Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Super. Ct. No. SCCVPO 05-833
CANTIL-SAKAUYE, J.
On June 16, 2004, members of the Shasta County Interagency Narcotics Task Force (Shasta CINTF) and the Siskiyou County-Wide Interagency Narcotics Task Force (Siskiyou CINTF) searched the home of probationer William James Skeen (Skeen) pursuant to a search condition in Skeen’s probation order. Skeen’s wife Kathleen Skeen (Kathleen) and the couple’s two children were present when the officers entered the residence. The search formed the basis for this civil action filed by Kathleen and the children against defendants County of Siskiyou (County), Siskiyou County Deputy Sheriff Robert Giannini and California Highway Patrol (CHP) Officer Eric Degraffenreid. Plaintiffs’ first cause of action for damages alleged that defendants “broke into plaintiffs’ home and terrorized, falsely arrested, imprisoned by holding them captive at gun point and injur[ed] plaintiffs.” (Capitalization omitted.) The second cause of action cited 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and alleged among other things that defendants, acting “under the color of the statutes, regulations, customs, policies, and usages of the County of Siskiyou . . . [¶] . . . [¶] [d]eprived plaintiffs of life, liberty, and property without due process of law.” Plaintiffs sought compensatory and punitive damages. Defendants successfully moved for summary judgment and summary adjudication. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c.)
Hereafter, undesignated statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure.
Plaintiffs raise two issues on appeal. First, they argue that they are entitled to reversal because the court “did not adhere to the dictates of the statutory procedures governing summary judgments in considering the motions and in ruling on them.” Second, plaintiffs contend that there was a triable issue of material fact on whether Officer Degraffenreid was entitled to qualified immunity. We conclude there was no error and affirm the judgment.
Plaintiffs’ statement of facts includes a summary of the court ruling. However, this summary evolves into argument on points where plaintiffs suggest there are triable issues of fact. California Rules of Court, rule 8.204(a)(1)(B) requires appellant to “[s]tate each point under a separate heading or sub-heading summarizing the point, and support each point by argument and, if possible, by citation of authority . . . .” Because plaintiffs do not separately state each of these points in the section labeled “Argument,” we do not address them in this appeal.
The factual background is taken from the separate statements of undisputed facts filed by plaintiffs, defendants County of Siskiyou and Robert Giannini, and defendant Eric Degraffenreid. Plaintiffs did not file a separate statement in response to Degraffenreid’s separate statement. We therefore accept the facts listed by Degraffenreid as undisputed. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subds. (b)(1)-(3).)
The Shasta CINTF is an interagency task force composed of officers from several local law enforcement agencies. At the time plaintiffs’ home was searched, Shasta CINTF was made up of two Redding police officers, two Shasta County sheriff’s deputies, one CHP officer, one Anderson police officer, and one Shasta County probation officer. The Shasta CINTF was commanded by Dan Callahan of the California Department of Justice Bureau of Narcotics Enforcement.
The Siskiyou CINTF is an interagency task force commanded by Dave Dunwoody, Special Agent Supervisor at the Bureau of Narcotics Enforcement, California Department of Justice at the time plaintiffs’ home was searched. Defendant Eric Degraffenreid was a CHP officer assigned as a special agent to the Siskiyou CINTF.
Degraffenreid was the case agent for the search of the home that Skeen shared with plaintiffs. He conducted an early morning briefing with the Shasta CINTF officers who conducted the search. At the briefing, Degraffenreid explained that the warrantless search was authorized by a search condition in Skeen’s informal probation order. He also told the officers about Skeen’s criminal record, which included battery on a peace officer and illegal possession and sale of narcotics.
Kathleen was aware that her husband had waived his right to object to a search of their home because he was on probation. Law enforcement officers had searched the residence on two prior occasions.
Officers Bishop, Modin, Wilson, Kent, Barrett, Miller and Callahan -- all members of Shasta CINTF -- entered plaintiffs’ home on June 16, 2004. Kathleen stated in her deposition that when the officers breached the front door, a piece of the door frame scraped her knee. Kathleen also stated that one of the officers stepped on her son’s head, causing a bump that lasted for three days but caused no permanent injury.
Degraffenreid was not among the officers who made the initial entry into the house. Nor did he physically injure, touch, assault, verbally harass or terrorize, or point a weapon at any of the plaintiffs during the search of their residence. Plaintiffs did not tell Degraffenreid that they suffered any physical injuries as a result of the search.
