See Branch v. Chamisa Dev. Corp., 2009-NMCA-131, ¶ 41, 223 P.3d 942, 951; Hydro Res. Corp. v. Gray, 2007-NMSC-061, ¶ 41, 173 P.3d 749, 760. The Energen Defendants stated that no New Mexico cases directly address fiduciary duties relating to JOAs, but cited three cases which, though mentioning fiduciary relationships, are not applicable under the circumstances of this case: Jack v. Hunt, 1966-NMSC-015, ¶¶ 11, 17, 410 P.2d 403, 407, 409; Kutz Canon Oil & Gas Co. v. Harr, 1952-NMSC-035, ¶ 46, 244 P.2d 522, 537; Skaggs v. Conoco, Inc., 1998-NMCA-061, ¶ 17, 957 P.2d 526, 530. [Doc. 197, p. 9] Seizing on these citations, the Gilbreath Defendants' response cites them—without attempt at argument they are relevant or applicable—with a one-sentence observation: "Several New Mexico cases state that fiduciary relationships are created, may be created, or are not extinguished in oil and gas agreements." [Doc. 229, pp. 4-5, ¶ 3]
In this case, we will not interpret Section 14–9–2 to stand for the proposition that the Wilsons were “bound to search the record,” Allen, 2005–NMCA–115, ¶ 34, 138 N.M. 318, 119 P.3d 743, after they sold the property subject to an oil and gas reservation, such that they should be held to have had constructive notice of Miller's quiet title action as a result of the recording of a quiet title judgment and later leasehold transactions in the San Juan County records. {47} Defendants argue further that Skaggs v. Conoco, Inc., 1998–NMCA–061, 125 N.M. 97, 957 P.2d 526, and Farrar v. Hood, 1952–NMSC–095, 56 N.M. 724, 249 P.2d 759, support the application of the doctrine of laches to the circumstances here. In Skaggs, in 1994 the plaintiffs sought to declare void a 1927 drilling and operating agreement between Mr. Skaggs (the decedent) and the prospecting company, Marland Oil Company of Colorado, permitting Marland to explore, drill, develop, produce, and market any oil and gas on the at-issue property.
In this case, we will not interpret Section 14–9–2 to stand for the proposition that the Wilsons were “bound to search the record,” Allen, 2005–NMCA–115, ¶ 34, 138 N.M. 318, 119 P.3d 743, after they sold the property subject to an oil and gas reservation, such that they should be held to have had constructive notice of Miller's quiet title action as a result of the recording of a quiet title judgment and later leasehold transactions in the San Juan County records. {47} Defendants argue further that Skaggs v. Conoco, Inc., 1998–NMCA–061, 125 N.M. 97, 957 P.2d 526, and Farrar v. Hood, 1952–NMSC–095, 56 N.M. 724, 249 P.2d 759, support the application of the doctrine of laches to the circumstances here. In Skaggs, in 1994 the plaintiffs sought to declare void a 1927 drilling and operating agreement between Mr. Skaggs (the decedent) and the prospecting company, Marland Oil Company of Colorado, permitting Marland to explore, drill, develop, produce, and market any oil and gas on the at-issue property.
S.F. Pac. Gold Corp, 143 N.M. 215, 226 (citing Lyons, 2000-NMCA-077, ¶¶ 21-22, 129 N.M. 487, 10 P.3d 166. (quoting Rhone-Poulenc, 32 F.3d at 863). Citing Lyons, 2000-NMCA-077, ¶ 23, 129 N.M. 487, 10 P.3d 166; Rule 11-511 (stating that the holder of the privilege waives the privilege by voluntarily disclosing or consenting "to disclosure of any significant part of the matter or communication," unless the disclosure itself is a privileged communication); Gingrich v. Sandia Corp., 2007-NMCA-101, ¶¶ 12-20, 142 N.M. 359, 165 P.3d 1135 (affirming the district court's ruling that a defendant waived attorney-client privilege when that defendant made " 'direct or offensive' " use of an attorney's report), cert. denied, 2007-NMCERT-007, 142 N.M. 330, 165 P.3d 327; Skaggs v. Conoco, Inc., 1998-NMCA-061, ¶ 21, 125 N.M. 97, 957 P.2d 526 (stating that the defendants did not waive their privilege because there was no showing that they relied on the documents to prove their defense). The New Mexico Court of Appeals construes the Rhone-Poulenc approach to waiver to include finding waiver "where direct use [of the privileged materials] is anticipated because the holder of the privilege must use the materials at some point in order to prevail."
