002); Krystal Jeep Eagle, Inc. v. Bureau of Prof'l & Occupational Affairs, 725 A.2d 846 (Pa.Cmwlth.1999); Foose. Thus, Garner's contentions that the District Attorney “would never make the [plea bargain] offer on a case involving alleged moral turpitude,” and that his convictions resulted from his counsel's failure to object to certain jury instructions and from the victims' misunderstanding of his constable powers rather than him deceiving or misleading anyone, are irrelevant.
The Moretti Court's definition has been repeatedly upheld. See Sklar v. Dep't of Health, 798 A.2d 268 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2002); Krystal Jeep Eagle, Inc. v. Bureau of Prof'l & Occupational Affairs, 725 A.2d 846 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1999); Foose. Thus, Garner's contentions that the District Attorney "would never make the [plea bargain] offer on a case involving alleged moral turpitude," and that his convictions resulted from his counsel's failure to object to certain jury instructions and from the victims' misunderstanding of his constable powers rather than him deceiving or misleading anyone, are irrelevant.
We first address Petitioners' argument that the hearing officer erred in overturning the withdrawal of Fox's MCA. Petitioners essentially argue that the violation of statewide protocol is sufficient, in and of itself, to justify the withdrawal of Fox's MCA. Petitioners contend that violations of state regulations have been found sufficient to support the revocation of other professional licenses, and the Department has previously revoked and suspended paramedics' certifications for violations of the Act. See Pellizzeri v. Bureau of Prof'l & Occupational Affairs, 856 A.2d 297, 300 (Pa.Cmwlth.2004) (discussing prior disposition of case in which this Court upheld decision of State Board of Vehicle Manufacturers, Dealers and Salespersons to revoke car salesman's license based on violations of Board of Vehicles Act ); Sklar v. Dep't of Health, 798 A.2d 268, 270–72 (Pa.Cmwlth.2002) (upholding decision of Department to revoke individual's certification as EMT and paramedic and to place another individual's certification as EMT and paramedic on probationary status for violating EMS Act). Thus, Petitioners argue that, because Fox violated the Department's statewide protocol, the withdrawal of Fox's MCA should be upheld. Act of December 22, 1983, P.L. 306, as amended,63 P.S. §§ 818.1–.37.