Defendant Robert Giannini was a K-9 handler for the Siskiyou County Sheriff’s Department at the time of the search. Giannini has never been a member of the Shasta CINTF or the Siskiyou CINTF. He was not a supervisor of either task force, and had no control over task force members or anyone who participated in the entry and search of plaintiffs’ home.
Prior to the June 16, 2004 entry into plaintiffs’ home, Giannini was asked to be available to conduct a K-9 narcotics search of the premises. Sometime after Shasta CINTF members entered the house, they told Giannini and his dog to come inside to search for narcotics. Giannini found no narcotics and left soon afterward to conduct a search at a different site. Giannini had no interaction with plaintiffs and was unaware that any plaintiff had been injured or needed medical treatment.
Plaintiffs responded in their separate statement with four words -- “Disagree as not possible” -- without any citation to the record. This response is insufficient to create a disputed factual issue. (§ 437c, subds. (b)(1)-(3).)
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. Plaintiffs’ Governmental Tort Claim:
Although the Shasta CINTF -- whose members entered plaintiffs’ home on June 16, 2004 -- operated under the supervision of the California State Department of Justice, and Giannini was not a member of that task force or the Siskiyou CINTF, and Degraffenreid was employed by the CHP, Kathleen nevertheless presented her governmental tort claim to the County in February 2005. The County returned the claim because it was in the improper form. Kathleen presented an amended claim which was returned on grounds that it was late. She then filed an application for leave to present a late claim pursuant to Government Code section 911.4, which the County Board of Supervisors denied. Kathleen received the notice of denial of the application for leave to file a lateclaim, which outlined the procedure for obtaining relief under Government Code section 946.6. Kathleen did not file a Government Code section 946.6 petition to be relieved from the provisions of Government Code section 945.4 in superior court.
Government Code section 945.4 provides: “Except as provided in Sections 946.4 and 946.6, no suit for money or damages may be brought against a public entity on a cause of action for which a claim is required to be presented in accordance with Chapter 1 (commencing with Section 900) and Chapter 2 (commencing with Section 910) of Part 3 of this division until a written claim therefor has been presented to the public entity and has been acted upon by the board, or has been deemed to have been rejected by the board, in accordance with Chapters 1 and 2 of Part 3 of this division.”
B. Plaintiffs’ Complaint and Defendants’ Answers:
Plaintiffs filed their complaint for damages and violation of constitutional rights in June 2005. Private counsel represented defendants the County and Robert Giannini, and the Attorney General represented defendant Eric Degraffenreid. The defendants filed separate answers which raised numerous affirmative defenses -- including allegations that plaintiffs failed to file a timely government tort claim, that plaintiffs sued the wrong entity and individuals, and that defendants were immune from liability.
C. Defendants’ Motions for Summary Judgment and Summary Adjudication:
In July 2006, defendants County and Giannini filed a motion for summary judgment and summary adjudication which included the required separate statement of undisputed facts. Plaintiffs’ response included a seven-page separate statement which, with three exceptions, failed to provide “citation to exhibit, title, page, and line numbers in the evidence submitted.” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1350(f); see § 437c, subd. (b)(3).)
Also in July 2006, Degraffenreid filed a motion for summary judgment and summary adjudication which included the required separate statement of undisputed facts. At that point, trial was set for December 5, 2006. Plaintiffs filed a half-page memorandum of points and authorities along with a declaration by plaintiffs’ attorney in opposition to Degraffenreid’s motion on October 3, 2006. Plaintiffs argued that the memorandum of points and authorities that they had filed in opposition to the other defendants’ motion for summary judgment supported their opposition to Degraffenreid’s motion “in so far as they pertain to [Degraffenreid].” Plaintiffs did not file a separate statement in response to Degraffenreid’s separate statement.
Plaintiffs’ attorney stated in his declaration that plaintiffs learned through discovery that Degraffenreid had given members of Shasta CINTF an “Operations Plan” for the search of Skeen’s residence at the early morning briefing. He also indicated that defendants had not responded to his formal request to produce the “Operations Plan.” Plaintiffs’ attorney also requested a continuance of the summary judgment motion, arguing that the “Operations Plan” would “provide material information to allow plaintiffs to meet and oppose defendant’s motion to end the case now short of a jury trial.”