Utah’s jurisprudence is consistent with that of other jurisdictions. See, e.g. , Villa Park Village v. Strickland , 60 Ill.App.3d 406, 17 Ill.Dec. 718, 376 N.E.2d 1047, 1048–49 (1978) (listing prior cases in which Illinois courts applied laches to bar quiet title actions); Knight v. Northpointe Bank , 300 Mich.App. 109, 832 N.W.2d 439, 444–45 (2013) (holding that laches barred the plaintiff from challenging whether the defendant, who had power of attorney for the original property owner, validly transferred land to herself); Johnson v. Estate of Shelton , 232 Mont. 85, 754 P.2d 828, 831 (1988) (holding that defendant’s counterclaim to nullify the exchange of quitclaim deeds was barred by laches); Skaggs v. Conoco, Inc. , 1998-NMCA-061, ¶ 13, 125 N.M. 97, 957 P.2d 526 (holding that laches barred plaintiff’s suit to quiet title to mineral leasehold); Robinson v. Estate of Harris , 391 S.C. 114, 705 S.E.2d 41, 44 (2011) (holding that laches barred plaintiffs’ quiet title action where plaintiffs waited 60 years to challenge grantor’s conveyance by deed). ¶17 We disagree.
{7} "Laches will lie when, in addition to other factors, there has been an unexplainable delay of such duration in asserting a claim as to render enforcement of such claim inequitable." Skaggs v. Conoco, Inc., 1998-NMCA-061, ¶ 14, 125 N.M. 97, 957 P.2d 526. The analysis of laches is case-specific.
In this case, we will not interpret Section 14-9-2 to stand for the proposition that the Wilsons were "bound to search the record," Allen, 2005-NMCA-115, ¶ 34, after they sold the property subject to an oil and gas reservation, such that they should be held to have had constructive notice of Miller's quiet title action as a result of the recording of a quiet title judgment and later leasehold transactions in the San Juan County records. {46} Defendants argue further that Skaggs v. Conoco, Inc., 1998-NMCA-061, 125 N.M. 97, 957 P.2d 526, and Farrar v. Hood, 1952-NMSC-095, 56 N.M. 724, 249 P.2d 759, support the application of the doctrine of laches to the circumstances here. In Skaggs, in 1994 the plaintiffs sought to declare void a 1927 drilling and operating agreement between Mr. Skaggs (the decedent) and the prospecting company, Marland Oil Company of Colorado, permitting Marland to explore, drill, develop, produce, and market any oil and gas on the at-issue property.
{31} To support a finding of waiver, New Mexico requires an offensive or direct use of privileged materials. Lyons, 2000-NMCA-077, ¶ 23, 129 N.M. 487, 10 P.3d 166; see also Rule 11-511 (stating that the holder of the privilege waives the privilege by voluntarily disclosing or consenting "to disclosure of any significant part of the matter or communication," unless the disclosure itself is a privileged communication); Gingrich v. Sandia Corp., 2007-NMCA-101, ¶¶ 12-20, 142 N.M. 359, 165 P.3d 1135 (affirming the district court's ruling that a defendant waived attorney-client privilege when that defendant made "`direct or offensive'" use of an attorney's report), cert. denied, 2007-NMCERT-007, 142 N.M. 330, 165 P.3d 327; Skaggs v. Conoco, Inc., 1998-NMCA-061, ¶ 21, 125 N.M. 97, 957 P.2d 526 (stating that the defendants did not waive their privilege because there was no showing that they relied on the documents to prove their defense). In Lyons, this Court adopted the approach to waiver that was put forth in Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Inc. v. Home Indemnity Co., 32 F.3d 851, 864 (3d Cir. 1994).
{35} "Laches will lie when, in addition to other factors, there has been an unexplainable delay of such duration in asserting a claim as to render enforcement of such claim inequitable." Skaggs v. Conoco, Inc., 1998-NMCA-061, ¶ 14, 125 N.M. 97, 957 P.2d 526. The elements of laches are: (1) conduct on the part of another which forms the basis for the litigation in question; (2) delay in the assertion of the complaining party's rights; (3) lack of knowledge or notice on the part of the defendant that the complaining party would assert such rights; and (4) injury or prejudice to the defendant in the event relief is accorded to the complaining party or the suit is not barred.
"The decision to apply laches is left to the sound discretion of the trial court which we review only for an abuse of discretion." Skaggs v. Conoco, Inc., 1998-NMCA-061, ¶ 13, 125 N.M. 97, 957 P.2d 526. {33} Plaintiff presented evidence that he had been steadily pursuing this matter since 1993, and that the City was well aware of Plaintiff's position. Plaintiff and his labor union protested the promotional process in September 1993. Plaintiff filed a complaint with the Labor Board later that year, alerting the City that he intended to assert his rights in the matter.