Opinion
Record No. 1618-94-3
Decided: January 31, 1995
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF DICKENSON COUNTY, Donald A. McGlothlin, Jr., Judge
(Hugh F. O'Donnell; Client Centered Legal Services of Southwest Virginia, Inc., on briefs), for appellant.
(James S. Gilmore, III, Attorney General; Richard L. Walton, Jr., Senior Assistant Attorney General; James W. Osborne, Assistant Attorney General, on brief), for appellee Virginia Employment Commission.
No brief for appellee Clintwood Garment Company.
Present: Judges Baker, Elder and Fitzpatrick
Pursuant to Code Sec. 17-116.010 this opinion is not designated for publication.
Dorothy Skeen appeals the decision of the circuit court which affirmed the decision of the Virginia Employment Commission (VEC). The VEC denied unemployment benefits to Skeen on the ground that she voluntarily left her employment without good cause. Upon reviewing the record and appellant's opening brief, we conclude that this appeal is without merit. Accordingly, we summarily affirm the decision of the trial court. Rule 5A:27.
Skeen raises two issues on appeal: (1) whether she received adequate notice of the issues to be considered before the VEC; and (2) whether she left her job voluntarily without good cause.
Under Code Sec. 60.2-625(A), "the findings of the [VEC] as to the facts, if supported by evidence and in the absence of fraud, shall be conclusive, and the jurisdiction of the court shall be confined to questions of law." See Shifflett v. Virginia Employment Comm'n, 14 Va. App. 96, 97, 414 S.E.2d 865, 865 (1992). "The VEC's findings may be rejected only if, in considering the record as a whole, a reasonable mind would necessarily come to a different conclusion." Craft v. Virginia Employment Comm'n, 8 Va. App. 607, 609, 383 S.E.2d 271, 273 (1989).
Adequate Notice
Due process requires that an affected party receive " 'reasonable notice and reasonable opportunity to be heard and to present his claim or defense, due regard being had to the nature of the proceeding and the character of the rights which may be affected by it.' " Eddine v. Eddine, 12 Va. App. 760, 763, 406 S.E.2d 914, 916 (1991) (quoting Dohany v. Rogers, 281 U.S. 362, 369 (1930)).
The circuit court found that the VEC provided adequate notice to Skeen that the issue to be resolved by the Appeals Examiner and the Commission was whether she left her employment voluntarily without good cause. We agree. The VEC was not required to set forth legal theories which might be dispositive in Skeen's appeal. The statutory references were provided, as were Skeen's right to obtain representation and the consequences of a failure to adequately present her case. We cannot say that there was a denial of due process in the notice provided to Skeen.
Good Cause for Leaving Employment
Whether an employee has good cause to leave employment "is a mixed question of law and fact reviewable by this court on appeal." Umbarger v. Virginia Employment Comm'n, 12 Va. App. 431, 432, 404 S.E.2d 380, 381 (1991). The good cause determination is made by applying "an objective standard to the reasonableness of the employment dispute and then to the reasonableness of the employee's efforts to resolve that dispute before leaving the employment." Id. at 435, 404 S.E.2d at 383.
The VEC determined that Skeen was disqualified for unemployment benefits because she voluntarily left her employment without good cause. See Code Sec. 60.2-618(1). The facts as determined by the VEC established that Skeen failed to notify the plant manager that the cleaning work which she was doing was causing her physical pain. Before the VEC, Skeen indicated that her knee and her shoulder were bothered by climbing stairs with cleaning supplies and lifting heavy buckets. Skeen advised the plant manager that she found the cleaning work to be hard, but never indicated that the tasks she was performing were causing her pain or sought assistance from her employer to alleviate any of the physical stress. While Skeen told her employer she was leaving work because of "medical problems," there is no indication that she notified her employer that the demands of her work were causing or contributing to those problems.
The employer indicated it had an elevator and a supply cart which would have been available for Skeen to use in her work. Those items would have saved Skeen from making numerous trips up and down the stairs with heavy cleaning supplies.
The circuit court affirmed the VEC's determination that Skeen left her job voluntarily without good cause because she had failed to take all reasonable steps to resolve the situation prior to quitting. We cannot say that the record as a whole necessarily leads us to a different conclusion than that reached by the VEC.
Accordingly, the decision of the circuit court is affirmed.
Affirmed.