In October 2006, Degraffenreid filed a memorandum of points and authorities in response to plaintiffs’ opposition. He argued that the court should deny plaintiffs’ motion for continuance because it was not brought in good faith and that the “Operations Plan” sought by plaintiffs was irrelevant to any of the issues raised in the motion for summary judgment. The deputy attorney general who represented Degraffenreid in the trial court stated in a declaration that the “Operations Plan” was prepared before the search of plaintiffs’ residence and did “not contain any facts that would be useful to plaintiffs in opposing [the summary judgment] motion.” She also declared that “[t]he document contain[ed] privileged information which could jeopardize the safety of officers who conduct narcotics search[es], and its disclosure could also undermine future narcotics task force operations.”
The court heard argument on all of the defendants’ motions for summary judgment in October 2006, and took the matters under submission.
In November 2006, while the motions for summary judgment were under submission, plaintiffs filed a motion to compel production of an unredacted version of the “Operations Plan.” Hearing on the motion was set in late December 2006. Meanwhile, at a trial management conference held in early December 2006, the court continued the trial to March 2007.
Also in December 2006 (before the trial management conference), Degraffenreid filed his opposition to plaintiffs’ motion to compel production of an unredacted version of the “Operations Plan” and requested sanctions. He argued that: (1) plaintiffs did not meet and confer to informally resolve the discovery dispute (§ 2031.310, subd. (b)); (2) the motion cut-off date for discovery expired in November 2006, 15 days before the original December 2006, trial date (§ 2024.020, subd. (a)); (3) plaintiffs did not include in their motion to compel a separate statement of items in dispute (Cal. Rules of Court, former rule 335); and (4) the “Operations Plan” was irrelevant to issues in the summary judgment motions which had already been argued and taken under submission.
In December 2006, the court heard argument on plaintiffs’ motion to compel and took the matter under submission. It denied the motion in March 2007.
In February 2007, the court granted the motion for summary judgment and summary adjudication filed by the County and Giannini. It ruled that: (1) plaintiffs “failed to meet [their] burden of showing a triable issue as to any material fact on the issue of [Kathleen’s] compliance with the claims filing requirements of the California Governmental Tort Liability Act (Government Code, §§ 905, 911.2, 945.4 and 950.2) sufficient to support [the] claims made in [the] First Cause of Action and avoid the bar of Government Code §§ 945.4 and 950.2”; (2) the evidence proffered by plaintiffs was insufficient to raise a triable issue of material fact “in that it failed to cite admissible evidence, failed to cite evidence which tended to contradict the evidence cited by defendants and otherwise failed to comply with . . . § 437c(b)(3)”; and (3) plaintiffs failed to show any triable issue of material fact with regard to the defenses raised by defendants to plaintiffs’ civil rights claim, specifically that the Shasta CINTF and the Siskiyou CINTF were not agencies of the County, Giannini was not a member of either task force, and Giannini did not set or carry out any County policy that deprived plaintiffs of a federally protected right.
On the same date the court granted Degraffenreid’s motion for summary judgment and summary adjudication. It ruled that: (1) plaintiffs’ first cause of action was barred by their failure to file a mandatory government tort claim (Gov. Code, §§ 911.2, 950.2, 950.4 & 945.4); (2) plaintiffs proffered no evidence and no separate statement in opposition to the merits of Degraffenreid’s motion; and (3) Degraffenreid proffered evidence to establish each element of his defense. With respect to plaintiffs’ motion to continue the motion for summary judgment, the court ruled that plaintiffs failed to meet the requirements for a continuance which included: “(1) facts establishing a likelihood that controverting evidence may exist; (2) the specific reasons why such evidence cannot be presented at the time of the summary judgment hearing; (3) an estimate of the time necessary to obtain such evidence; and (4) the specific steps or procedures the opposing party intends to utilize to obtain such evidence.”
Plaintiffs moved for new trial, citing procedural irregularities. The court denied the motion and this appeal ensued.
DISCUSSION
I.
Motions for Summary Judgment
The summary judgment procedure and standard of review are well-established. “Any party may move for summary judgment in any action or proceeding if it is contended that the action has no merit or that there is no defense to the action or proceeding.” (§ 437c, subd. (a).) The court shall grant the motion for summary judgment “if all the papers submitted show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” (§ 437c, subd. (c).)
