"This prohibition ensures the finality of adoption judgments, thereby minimizing the potential for traumatic changes in the lives of adoptive parents and children long after their relationship has been formalized." Storm v. Mullins, 199 S.W.3d 156, 161 (Ky. 2006); see also S.J.L.S. v. T.L.S., 265 S.W.3d 804, 829 (Ky. App. 2008) ("Even absent a statute, courts have been hesitant to upset an adoption decree for lack of requisite consent or such other procedural irregularity.")

They prohibited adoption of a same-sex partner’s biological or adopted child without terminating that partner’s parental rights. S.J.L.S. v. T.L.S. , 265 S.W.3d 804, 820 (Ky. App. 2008). And by the statutory creation of the de facto custodian, Kentucky courts lost the ability to apply the in loco parentis doctrine that might have allowed a same-sex partner the standing to seek custody or visitation with her non-biological child.

Because these proceedings were carried out in 'friendly suit' manner, without the presentation of a countervailing legal position, and without even the objective participation of the Cabinet, the parties lost all benefit of an otherwise adversarial system." S.J.L.S. v. T.L.S., 265 S.W.3d 804, 836 (Ky. App. 2008) (emphasis in original). Notwithstanding its facial deficiency, the Hamms' petition was never amended.

Under Kentucky law, the Cabinet’s participation pre-petition is unnecessary for an adoption by a step-parent. KRS 199.470(4)(a) (No approval of an adoption shall be necessary in the case of "[a] child sought to be adopted by a blood relative, including a relative of half-blood, first cousin, aunt, uncle, nephew, niece, and a person of a preceding generation as denoted by prefixes of grand, great, or great-great; [or] stepparent ....") (emphasis added); S.J.L.S. v. T.L.S. , 265 S.W.3d 804, 828 (Ky. App. 2008) (" KRS 199.470(4)(a) makes the Cabinet's pre-petition participation unnecessary in some circumstances[.]"). Since Step-mother was a named party to the amended petition, Cabinet involvement was unnecessary at that point in the case. SeeId.

Under Kentucky law, the Cabinet's participation pre-petition is unnecessary for an adoption by a step-parent. KRS 199.470(4)(a) (No approval of an adoption shall be necessary in the case of "[a] child sought to be adopted by a blood relative, including a relative of half-blood, first cousin, aunt, uncle, nephew, niece, and a person of a preceding generation as denoted by prefixes of grand, great, or great-great; [or] stepparent . . . .") (emphasis added); S.J.L.S. v. T.L.S., 265 S.W.3d 804, 828 (Ky. App. 2008) ("KRS 199.470(4)(a) makes the Cabinet's pre-petition participation unnecessary in some circumstances[.]"). Since Step-mother was a named party to the amended petition, Cabinet involvement was unnecessary at that point in the case.

It is well established in Kentucky law that any order issued by a court that did not have proper jurisdiction is "void ab initio . . . is not entitled to any respect or deference by the courts." S.J.L.S. v. T.L.S., 265 S.W.3d 804, 833 (Ky. App. 2008) (internal citations omitted). Moreover, the Jefferson Family Court order is considered "a legal nullity, and a court has no discretion in determining whether it should be set aside."

Under Kentucky law, courts may hold contracts or contractual provisions void and unenforceable if they violate public policy. Wehr Constructors, Inc. v. Assurance Co. of Am., 384 S.W.3d 680, 688 (Ky. 2012); see also S.J.L.S. v. T.L.S., 265 S.W.3d 804, 821 (Ky. 2008) (collecting cases). The legislature is chiefly responsible for establishing public policy, but in the absence of a legislative decree the courts may also adopt and apply public policy principles.

It is clear that any agreement that would require FAHE to violate the law could not be enforced. "Agreements that run contrary to law, or are designed to avoid the effect of a statute, are illegal." S.J.L.S. v. T.L.S., 265 S.W.3d 804, 821 (Ky. App. 2008). Thus, to the extent that any law requires that FAHE conduct environmental or Hazardous Material testing or sampling or that FAHE permit such testing or sampling to be done by another party, the contract could not prohibit FAHE from doing so.

Kentucky also follows the doctrine of expressio unius est exclusio alterius. S.J.L.S. v. T.L.S., 265 S.W.3d 804, 826 (Ky.App. 2008). Thus, in Kentucky, "[i]t is a primary rule of statutory construction that the enumeration of particular things excludes the idea of something else not mentioned."

Law trumps equity. See S.J.L.S. v. T.L.S., 265 S.W.3d 804, 820 (Ky.App.2008) (“It is well settled that equitable considerations and estoppel cannot be permitted to prevail when in conflict with positive written law.” (quoting Louisiana State Troopers Ass'n., Inc. v. Louisiana State Police Retirement Bd., 417 So.2d 440, 445 (La.Ct.App.1982))).