Opinion
No. CV02 039 83 42 S
May 11, 2004
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (MOTION 108)
The plaintiff was once employed as a printing press operator at the defendant Connecticut Post. According the allegations of the instant complaint, on May 2, 2000 he sustained a work-related injury as a result of which his forefinger, middle finger and ring finger were amputated. On May 20, 2001 the defendant terminated the plaintiff.
In his complaint the plaintiff alleges that the defendants terminated him in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C § 12101 et seq. He further alleges that the defendants discriminated against him in violation of General Statutes § 46a-60(a)(1). The plaintiff also seeks punitive damages for the willful and wanton violation of § 46a-60(a)(1).
42 U.S.C. § 12112, states, in pertinent part, "[n]o covered entity shall discriminate against a qualified individual with a disability because of the disability of such individual in regard to job application procedures, the hiring, advancement, or discharge of employees, employee compensation, job training, and other terms, conditions, and privileges of employment."
Connecticut General Statutes § 46a-60(a) states, in pertinent part, "[i]t shall be a discriminatory practice in violation of this section: (1) For an employer, by the employer or the employer's agent, except in the case of a bona fide occupational qualification or need, to refuse to hire or employ or to bar or to discharge from employment any individual or to discriminate against such individual in compensation or in terms, conditions or privileges of employment because of the individual's race, color, religious creed, age, sex, marital status, national origin, ancestry, present or past history of mental disability, mental retardation, learning disability or physical disability . . ."
The defendants have filed a Motion for Summary Judgment. The basis for the motion is that "the plaintiff does not have the elements of a prima facie case of discrimination." They argue that the plaintiff was not discharged, but, rather, his position was eliminated during a reduction in force. They further contend they had no obligation to create a new position for the plaintiff nor were they obligated to preserve the plaintiff's job beyond the time required under family and medical leave laws. The defendants finally suggest that an employer may discharge employees with workplace injuries if the employee can no longer perform requisite duties.
Practice Book § 17-49 provides that summary judgment shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, affidavits and any other proof submitted show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Although the party seeking summary judgment has the burden of showing the nonexistence of any material fact, a party opposing summary judgment must substantiate its adverse claim by showing that there is a genuine issue of material fact, together with the evidence disclosing the existence of such an issue. Practice Book §§ 17-45, 17-46; Burns v. Hartford Hospital, 192 Conn. 451, 455, 472 A.2d 1257 (1984). In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the trial court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Strada v. Connecticut Newspapers, Inc., 193 Conn. 313, 317, 477 A.2d 1005 (1984). Summary judgment is "designed to eliminate the delay and expense of litigating an issue where there is no real issue to be tried." Wilson v. City of New Haven, 213 Conn. 277, 279, 567 A.2d 829 (1989).
"Summary judgment is inappropriate where the inferences that the parties seek to have drawn deal with questions of motive, intent and subjective feelings and reactions." Tryon v. North Branford, 58 Conn. App. 702, 707, 755 A.2d 317 (2000). "A question of intent raises an issue of material fact, which cannot be decided on a motion for summary judgment." Picataggio v. Romeo, 36 Conn. App. 791, 794, 654 A.2d 382 (1995). "[E]ven with respect to questions of motive, intent and good faith [however], the party opposing summary judgment must present a factual predicate for [her] argument in order to raise a genuine issue of material fact." Wadia Enterprises, Inc. v. Hirschfeld, 224 Conn. 240, 250, 618 A.2d 506 (1992).
"In McDonnell Douglas Corporation v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973), the United States Supreme Court set forth the basic allocation of burdens and order of presentation of proof in cases involving claims of employment discrimination. The plaintiff bears the initial burden of proving by the preponderance of the evidence a prima facie case of discrimination . . . In order to meet this burden, the plaintiff must present evidence that gives rise to an inference of unlawful discrimination." Diaz v. Housing Authority, 258 Conn. 724, 730, 785 A.2d 192 (2001) (citations omitted). "To establish a prima facie case of discrimination under § 31-290a, the plaintiff must show that [he] was exercising a right afforded [him] under the act and that the defendant discriminated against [him] for exercising that right." Diaz, 258 Conn. at 731. "The level of proof required to establish a prima facie case is minimal and need not reach the level required to support a jury verdict in the plaintiff's favor." Craine v. Trinity College, 259 Conn. 625, 638, 791 A.2d 518 (2002).
The plaintiff in the present action has established a prima facie case of disability discrimination. The inquiry concerning the reduction in work force "is highly fact specific . . . and [the] plaintiffs must demonstrate not that they were qualified for the eliminated jobs but rather for other existing jobs." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Windham v. Time Warner, Inc., 275 F.3d 179, 187 (2d Cir. 2001). The plaintiff's affidavit raises this inference.
Since the plaintiff has established a prima facie case of disability discrimination, the burden shifts to the defendants to proffer a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for its actions, though the introduction of admissible evidence. The burden of persuasion then shifts to the plaintiff who must establish that the employer's proffered reason is a pretext for discrimination. Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 256 (1981). This may be shown directly, by demonstrating that discrimination more likely motivated the employer's action, or indirectly, by showing that the employer's proffered reason is untrustworthy. Id. "A trial court must be cautious about granting summary judgment to an employer when . . . intent is at issue." Gallo v. Prudential Residential Services, 22 F.3d 1219, 1224 (2d Cir. 1994).
In the present case there is sufficient evidence to give rise to an inference of unlawful discrimination. "A party has the same right to submit a weak case as he has to submit a strong one." (Citations omitted.) Thomas v. West Haven, 249 Conn. 385, 392, 734 A.2d 535 (1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1187 (2000).
Accordingly, the defendants' motion for summary judgment must be denied.
DEWEY, J.