A defendant moving for summary judgment “has met his or her burden of showing that a cause of action has no merit if that party has shown that one or more elements of the cause of action, even if not separately pleaded, cannot be established, or that there is a complete defense to that cause of action. Once the defendant . . . has met that burden, the burden shifts to the plaintiff . . . to show that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to that cause of action or a defense thereto. The plaintiff or cross-complainant may not rely upon the mere allegations or denials of its pleadings to show that a triable issue of material fact exists but, instead, shall set forth the specific facts showing that a triable issue of material fact exists as to that cause of action or a defense thereto.” (§ 437c, subd. (p)(2).)
The summary judgment procedure ensures that material facts are met with material facts. Once the burden shifts to plaintiff, he or she must respond with opposition papers that “include a separate statement that responds to each of the material facts contended by the moving party to be undisputed, indicating whether the opposing party agrees or disagrees that those facts are undisputed. The statement also shall set forth plainly and concisely any other material facts that the opposing party contends are disputed. Each material fact contended by the opposing party to be disputed shall be followed by a reference to the supporting evidence. Failure to comply with this requirement of a separate statement may constitute a sufficient ground, in the court’s discretion, for granting the motion.” (§ 437c, subd. (b)(3).) California Rules of Court, rules 3.1350 to 3.1354 detail the content and format of documents filed in support of the motion.
The appellate court reviews de novo the trial court’s decision to grant summary judgment, reviewing the ruling, not the rationale. In reviewing the summary judgment, the appellate court applies the same three-step analysis used by the trial court by: (1) identifying the issues framed by the pleadings; (2) determining whether the moving party has negated the opponent’s claims; and (3) determining whether the opposition has demonstrated the existence of a triable, material issue of fact. (Silva v. Lucky Stores, Inc. (1998) 65 Cal.App.4th 256, 261.) We conclude that plaintiffs failed to show any triable issues of material fact in the case before us.
II.
There Were No Procedural Irregularities
Plaintiffs cite four “irregularities” which they contend prejudiced plaintiffs’ ability to defend the motions for summary judgment. There is no merit in this contention.
A. Timeliness Of Rulings On Defendants’ Motions For Summary
Judgment:
Section 437c, subdivision (a) provides that a motion for summary judgment “shall be heard no later than 30 days before the date of trial, unless the court for good cause orders otherwise.” Plaintiffs acknowledge that defendants filed their motions for summary judgment more than 30 days before the December 2006 date for jury trial. It is also undisputed that the court heard argument on the motions and took matters under submission in October 2006. Plaintiffs argue, however, that “the court found it necessary to exceed the time limit actually taking some 114 days during which plaintiffs were prejudiced by the court’s not ruling on their pending application for a continuance to complete discovery.” They maintain that “[s]uch irregularity resulted in an unfair trial for plaintiffs.”
Contrary to plaintiffs’ suggestion, section 437c contains no limit on the time the court can take to decide a motion for summary judgment. In December 2006 the court continued the trial date after it had earlier taken the summary judgment motions under submission. Moreover, plaintiffs cite no facts to show how they were prejudiced by the time that the court took to make its ruling. (In re Marriage of McLaughlin (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 327, 337 [appellant has the burden to show that the alleged error is prejudicial, i.e., he must spell out in his brief exactly how it caused a miscarriage of justice; failure to do so will result in rejection of his claim of error].) Based on this record, we conclude there was no “irregularity” and no prejudice to plaintiffs.
B. Alleged Failure To Act On Plaintiffs’ Motion For
Continuance:
In response to Degraffenreid’s motion for summary judgment, plaintiffs filed an opposition and requested a continuance. Noting that continuances are liberally granted to allow parties to oppose summary judgment motions (Frazee v. Seely (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 627), plaintiffs maintain that the court abused its discretion when it failed to act on their request for continuance for purposes of discovery.
Degraffenreid opposed plaintiffs’ request for continuance on grounds that: (1) it was brought in bad faith; and (2) the “Operations Plan,” the piece of discovery sought by plaintiffs, was irrelevant to the issues raised in the motion for summary judgment. The court apparently agreed. It proceeded to hear argument on the summary judgment motions on October 18, 2006.
