Opinion
Civil Action No. 1:01-CV-065-C.
April 11, 2002
ORDER
On this date the Court considered Defendent Hertz Rent-a-Car's ("Defendant Hertz") Motion for Summary Judgment filed March 15, 2002. Neither James Sivis and Fonda Sivis, Brenda Smith and Beverly Watson, as Next Friend of Matthew Setters, a Minor ("Plaintiffs"), Lupe Mejia, Individually and as Representative of the Estate of Adolpho Mejia, Deceased ("Defendant Lupe Mejia"), nor The Estate of Adolpho Mejia, Deceased filed a Response to Defendant Hertz' Motion for Summary Judgment. After considering all the relevant arguments and evidence, the Court GRANTS Defendant Hertz' Motion for Summary Judgment.
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
On July 8, 1999, Adolfo Mejia rented a 1999 Toyota Camry from Defendant Hertz Rent-a-Car at its Dallas Fort Worth Airport location. Adolfo Mejia represented to Defendant Hertz that he was an employee of GTE and authorized to receive benefits extended to GTE employees under "Agreement for Rental Vehicle Services Between GTE Communication Systems Corporation and Sprint/United Management Company and the Hertz Corporation (hereinafter "Service Contract"). The rental of the 1999 Toyota Camry was subject to the terms of the Hertz Rental Agreement and the Service Contract. On July 11, 1999, an accident occurred involving Plaintiffs while Defendant Lupe Mejia was operating the 1999 Toyota Camry.
On January 26, 2001, Plaintiffs filed a petition in the 32nd District Court in Nolan County Texas. Plaintiffs' petition alleges that Defendant Lupe Mejia was negligent and that Defendant Hertz was negligent in allowing Defendant Lupe Mejia to operate the vehicle and for allowing Adolfo Mejia to lease the vehicle. On April 20, 2001, Defendants fried a Notice of Removal. On May 21, 2001, Plaintiffs filed a Motion to Remand, which was denied by this Court in an Order dated August 3, 2001. On January 15, 2002, the Court granted Plaintiffs' and Defendant Hertz' Stipulation of Dismissal of Plaintiffs' Claims against Defendant Hertz.
II. STANDARD
Summary judgment is appropriate only if "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any," when viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, "show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247 (1986). A dispute about a material fact is "genuine" if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving party. Id. In making its determination, the court must draw all justifiable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party. Id. at 255. Once the moving party has initially shown "that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case," Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986), the non-movant must come forward, after adequate time for discovery, with significant probative evidence showing a triable issue of fact. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(e); State Farm Life Ins. Co. v. Gutterman, 396 F.2d 116, 118 (5th Cir. 1990). Conclusory allegations and denials, speculation, improbable inferences, unsubstantiated assertions, and legalistic argumentation are not adequate substitutes for specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Douglass v. United Servs. Auto, Ass'n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1428 (5th Cir. 1996) (en banc); SEXY v. Recile, 10 F.3d 1093, 1097 (5th Cir. 1993). To defeat a properly supported motion for summary judgment, the non-movant must present more than a mere scintilla of evidence. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 251. Rather, the non-movant must present sufficient evidence upon which a jury could reasonably find in the non-movant's favor. Id.
III. DISCUSSION
Negligent Entrustment Claim
Defendant Hertz requests this Court to grant summary judgment on Plaintiffs' claim of negligent entrustment against Defendant Hertz. Pursuant to the Court's Order dated January 15, 2002, granting Plaintiffs' and Defendant Hertz' Stipulation of Dismissal dismissing Plaintiffs' claims against Defendant Hertz, Defendant Hertz' request for summary judgment is moot as to this claim because this claim has been dismissed.
Duty to Provide a Defense or Indemnify
Defendant Hertz claims that it is entitled to summary judgment regarding its counterclaim and cross-claims for declaratory judgment Defendant Hertz claims that it is not obligated to provide a defense for or to indemnify anyone other than "authorized operators." Defendant Hertz claims that Defendant Lupe Mejia was not an "authorized operator."
When Adolpho Mejia rented the 1999 Toyota Camry from Hertz, he represented to Hertz that he was authorized to receive benefits extended to employees of GTE under CDP number 216544, otherwise known as the Service Contract. The rental was subject to the Hertz Rental Agreement and the Service Contract The Rental Agreement provides as follows:
Liability Protection
Paragraph (a) applies if the provisions of your CDP number or rate plan includes [sic] the extension by Hertz of Liability protection.
