Its purpose is to enable parties, in appropriate circumstances of actual controversy, to obtain an adjudication of their rights before actual injury occurs, to settle matters before they ripen into violations of law or a breach of contractual duty, to avoid a multiplicity of actions by affording a remedy for declaring in one expedient action the rights and obligation of all litigants, or to avoid the strictures associated with obtaining coercive relief, when coercive relief is neither desired nor necessary to resolve the matter. [ Skiera v. Nat'l Indemnity Co., 165 Mich.App. 184, 189, 418 N.W.2d 424 (1987), quoting 3 Martin, Dean & Webster, Michigan Court Rules Practice (3d ed.), Rule 2.605, p. 422.

matter. [Skiera v Nat'l Indemnity Co, 165 Mich.App. 184, 189; 418 N.W.2d 424 (1987)] Close analysis of defendants' counterclaim reveals that defendants did not allege a claim against plaintiffs for which plaintiffs bore liability of any sort to any of the defendants.

See Pontiac Police & Fire, 309 Mich App at 624-625. Cf. Skiera v Nat'l Indemnity Co, 165 Mich App 184, 189-191; 418 NW2d 424 (1987). Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by determining that Spectrum could not seek declaratory judgment as a means of circumventing Covenant, and because Spectrum lacked standing to pursue declaratory judgment, the trial court properly denied the motion to amend as futile.

The purpose of a declaratory judgment is to "enable parties, in appropriate circumstances of actual controversy, to obtain an adjudication of their rights before actual injury occurs [and] to settle matters before they ripen into a violation of law or a breach of contractual duty . . . ." Skiera v Nat'l Indemnity Co, 165 Mich App 184, 189; 418 NW2d 424 (1987) (quotation marks and citation omitted). An actual controversy exists for purposes of the declaratory judgment rule, MCR 2.605, when a "declaratory judgment is necessary to guide a plaintiff's future conduct in order to preserve legal rights."

Id. at 589. As this Court explained in Skiera v Nat Indem Co, 165 Mich App 184, 189; 418 NW2d 424 (1987), the purpose of the declaratory judgment rule is: to enable parties, in appropriate circumstances of actual controversy, to obtain an adjudication of their rights before actual injury occurs, to settle matters before they ripen into violations of law or a breach of contractual duty, to avoid multiplicity of actions by affording a remedy for declaring in one expedient action the rights and obligation of all litigants, or to avoid the strictures associated with obtaining coercive relief, when coercive relief is neither desired nor necessary to resolve the matter.

The purpose of a declaratory judgment is to enable the parties to obtain adjudication of rights before an actual injury occurs, to settle a matter before it ripens into a violation of the law or a breach of contract, or to avoid multiplicity of actions by affording a remedy for declaring in expedient action the rights and obligations of all litigants. Skiera v Nat'l Indemnity Co, 165 Mich App 184, 189; 418 NW2d 424 (1987). Our Supreme Court has previously approved of declaratory relief for future expenses in a no-fault action.

The second reason that JDI has no cause of action against North Brothers in state court is that North Brothers is a third party that is not involved in JDI's contract dispute with ABT. In Skiera v. National Indemnity Co., 165 Mich. App. 184, 418 N.W.2d 424, 427 (1987), the Michigan Court of Appeals stated that we believe that the breach of contract to be avoided by use of the declaratory judgment is normally one where the contemplated conduct or inaction by the plaintiff affects a contract between the plaintiff and the defendant in the declaratory judgment action, not between the plaintiff and a third party.

In another case, the Michigan Court of Appeals noted that the purpose of the declaratory judgment "is to enable parties, in appropriate circumstances of actual controversy, to obtain an adjudication of their rights before actual injury occurs, to settle matters before they ripen into . . . a breach of contractual duty. . . ." Skiera v. National Indem., 165 Mich. App. 184, 189, 418 N.W.2d 424 (1987) (emphasis added). It appears that none of these policies and purposes are applicable in this case.

Clearly, one purpose of the charter counties act, MCL 45.501 et seq.; MSA 5.302(1) et seq., was to give charter counties some degree of autonomy over county affairs. Construing and interpreting the statute as a whole to best achieve its intended purpose, we conclude that a charter county may modify its county civil service system. Latham v Wedeking, 162 Mich. App. 9, 12; 412 N.W.2d 225 (1987); Norcross Co v Turner-FisherAssociates, 165 Mich. App. 170, 178; 418 N.W.2d 424 (1987). Plaintiffs concede that, if defendants had the authority to modify the county civil service system, then the modifications were properly accomplished by charter and ordinance.