Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
San Francisco City & County Super. Ct. No. CGC-05-444060
Jenkins, J.
Plaintiff and appellant Yee Keung Siu (Siu) appeals the trial court’s order awarding attorney fees and costs to defendants and respondents, Pius Lee, et al. (Lee). Lee incurred the attorney fees in connection with his special motion to strike under Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16 (hereafter section 425.16), otherwise known as an anti-SLAPP motion. We affirm.
“SLAPP is an acronym for ‘strategic lawsuit against public participation.’ ” (Jarrow Formulas, Inc. v. LaMarche (2003) 31 Cal.4th 728, 732, fn. 1.)
Background
In Siu v. Lee (Oct. 11, 2007, A116191) [nonpub. opn.] (Siu I), Lee appealed the trial court’s denial in part of his special motion to strike Siu’s complaint. In Siu I, we observed that “the genesis of this suit lies in the operations of the Chinese Economic Development Group (CEDG)[,] . . . a nonprofit corporation active in San Francisco’s Chinatown affairs and established to help revitalize the Chinatown economy after the effects of the 1989 Loma Prieta earthquake.” (Siu I, supra, at *1.) We noted that according to the allegations in the operative complaint: “Siu was a member of the Board of Directors of the CEDG and held the position of Vice President from April 2001 until around July 15, 2004. On July 15, 2004, Siu endorsed a check on a CEDG bank account to ‘cash’ in the amount of $140,000. The check was signed by both Siu and Chark Lui, the co-Vice President of the Board. The $140,000 was converted into a cashier’s check for disbursement to another nonprofit corporation, the Chinatown Community Development Center (CCDC) for CCDC’s expenditures on a variety of neighborhood projects. . . . Siu alleges he endorsed the check with the approval of the Board and in accordance with a previously executed contract between CEDG and CCDC. On or around August 9, 2004, shortly after Sui’s [sic] endorsement of the $140,000 check, Lee became the Chairman of the Board of Directors of CEDG and his c[od]efendant William ‘Bill’ Lee became a member of the Board.” (Id. at *2)
Siu also alleged Lee made various statements in the Chinatown press to the effect that Siu’s endorsement of the $140,000 check was an unauthorized and illegal act. (Siu I, supra, at *2.) Siu further alleged that “ ‘[d]efendants or their agents provided to the press and thereby caused to be published on or about August 22, 2004 in the Ming Pao Newspaper an image of a bank signature card bearing Plaintiff’s signature specimen, his date of birth, and his mother’s maiden name, as well as an image of the $140,000 check made drawn on a CEDG account at United Commercial Bank [(Bank)] made out to cash with Plaintiff’s signature specimen.’ ” (Id. at *3.)
“Based on these allegations . . . the [complaint] stated twelve causes of action: 1. libel; 2. libel per se; 3. slander; 4. slander per se; 5. invasion of privacy (false light); 6. invasion of privacy (public disclosure of private facts); 7. violation of constitutional right to privacy; 8. negligence; 9. negligent infliction of emotional distress; 10. intentional infliction of emotional distress; 11. negligent violation of statutory duty; and 12. injunctive relief. [¶] . . . The trial court granted in part and denied in part Lee’s special motion to strike. The court struck causes of action 1-4, and denied the special motion with respect to causes of action 5-12.” (Siu I, supra, at *4.)
We affirmed in part and reversed in part. Specifically, we held: “The trial court’s order granting in part and denying in part . . . Lee’s special motion to strike is affirmed with respect to striking the First, Second, Third and Fourth Causes of Action, and is affirmed with respect to denying the special motion to strike the Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh Causes of Action. [¶] The trial court’s order is reversed with respect to the Fifth and Twelfth Causes of Action. The trial court erred by failing to grant Lee’s special motion to strike with respect to the Fifth Cause of Action (Invasion of Privacy—False Light) and Twelfth Cause of Action (Injunctive Relief). These causes of action should be stricken from the [complaint]. [¶] The case is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.” (Siu I, at *15.)
Following remand, Lee filed a motion for attorney fees on December 26, 2007. In his motion, Lee requested attorney fees totaling $183,700 and costs totaling $3,222.32. Lee argued an appropriate “lodestar” amount for attorney fees was $91,850. This amount reflected a total of 167 hours for all phases of the anti-SLAPP motion at $550 per hour. Lee also argued a fee enhancement was warranted due to the novelty and complexity of the issues involved in the anti-SLAPP motion, and requested that the court multiply the lodestar amount by two.