Once again, plaintiffs offer no facts or law to support their argument that the court abused its discretion in impliedly denying their request for continuance. (Garrick Development Co. v. Hayward Unified School Dist. (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 320, 334 [appellant may not simply incorporate by reference arguments made in papers filed in the trial court but, instead, must brief them on appeal; otherwise, the arguments will not be considered]; Atchley v. City of Fresno (1984) 151 Cal.App.3d 635, 647 [when a point is asserted without argument or legal authority, it is deemed to be without foundation and requires no discussion by the reviewing court].)
C. Alleged Destruction of Evidence By The Deputy Attorney
The production of the “Operations Plan” was an issue between plaintiffs and Degraffenreid. On appeal, the County and Giannini leave the argument on this issue to Degraffenreid.
Plaintiffs argue without citation to the record that the deputy attorney general representing Degraffenreid prevented “plaintiffs from having a fair trial by her conduct in intentionally suppressing destroying, and otherwise causing a spoilation [sic] of material evidence, i.e., the ‘Operations Plan’ . . . [a]nd then refusing to allow the court to conduct an in-camera review of the original documents so it could determine as to the validity of an unmeritorious claim of ‘privilege.’” There is no factual support for plaintiffs’ claim that the deputy attorney general intentionally destroyed or suppressed material evidence.
It is incumbent upon appellants not only to present factual analysis and legal authority on each point made, they must support each argument with citations to material facts in the record; otherwise the argument is forfeited. (Duarte v. Chino Community Hospital (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 849, 856.)
The deputy attorney general filed a declaration in support of defendant Degraffenreid’s opposition to plaintiffs’ motion to compel which detailed the procedural history of the dispute over the “Operations Plan.” Based on the original trial date of December 5, 2006, the cut-off date for discovery was November 6, 2006, and the cut-off date for hearings on discovery motions was November 20, 2006. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2024.020.) Plaintiffs’ counsel requested production of the “Operations Plan” by letter on August 8, 2006, and by formal request on August 30, 2006. Plaintiffs’ counsel extended time for Degraffenreid to respond. Degraffenreid provided plaintiffs with a redacted copy of the “Operations Plan” on October 16, 2006, within the time extension, but reserved his objection to the demand on grounds of privilege pursuant to Government Code sections 3300-3013, 6254, subdivision (k), and 6255, Penal Code section 832.7 and 832.8, and Evidence Code sections 1043-1045.
Plaintiffs filed their motion to compel production of the unredacted “Operations Plan” on November 27, 2006, after the discovery cut-off date. They argued that Degraffenreid’s “refusal to fully comply with the Demand for Identification, Production, and Inspection of Documents, except for the deliberately delayed submission of a selectively redacted copy of the ‘Operation Plan’ the document demanded, was without substantial justification, as was the objections to its production on the postiche ground of privilege.” Plaintiffs maintained that the document was relevant.
In his response to plaintiffs’ motion to compel, Degraffenreid argued, among other things, that plaintiffs filed the motion after the discovery cut-off date without obtaining leave to extend discovery, and failed to establish good cause for production of the “Operations Plan.” Specifically, Degraffenreid reiterated that the majority of the redacted information was irrelevant to the issues in the case and was privileged.
Plaintiffs disputed Degraffenreid’s claims that their motion was procedurally defective, characterizing Degraffenreid’s objections as “nothing more than a continuing refusal to allow discovery of an incriminating document.” They also discounted Degraffenreid’s claim of privilege stating: “Inasmuch as the ‘Operation Plan’ had been distributed to each of the force of 9 unredacted, apparently all the asserted privileges were of no mind at the time of the raid. At the October 18, 2006 hearing [on the motion for summary judgment] Attorney Price informed the Court that his client Giannini couldn’t find his copy or lost it or discarded it. So much for confidentially [sic] and privilege.”
At the December 2006 hearing on plaintiffs’ motion to compel production of the “Operations Plan,” the deputy attorney general represented, in response to a question from the court, that there were two or three pages not included in the material produced that fell within the privilege set forth in Government Code section 6254, subdivision (f). She expressly objected to any in camera review of the entire document. The court took the matter under submission. It summarily denied the motion to compel on March 1, 2007, three weeks after it ruled on defendants’ motions for summary judgment. The court had previously stated in its ruling on Degraffenreid’s summary judgment motion that there was “no showing that the production of the unredacted operations plan would disclose [competent evidence to raise triable issues]” and that “[t]he operations plan is a red herring.”