(a) Within the limits stated in this paragraph, Hertz will indemnify, hold harmless and defend you and any Authorized Operators from and against liability to Third parties which by definition excludes any of your or any authorized operator's family members related by blood, marriage or adoption residing with you or them.
The Service Contract provides as follows:
VI. Insurance and Indemnification
A. Liability Protection
1. Notwithstanding any lesser amounts specified as the limits of protection, if any, or contrary terms of protection under "Liability Protection" in any Rental Agreement pertaining to any rental from Hertz under the Agreement, and the Company's CDPID (Corporate Identification Number) number is noted on the rental agreement ("Rental Agreement"), and the liability claim does not arise out of any prohibited use under the Rental Agreement, Hertz will provide primary protection subject to and in accordance with the provisions of the Rental Agreement in effect at the time and place of rental for such rental, for bodily injury or death. . . .
2. Within the limits stated above, Hertz will indemnify, hold harmless, and defend Company employee renters ("Renter") and fellow employees who operate the car incidental to their business duties from and against liability to third parties, excluding any Renter's or any Authorized Operator's family members related by blood, marriage or adoption residing with Renter or them for bodily injury, including death and property damage. . . .
4. The Renter shall have the right to allow any duly licensed driver who otherwise meets Hertz' applicable rental qualifications in effect at the time and place of rental, who is a business associate, customer, or supplier with whom the Renter may have business dealings on behalf of the Company, to use the rented car during the course of a rental that is in whole or in part for the business purposes of Company, even though such person is not an employee of Company and has not signed the Rental Agreement Any such person granted such permission shall be deemed an Authorized Operator under the terms of the Rental Agreement but shall only be entitled to the benefit of all liability and property damage protection provided under the Rental Agreement, if any, and not to the protection specified in subparagraph 1, above.
The Hertz Rental Agreement defines "authorized operators" as follows:
2. Who May Operate the Car
Only You and, if allowed under Your Hertz CDP rate code and with Your permission, Your employer, and fellow employees incidental to their business duties are authorized to operate the Car ("Authorized Operator(s)"). Except to the extent necessary for valet parking or in an emergency as permitted by law, no other persons are permitted to operate the Car unless all such persons meet Hertz' qualifications and sign an Additional Authorized Operator form at the time of rental. All Authorized Operators must be at least 25 years old and have a valid driver's license from a jurisdiction acceptable to Hertz At Hertz' discretion, other qualifications may be in effect at the time and place of rental. . . .
After examining the relevant evidence, it is clear that Defendant Lupe Mejia was not an "authorized operator" under the Hertz Rental Agreement. Moreover, no evidence was presented that Lupe Mejia otherwise met the Hertz applicable rental qualifications or was a business associate, customer, or supplier with whom Adolpho Mejia had any business dealings on behalf of GTE. As such, Hertz has no duty to provide liability protection for Defendant Lupe Mejia's acts and cannot be liable to indemnify. Defendant Hertz' Motion for Summary Judgment on this claim is GRANTED.
Defendant Hertz also claims that it has no liability for the acts of Adolpho Mejia. Under the terms of the Rental Agreement and the Service Contract, Adolpho Mejia was entitled to liability protection. However, to be entitled to the liability protection, Adolpho Mejia had to act within the terms of the contracts. Specifically, the Rental Agreement provided:
5. Prohibited Uses of the Car
Any use of the car as prohibited below will breach this agreement . . . to the extent permitted by law, LDW, PAI, and PEC, LIS and all liability protection under this agreement will also be void. Under this agreement You and/or any authorized operator may not:
(a) Permit the use of the car by anyone other than an authorized operator.
As previously noted above, the Service Contract also provides indemnification and protection so long as the "claim does not arise out of any prohibited use under the Rental Agreement."
It is clear that the liability claim in this case arose out of an unauthorized operator operating the 1999 Toyota Camry. Adolpho Mejia had no authority to allow an unauthorized operator such as Defendant Lupe Mejia operate the 1999 Toyota Camry. Accordingly, Defendant Hertz has no duty to defend or indemnify the Estate of Adolpho Mejia for liability resulting from his acts. Defendant Hertz' Motion for Summary Judgment on this claim is GRANTED.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons previously discussed, Defendant Hertz' Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED.
SO ORDERED.