Siu filed an opposition to Lee’s motion for attorney fees on January 15, 2008. Siu argued that because Lee’s anti-SLAPP motion only succeeded in striking six of the twelve causes of action in the complaint, Lee should only receive half of his reasonable attorney fees. Siu also argued Lee should not recover fees on appeal, that the attorney hours claimed by Lee was excessive, that the hourly rate sought by Lee’s counsel was excessive, and that a multiplier was unwarranted.
On January 30, 2008, the trial court held a hearing and thereafter entered an order regarding Lee’s motion for attorney fees. The court’s order states: “Defendant Pius Lee’s Motion for Attorney’s Fees and Costs (C.C.P. Section 425.16(c)) is granted in part, awarding defendant [$54,275.00] in attorney’s fees. This award of attorney’s fees in calculated on the market rate of $325 an hour times 167 hours. Defendant Pius Lee is also awarded costs of [$3,182.32]. Defendant’s request for a multiplier is denied.” Siu filed a timely notice of appeal on March 27, 2008.
Discussion
A. Applicable Law
The anti-SLAPP statute’s fee provision states that “a prevailing defendant on a special motion to strike shall be entitled to recover his or her attorney’s fees and costs.” (§ 425.16, subd. (c), italics added.) Under this provision, “any SLAPP defendant who brings a successful motion to strike is entitled to mandatory attorney fees.” (Ketchum v. Moses (2001) 24 Cal.4th 1122, 1131.) “The determination whether a party prevailed on an anti-SLAPP motion lies within the broad discretion of a trial court. [Citation.] We review this determination on an abuse of discretion standard.” (Mann v. Quality Old Time Service, Inc. (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 328, 340 (Mann).)
For purposes of a fee award, a SLAPP defendant “need not succeed in striking every challenged claim to be considered a prevailing party within the meaning of section 425.16.” (Mann, supra, 139 Cal.App.4th at p. 339.) Nevertheless, where a SLAPP defendant “cannot in any realistic sense be said to have been successful, fees need not be awarded.” (Moran v. Endres (2006) 135 Cal.App.4th 952, 954, 956 [affirming trial court’s denial of attorney fees where “[d]efendants sought to dismiss the entire complaint, and instead obtained only the most illusory victory” by succeeding in striking only plaintiff’s cause of action for civil conspiracy which “added little or nothing to plaintiff’s case”].)
Where a defendant achieves mixed success in an anti-SLAPP motion, the defendant is “entitled to recover attorney fees and costs incurred in moving to strike the claims on which [he or she] prevailed, but not fees and costs incurred in moving to strike the remaining claims. The trial court may determine the appropriate amount of fees and costs, upon a proper application by defendants.” (ComputerXpress, Inc. v. Jackson (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 993, 1020.) In determining an appropriate amount of fees for partial success on an anti-SLAPP motion, “the court should first determine the lodestar amount for the hours expended on the successful claims, and, if the work on the successful and unsuccessful causes of action was overlapping, the court should then consider the defendant’s relative success on the motion in achieving his or her objective, and reduce the amount if appropriate. [¶] This analysis includes factors such as the extent to which the defendant’s litigation posture was advanced by the motion, whether the same factual allegations remain to be litigated, whether discovery and motion practice have been narrowed, and the extent to which future litigation expenses and strategy were impacted by the motion. The fees awarded to a defendant who was only partially successful on an anti-SLAPP motion should be commensurate with the extent to which the motion changed the nature and character of the lawsuit in a practical way. The court should also consider any other applicable relevant factors, such as the experience and abilities of the attorney and the novelty and difficulty of the issues, to adjust the lodestar amount as appropriate.” (Mann, supra, 139 Cal.App.4th at p. 345.)
