Opinion
19-P-491
04-24-2020
Bodhisattva SKANDHA v. Melissa BAIMA & another.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 1:28
The plaintiff, Bodhisattva Skandha, is an inmate currently incarcerated at Massachusetts Correctional Institution at Norfolk (MCI-Norfolk). He appeals from an order denying him leave to file a complaint in the Superior Court. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.
On January 25, 2019, the plaintiff filed a complaint in the Suffolk Superior Court, naming Middlesex District Attorney Marian T. Ryan and Assistant District Attorney Melissa Baima as defendants. The complaint alleges that "[t]he plaintiff is a party to a contractual agreement between the defendants, who agreed to 'no further prosecute so much of the above entitled indictment as charges murder in the first-degree.'" The complaint also alleges that "[t]he defendants breached the contractual agreement on October 3, 2017 when defendant Ryan ordered defendant Baima to prosecute for a denial of parole consistent with a sentence of murder in the first degree." The complaint further states that the "defendants acted outside the purview of their official capacities as the contractor and subcontractor to the agreement as District Attorney and Assistant District Attorney, which causes them to be sued personally."
The plaintiff is subject to an order in the Superior Court for Suffolk County requiring prior judicial review of any complaint before acceptance for filing. See Skandha v. Clerk of the Superior Court for Civ. Business in Suffolk County, 472 Mass. 1017, 1019 (2015). The regional administrative justice conducted this review and denied the plaintiff leave to file his complaint, stating that "[t]he Complaint fails to state a claim. It is also barred by official immunity, failure to exhaust administrative remedies[,] and for lack of jurisdiction over a civil suit that purports to enforce a prosecutorial decision in a criminal matter."
As an initial matter, to the extent that the plaintiff challenges the validity of the order entered in 2011, he has no chance of success. It is firmly established that the Superior Court may prudentially exercise its inherent discretion to enjoin a plaintiff from bringing future legal proceedings
without prior leave of the court when such an injunction is necessary to put "a stop to harassing, vexatious, and repetitious litigation." State Realty Co. of Boston v. MacNeil, 341 Mass. 123, 124 (1960). See Russell v. Nichols, 434 Mass. 1015, 1015-1016 (2001) ; Berkson v. Palmer & Dodge, LLP, 428 Mass. 1002, 1002 (1998).
In light of the sheer volume and the nature of the plaintiff's filings over the years, the Superior Court acted well within its discretion in issuing (and in still adhering to) the September 30, 2011 order. Moreover, the September 30, 2011 order is narrowly tailored and does not prevent the plaintiff from filing civil actions or obstruct his constitutional right of access to the courts. See State Realty Co. of Boston, 341 Mass. at 124. Rather, the order is prudently fashioned to control and preempt only vexatious, frivolous, and harassing suits. Id. For these reasons, the September 30, 2011 order is valid.
Next, contrary to the plaintiff's assertion, the judge did not abuse her discretion or commit legal error in screening out the plaintiff's complaint. The complaint is frivolous. The standard for reviewing the sufficiency of a complaint under Mass. R. Civ. P. 12 (b) (6), 365 Mass. 754 (1974), is set forth in Iannacchino v. Ford Motor Co., 451 Mass. 623, 635-636 (2008) : "[A] plaintiff's obligation to provide the ‘grounds’ of his ‘entitle[ment] to relief’ requires more than labels and conclusions .... Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level ... [based] on the assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact)" (citation omitted). See Doe v. Secretary of Educ., 479 Mass. 375, 387 (2018).
Here, the plaintiff has not alleged facts plausibly suggesting that the defendants could be held personally liable for breach of contract. It suffices to note, as the judge observed, that prosecutors are immune from suit arising out of their role as advocates for the State. See Chicopee Lions Club v. District Attorney for Hampden Dist., 396 Mass. 244, 251-252 (1985). Moreover, the plaintiff does not allege facts to support his claim against the defendants in their individual capacities. See, e.g., Cristo v. Evangelidis, 90 Mass. App. Ct. 585, 590 (2016). Finally, the defendants are also protected under the immunity afforded to the act of giving testimony. See Sriberg v. Raymond, 370 Mass. 105, 108 (1976) ("[S]tatements by a party, counsel or witness in the institution of, or during the course of, a judicial proceeding are absolutely privileged provided such statements relate to that proceeding").
Order denying leave to file complaint affirmed.