Skinner v. U.S.

Full title: Anne H. SKINNER, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America…

Court: United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit

Date published: Feb 22, 2001

4 F. App'x 478 (9th Cir. 2001)

Opinion

4 Fed.Appx. 478 (9th Cir. 2001) Anne H. SKINNER, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America, Defendant-Appellee. No. 00-35175. D.C. No. CV-97-449-JKS. United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit. February 22, 2001

Submitted February 12, 2001 ¹.

1 The panel unanimously finds this case suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2). Thus, to the extent Skinner requests oral argument, that request is denied.

NOT FOR PUBLICATION. (See Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure Rule 36-3)

Medical malpractice action was brought under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA). The United States District Court for the District of Alaska, James K. Singleton, Chief Judge, denied plaintiff's second motion to reconsider summary judgment for defendant. Plaintiff appealed. The Court of Appeals held that: (1) it lacked jurisdiction to address plaintiff's contentions regarding merits of district court's original entry of judgment, and (2) denial of motion for relief from judgment was not an abuse of discretion.

Affirmed. Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Alaska James K. Singleton, Chief Judge, Presiding.

Before LEAVY, THOMAS, and RAWLINSON, Circuit Judges.

MEMORANDUM ²

2 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and may not be cited to or by the courts of this circuit except as may be provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.

Anne H. Skinner appeals pro se the district court's order denying her second motion to reconsider summary judgment for defendant in Skinner's action alleging medical malpractice under the Federal Tort Claims Act. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.

We lack jurisdiction to address Skinner's contentions regarding the merits of the district court's original entry of judgment because Skinner failed to file a notice of appeal within 60 days of the district court's order denying her first motion to reconsider. Accordingly, by order dated June 27, 2000, the scope of Skinner's appeal was limited to denial of her second motion for reconsideration.

"An untimely motion for reconsideration is construed as a motion based on Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b)." Mt. Graham Red Squirrel v. Madigan, 954 F.2d 1441, 1463 n. 35 (9th Cir.1992). Denial of such a motion is reviewed for abuse of discretion. See School Dist. No. 1J, Multnomah County v. ACandS, Inc., 5 F.3d 1255, 1262 (9th Cir.1993). Because Skinner failed to demonstrate mistake, inadvertence, surprise, excusable neglect, newly discovered evidence, or any other basis for relief from judgment, the district court did not abuse

Page 480.

its discretion by denying her motion to reconsider. See id. at 1262-63.

AFFIRMED.