Opinion
No. 07-10-0039-CV
February 1, 2011. DO NOT PUBLISH.
Appealed from the 181st District Court of Randall County; No. 60,312-B; Honorable John B. Board, Judge.
Before QUINN, C.J., HANCOCK and PIRTLE, JJ.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Appellant, Six Thousand Ninety Five Dollars and Eighty-Five Cents U.S. Currency ($6,095.85) (James Ortiz) ("Ortiz"), appeals the trial court's order granting summary judgment in the State's favor in a proceeding seeking forfeiture of $6,095.85, pursuant to Chapter 59 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. In two points of error, Ortiz asserts the State's evidence in support of its motion for summary judgment was (1) legally and (2) factually insufficient. Because we lack subject matter jurisdiction, we dismiss this appeal.
For convenience, Chapter 59 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure will be cited throughout the remainder of this opinion as "Chapter 59," and provisions of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure will be cited as "article _______" or "art. _______." See art. 59.01-.14 (West 2006 and West Supp. 2010).
"When a court lacks jurisdiction, its only legitimate choice is to dismiss." In re John G., 315 S.W.3d 519, 522 (Tex. 2010) (quoting State v. Morales, 869 S.W.2d 941, 949 (Tex. 1994)).
Subject Matter Jurisdiction — Standing
A threshold question in any case is whether the court has subject matter jurisdiction over the pending controversy. Texas Ass'n of Business v. Texas Air Control Bd., 852 S.W.2d 440, 443-44 (Tex. 1993). Standing is a constitutional prerequisite to maintaining any suit; South Texas Water Authority v. Lomas, 223 S.W.3d 304, 307 (Tex. 2007), without which a court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to hear a case. Austin Nursing Center, Inc. v. Lovato, 171 S.W.3d 845, 849 (Tex. 2005); Potter County Attorney's Office v. Stars Stripes Sweepstakes, L.L.C., 121 S.W.3d 460, 467 (Tex.App.-Amarillo 2003, no pet.). Standing must exist at every stage of the legal proceedings, including appeal; Williams v. Lara, 52 S.W.3d 171, 184 (Tex. 2001), and may be raised by the court sua sponte for the first time on appeal. Univ. of Texas Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Loutzenhiser, 140 S.W.3d 351, 358 (Tex. 2004). Whether a court has subject matter jurisdiction is a question of law that we review de novo. First National Bank v. Fernandez, 315 S.W.3d 494, 502 (Tex. 2010).
The standing requirement, implicit in the open courts provision of the Texas Constitution, Tex. Const. art. I, § 13 ("All courts shall be open, and every person for an injury done to him, in his lands, goods, person or reputation, shall have a remedy by due course of law."), contemplates access to the courts only for those litigants suffering actual injury. The M.D. Anderson Cancer Center v. Novak, 52 S.W.3d 704, 708 (Tex. 2001).
Chapter 59 authorizes the State to pursue forfeiture of funds that constitute proceeds from illegal drug trafficking. See art. 59.01-.14. A forfeiture proceeding under Chapter 59 is a civil en rem proceeding governed by the procedural rules applicable to civil trials and appeals generally. State v. Silver Chevrolet Pickup, 140 S.W.3d 691, 692 (Tex. 2004) (per curiam). See art. 59.05(a), (b). In the statutory scheme, property, including currency, is subject to seizure and forfeiture if it is found to be contraband. Art. 59.02(a). Contraband is property used or intended to be used in the commission of certain felonies, or proceeds derived from those felonies. Art. 59.01(2)(A)-(D). See Silver Chevrolet Pickup, 140 S.W.3d at 692.
"Standing focuses on the question who may bring an action." Patterson v. Planned Parenthood, 971 S.W.2d 439, 442 (Tex. 1992). Although a person need only be in possession of the property at the time it was seized to be made a party to the forfeiture proceeding; art. 59.04(j), only property "owners" or "interest holders" are permitted to challenge the forfeiture of property to the State. Art. 59.02(h)(1). A person must also be either an "owner" or "interest holder" of the forfeited property to have standing to challenge the forfeiture on appeal. See $27,920.00 v. State, 37 S.W.3d 533, 538 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 2000, pet. denied); $17,329.00 v. State, 880 S.W.2d 788, 789 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1993, no writ).
For purposes of Chapter 59, an "owner" is "a person who claims an equitable or legal ownership interest in property"; art. 59.01(6), and an "interest holder" is a "bona fide holder of perfected lien or a perfected security interest in the property. Art. 59.01(4).
Chapter 59 states, in pertinent part, as follows:
(h)(1) An owner or interest holder's interest in property may not be forfeited under this chapter if at the forfeiture hearing the owner or interest holder proves by a preponderance of the evidence that the owner or interest holder was not a party to the offense giving rise to the forfeiture and that the contraband;
(A) was stolen from the owner or interest holder before being used in the commission of the offense giving rise to the forfeiture;
(B) was purchased with:
(i) money stolen from the owner or interest holder; or
(ii) proceeds from the sale of property stolen from the owner or interest holder; or
(C) was used or intended to be used without the effective consent of the owner or interest holder in the commission of the offense giving rise to the forfeiture.
Throughout the proceedings below, Ortiz consistently maintained that his mother owns the cash at issue. In his motion for summary judgment and motion for a new trial filed with the trial court, he stated the money belongs to his mother. On appeal, he continues to aver in his brief and an attached statement that the money belongs to his mother. Having asserted no property interest, ownership or otherwise, in the money at issue, Ortiz lacks standing to appeal its forfeiture to the State. See $27,920.00, 37 S.W.3d at 538; $17,329.00, 880 S.W.2d at 789.
Conclusion
Lacking subject matter jurisdiction of Ortiz's claim, we dismiss this appeal.