However, the basis of liability is not the parental relationship. Chastain v. Johns, 120 Ga. 977 ( 48 S.E. 343, 66 LRA 958); Skelton v. Gambrell, 80 Ga. App. 880 (3) ( 57 S.E.2d 694). Excluding cases applying the "family car doctrine," recovery against the parents has been denied in situations where, because of an act of the child, plaintiff was blinded by sulphuric acid in a school laboratory ( Stanford v. Smith, 43 Ga. App. 747, 160 S.E. 93, conforming to certified question, 173 Ga. 165, 159 S.E. 666); killed by pistol wounds inflicted by a fourteen-year-old ( Skelton v. Gambrell, 80 Ga. App. 880, supra); stabbed by a fifteen-year-old who was allegedly "reckless, indiscreet, and indifferent as to the rights of others," ( Hulsey v. Hightower, 44 Ga. App. 455, 161 S.E. 664); struck by a bicycle being ridden on the sidewalk in violation of an ordinance by a fourteen-year-old on his way to school ( Calhoun v. Pair, 71 Ga. App. 211, 30 S.E.2d 776, conforming to certified questions, 197 Ga. 703, 30 S.E.2d 180); struck by a lawn rake left accessible to a minor ( Matthews v. Johnson, 100 Ga. App. 331, 111 S.E.2d 158), and where his livestock was sho

McNabb claims that in order for her "to have any foreseeability, she must have had some prior knowledge that John McKeachie was likely to harm someone." Relying on Doe v. Howell, 212 Ga. App. 305 ( 441 S.E.2d 767) (1994) and Skelton v. Gambrell, 80 Ga. App. 880 ( 57 S.E.2d 694) (1950), McNabb claims that the injury was unforeseeable as a matter of law. However, both of these cases are distinguishable and fail to sustain McNabb's argument.

Therefore, the mere fact that Quinn, as a liar, had been negligently employed and was employer's employee at the time appellant's claims arose would not constitute the proximate cause of appellant's damages. See generally Skelton v. Gambrell, 80 Ga. App. 880 ( 57 S.E.2d 694) (1950). Therefore, summary judgment was not erroneously granted to appellee as to appellant's negligent hiring claims.

Thus: "A father is not liable for a tort of his minor child, with which he was in no way connected, which he did not ratify, and from which he did not derive any benefit." Id. at page 977; Hulsey v. Hightower, 44 Ga. App. 455, 458 ( 161 S.E. 664); Skelton v. Gambrell, 80 Ga. App. 880 (3) ( 57 S.E.2d 694); Herrin v. Lamar, 106 Ga. App. 91 ( 126 S.E.2d 454). Also, consistent with common law principles, a parent may be held liable for an injury caused directly by his minor child where the parent's own original negligence or contributing negligence has made the child's act possible.

While the petition also contends that Chanin was negligent in failing to take positive action to prevent the injury after the risk was discovered, the general rule as to parental liability prevents a recovery on that theory of negligence, the allegations not showing that Chanin was guilty of negligence in the creation of the risk. If he was under a duty at that point, it was a moral duty to act to prevent the injury and not a legal one. We wish to distinguish Skelton v. Gambrell, 80 Ga. App. 880 ( 57 S.E.2d 694) and Bell v. Adams, 111 Ga. App. 819 ( 143 S.E.2d 413). In those cases recovery was denied because it appeared that the proximate cause of the injury was the intervening independent criminal act of the minor, which could not reasonably have been foreseen by the parent.

In a suit for damages, where it appears upon the face of the plaintiff's petition that there intervened between the alleged negligence of the defendant and the damage sustained by the plaintiff, the independent criminal act of a third person which could not have been reasonably foreseen by the defendant, and which was the direct and proximate cause of the damage, the petition should be dismissed on general demurrer. Andrews Co. v. Kinsel, 114 Ga. 390 ( 40 S.E. 300, 88 ASR 25); Daigrepont v. Teche Greyhound Lines, Inc., 189 Ga. 601, 605 ( 7 S.E.2d 174, 127 ALR 217); Pinnell v. Yellow Cab Co., 77 Ga. App. 73, 75 ( 47 S.E.2d 774); Skelton v. Gambrell, 80 Ga. App. 880, 884 ( 57 S.E.2d 694). The latter rule apparently would not apply if the petition had disclosed that the defendant had reasonable grounds for apprehending that the criminal act would be committed.

" In Skelton v. Gambrell, 80 Ga. App. 880 (1) ( 57 S.E.2d 694), it was said: "The word `caused' more generally conveys the meaning of intention and affirmative action." In that case, construing a petition on general demurrer, it was held that "caused" should be so construed. While a petition is to be construed most strongly against the pleader on general demurrer, as was said in Raines v. Jones, 96 Ga. App. 412, 414 ( 100 S.E.2d 157): "Even in construing the petition most strongly against the pleader, a strained and unreasonable construction can not be placed on an allegation in testing its sufficiency as against a demurrer.

This issue should have been submitted to a jury. Generally, independent illegal acts of third persons are deemed unforeseeable and therefore the sole proximate cause of the injury, which excludes the negligence of another as a cause of injury. E.g., Andrew v. Kinsell, 114 Ga. 390, 40 S.E. 300 (1901) (defendant not liable when burglars entered adjoining store through windows and connecting partition negligently left open); Skelton v. Gambrell, 80 Ga. App. 880, 57 S.E.2d 694 (1950) (minor's commission of murder with pistol furnished him by parents held unforeseeable where he was known to be reckless but not malicious). In some cases, however, criminal acts have been held to be foreseeable.

Other Georgia cases are to like effect. Belding v. Johnson, 86 Ga. 177, 12 S.E. 304, 11 L.R.A. 53; Skelton v. Gambrell, 80 Ga. App. 880, 57 S.E.2d 694; Hulsey v. Hightower, 44 Ga. App. 455, 161 S.E. 664. In the latter case the Court specifically distinguished the factual situation before it — one involving an intentional and competent criminal act — from that present in Spires v. Goldberg, 26 Ga. App. 530, 106 S.E. 585, upon which the trial Court placed principal reliance.

ter pocket in the living room; the boy used the gun and injured another boy; father held liable); Kuchlik et al. v. Feuer et al., 267 N.Y.S 256, 239 App. Div. 338 (father held liable for action of son in shooting BB rifle which injured plaintiff on theory that father knew the boy possessed such a rifle); Gudziewski v. Stemplesky et al., 263 Mass. 103, 160 N.E. 334 (whether father knew that 13 year old son had in his possession and used an air gun with which he shot another boy was question for jury). See also: Phillips v. D'Amico, (La.) 21 So.2d 748; Giguere v. Rosselot et al., 110 Vt. 173, 3 A.2d 538; Vallency v. Rigillo, 91 N.J. 307, 102 A. 348; Mazzilli v. Selger et al., 13 N.J. 296, 99 A.2d 417, aff'g in part, and rev'g in part, 23 N.J. Super. 496, 93 A.2d 216. Contra: Lopez v. Chewiwie et al., 51 N.M. 421, 186 P.2d 512; Figone et ux. v. Guisti, 43 Cal.App. 606, 185 P. 694; Martin et al. v. Barrett et al., 120 Cal.App.2d 625, 261 P.2d 551; Hagerty v. Powers, 66 Cal. 368, 5 P. 622; Skelton et al. v. Gambrell et al., 80 Ga. App. 880, 57 S.E.2d 694. In Warren "Negligence in the New York Courts", Vol. 2, § 86, p. 439, it is stated: "In some cases the negligence of the parent consists in permitting a child to use a dangerous instrumentality such as an air rifle or gun.