B. Standard of Review
“We review an anti-SLAPP attorney fee award under the deferential abuse of discretion standard. [Citations.] The trial court’s fee determination ‘ “ ‘will not be disturbed unless the appellate court is convinced that it is clearly wrong.’ ” ’ [Citation.] An attorney fee dispute is not exempt from generally applicable appellate principles: ‘The judgment of the trial court is presumed correct; all intendments and presumptions are indulged to support the judgment; conflicts in the declarations must be resolved in favor of the prevailing party, and the trial court’s resolution of any factual disputes arising from the evidence is conclusive.’ ” (Christian Research Institute v. Alnor (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1315, 1322.) “The trial court is not required to issue a statement of decision.” (Id. at p. 1323.) “ ‘ “ ‘[W]hile the concept “abuse of discretion” is not easily susceptible to precise definition, the appropriate test has been enunciated in terms of whether or not the trial court exceeded “ ‘the bounds of reason, all of the circumstances before it being considered. . . .’ ” [Citations.]’ [Citation.] ‘A decision will not be reversed merely because reasonable people might disagree. “An appellate tribunal is neither authorized nor warranted in substituting its judgment for the judgment of the trial judge.” ’ ” ’ ” (Ibid.)
C. Analysis
Siu contends the trial court abused its discretion in applying these legal principles. Siu asserts that “partially prevailing defendants on a [section] 425.16 motion are not entitled to their full fees,” and that the trial court’s failure to reduce Lee’s attorney fees to reflect the partial success of his anti-SLAPP motion was an abuse of discretion. Siu’s contentions are unpersuasive.
Preliminarily, we note Siu concedes Lee is entitled to some measure of attorney fees. In other words, Siu does not contend the trial court abused its discretion by finding Lee is a “prevailing defendant” under section 425.16. Rather, Siu takes issue with the fee amount decided upon by the trial court and its method of arriving at that amount. Indeed, Siu asserts that what the trial court should have done is “reduce the hours sought in [Lee’s] fee motion by one half, which would be an accurate reflection of his proportionate success [on] the special motion to strike and on the subsequent appeal.” Even if we agreed with Siu’s approach, that would not compel reversal because we are not free to simply substitute our “judgment for the judgment of the trial judge.” (Christian Research Institute v. Alnor, supra, 165 Cal.App.4th at p. 1323.) Rather, reversal is warranted only if the trial court’s fee computation is beyond the bounds of reason. (Ibid.)
In this regard, it is true that despite Lee’s partial success the trial court did not reduce the 167 total attorney hours Lee claimed. However, the trial court did reduce the hourly fee claimed by Lee from $550 per hour to $325 per hour. This alone reduced the lodestar amount from $91,850 to $54,275. Additionally, the trial court denied Lee’s request for a multiplier of two to account for the novelty and complexity of the issues and the skill and experience of his counsel. Thus, the trial court reduced Lee’s claim for attorney fees from a total of $183,700 to an award of $54,275. In sum, the trial court’s fee award reduced the lodestar amount requested by about 41 percent and the total fee amount requested by about 70 percent.
If the trial court had halved the hours from 167 to 83.5, as suggested by Siu, but applied the hourly rate requested by Lee, then the fee award would have been $45,925.
The fee award reflects the trial court’s estimation of the extent to which Lee’s motion “changed the nature and character of the lawsuit” (Mann, supra, 139 Cal.App.4th at p. 345), in particular by eliminating the defamation causes of action directed at his right to free speech on a topic of legitimate public concern and narrowing the facts of the case to those concerning the alleged publication of private facts. (See Siu I, supra, at *7.) The fee award also reflects the trial court’s consideration of “other applicable relevant factors, such as the experience and abilities of the attorney and the novelty and difficulty of the issues” in deciding not to apply a multiplier to the lodestar amount. (Mann, supra, 139 Cal.App.4th at p. 345.) Accordingly, we cannot say the trial court exceeded the bounds of reason in its method of scaling down Lee’s claimed fee award to arrive at an amount reflecting his partial success in his special motion to strike. (Cf. Mann, supra, 139 Cal.App.4th at pp. 333, 345-346 [holding that the trial court abused its discretion by reducing attorney fees by only $7,000, and concluding defendants were entitled to recover $32,032.50 (50 percent of the claimed fees), where defendant succeeded in striking only one of four causes of action on an anti-SLAPP motion].)
Disposition
The trial court’s attorney fee order is affirmed. Siu shall bear costs on appeal.
We concur: McGuiness, P. J., Siggins, J.