The record supports the conclusion that what plaintiffs characterize as destruction or spoliation was nothing more than redaction of what the deputy attorney general viewed as a privileged document. Degraffenreid represented in his points and authorities in opposition to plaintiffs’ motion for new trial that “[a]n unredacted copy of the document still exists.” Moreover, what plaintiffs describe as suppression was nothing more than the exercise of well-established privileges on behalf of Degraffenreid. In camera review was not warranted because, as repeatedly argued by Degraffenreid, plaintiffs’ motion to compel an unredacted version of the Operations Plan was untimely and procedurally defective. In any event, plaintiffs fail to establish prejudice. The unredacted portions of the “Operations Plan,” which included cell phone and pager numbers of the law enforcement officers, would not have raised any triable issues in the civil case before us.
D. The Court’s Ruling on Plaintiffs’ Motion To Compel:
Finally, plaintiffs contend, without citation to authority, that the court “acted irregularly when it allowed the Deputy Attorney General to submit crucial, material evidence that had been tampered with and otherwise spoiled and ruled against plaintiffs[’] attempts to obtain the evidence in the original version and not the version submitted to plaintiffs and the court in its spoilation [sic] condition of blacked-out, tampered with, missing pages.”
An argument raised without citation to any supporting legal authority lacks foundation and may be rejected summarily. (In re Marriage of Nichols (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 661, 672-673, fn. 3.)
“In all discovery proceedings a broad discretion is vested in the trial court in granting or refusing to grant an order directed at discovery, and whatever order the trial court may make may not be disturbed unless there has been an abuse of discretion by it. [Citations.]” (Hayden v. Friedman (1961) 190 Cal.App.2d 409, 413.) As we explained, the deputy attorney general did not unlawfully destroy or suppress the “Operations Plan.” Moreover, there was no abuse of discretion in failing to examine the document in camera or in denying plaintiffs’ motion because the motion to compel was untimely and procedurally defective.
III.
Officer Degraffenreid’s Is Entitled To Qualified Immunity
Defendant Degraffenreid moved for summary judgment and summary adjudication in the second cause of action for civil rights violation claiming, among other things, that he was “entitled to qualified immunity for reasonable actions he took in good faith in connection with the search conducted at plaintiffs’ residence on June 16, 2004 . . . .” Under the doctrine of qualified immunity, “government officials performing discretionary functions, generally are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” (Harlow v. Fitzgerald (1982) 457 U.S. 800, 818 [73 L.Ed.2d 396, 410].) Thus, “where an official’s duties legitimately require action in which clearly established rights are not implicated, the public interest may be better served by action taken ‘with independence and without fear of consequences.’ [Citation.]” (Id. at p. 819 [73 L.Ed.2d at p. 411].) In granting Degraffenreid’s motion, the court listed the facts which supported his defense of qualified immunity.
Plaintiffs do not challenge the court’s findings in support of its ruling that Degraffenreid proffered facts to show he was entitled to qualified immunity. Instead, plaintiffs argue that the “Operations Plan” could have revealed evidence to defeat Degraffenreid’s defense of qualified immunity or, at minimum, created a triable issue of fact on that issue. Plaintiffs maintain that “it is rather obvious that qualified immunity can not [sic] be available as there was a knowing violation of informal probation searches in Siskiyou County and that no reasonable police officer would participate in such a searches [sic] as was done to the Skeen Family, the horrific facts of which are as previously set forth herein . . . .”
In light of our conclusion that the deputy attorney general did not unlawfully destroy or suppress the “Operations Plan” and the court did not abuse its discretion in denying plaintiffs’ motion to compel its production, we conclude there is no merit in plaintiffs’ argument. We also note that plaintiffs failed to file a separate statement of undisputed facts in response to Degraffenreid’s separate statement in support of his defense of qualified immunity. Accordingly, there are no facts before the court to support plaintiffs’ claim that there remain any triable issues in this lawsuit.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Respondents are awarded costs on appeal. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.278 (a)(2).)
We concur: BLEASE, Acting P.J., BUTZ, J.
Government Code section 946.6 authorizes a claimant to petition the court for relief where the public entity has denied a Government Code section 911.4 application to file a late claim. (Gov. Code, § 946.6, subd. (b)(1).)