Respondent paid and, after its claim for a refund had been disallowed, began the present suit. The Government won in the District Court, 255 F. Supp. 228 (D.C. N. D. Okla. 1966), but the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reversed, 392 F.2d 128 (1968). Upon petition by the Government, we granted certiorari, 393 U.S. 820 (1968), to consider whether the Court of Appeals decision had allowed respondent "the practical equivalent of double deduction," Charles Ilfeld Co. v. Hernandez, 292 U.S. 62, 68 (1934), in conflict with past decisions of this Court and sound principles of tax law.
Therefore, a Justice or Judge need not be serving at the time he becomes eligible for retirement in order to draw retirement benefits. Where the meaning of a statute is clear on its face, it must be enforced as written. Skelly Oil Company v. United States, 255 F. Supp. 228 (N.D. Okl. 1966). It is therefore the opinion of the Attorney General that a Justice or Judge who has served eight years of accredited service and then resigns before qualifying for retirement benefits under any of the provisions of 20 O.S. 1102 [ 20-1102] (1969), as amended, may retire under the Uniform Retirement System for Justices and Judges Act upon reaching age 70, providing he was serving as a Justice of the State Supreme Court, or a Judge of the Court of Criminal Appeals on April 8, 1968, or as a Judge of the District Court or Superior Court on January 12, 1969. Otherwise, the Justice or Judge must serve at least one year and the major portion of a second year after January 12, 1969, to be eligible. If said Justice or Judge dies before receiving any retirement benefits, his named beneficiary, or his estate, if he has no named beneficiary, is entitled to receive his accumulated contribution. (W. Howard O'Bryan Jr.) ** SEE: OPINION NO. 75-152 (1975) **
Section 74 O.S. 923 [ 74-923] prevents existing rights of members and beneficiaries from being affected by alterations, amendments or repeal. Where the meaning of a statute is clear on its face, it must be enforced as written. Skelly Oil Company v. U.S., 255 F. Supp. 228 (N.D. Okl. 1966). O.S.L. 1963, ch. 50, Section 15 as amended O.S.L. 1965, ch. 432, Section 5; O.S.L. 1968, ch. 400, Section 3 (74 O.S. 915 [ 74-915] (1968)) states as follows: "(1) Any member who shall retire on or after his normal retirement date shall be entitled to receive an annual retirement benefit equal to the sum obtained by adding an amount for participating service and an amount for prior service determined as herein provided. The amount for prior service shall be equal to the sum of Sixty Dollars ($60.00) per annum multiplied by the number of years of prior service entitled to credit as provided in Section 13 of this Act.
King v. State, Okl. Cr., 270 P.2d 370 (1954). Where the meaning of a statute is clear on its face, it must be enforced as written. Skelly Oil v. U.S., Okl., 255 F. Supp. 228 (N. D. Okl., 1966). Finding no ambiguity on the face of Senate Bill 524, Section 21, 31st Oklahoma Legislature, Second Session (1968), it is the opinion of the Attorney General that the requirement of a certificate of authorization is a mandatory condition precedent to corporate practice of engineering in Oklahoma. (Reid Robison) ** SEE: OPINION NO. 79-352 (1979) **
Rules of construction are to aid in resolving doubts, and not to create them. Ex Parte Higgs, 97 Okl.Cr. 338, 263 P.2d 752. Where the language of a statutes clear and unambiguous, the statute must be held to mean what it plainly expresses; and no room is left for construction; and one cannot search for meaning beyond the statute itself. King v. State, Okl.Cr., 270 P.2d 370. Legislative silence, when the legislature had the authority to speak, gives rise to an implication of intent, City of Duncan v. Bingham, Okl., 394 P.2d 456. Where the meaning of a statute is clear on its face, it must be enforced as written. Skelly Oil v. U.S., Okl., 255 F. Supp. 228. Finding no ambiguity on the fact of Section 59 O.S. 16 [59-16] (1961), it is, therefore, the opinion of the Attorney General that House Bill No. 1216, 31st Legislature, Second Session, 1968, is to be read as written, and the distinction between "employee" and "principal" made in subsection (2) of Section 16 is not to be read into subsection (1). (Reid Robison)